People v. Baskin
| Decision Date | 29 September 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 40416,40416 |
| Citation | 230 N.E.2d 208,38 Ill.2d 141 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Hinda BASKIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
J. Edward Jones, Blue Island, for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and David B. Selig, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.
A complaint was filed in the first municipal district of the circuit court of Cook County, on May 12, 1966, charging the defendant, Hinda Baskin, with the crime of theft of property of the value of $5 from Walgreen Drug Company. On the same date the defendant demanded a trial by jury and posted a bond. On May 26, the date to which the cause had been continued, the defendant did not appear and an order was entered forfeiting the bond and a warrant was issued for her arrest. On June 8 the defendant appeared and filed a new bond and the previous bond forfeiture was set aside. The cause was set for trial on July 20. On that date the cause was continued until August 3 on motion of the defendant. It was thereafter continued twice by order of court and set for trial on October 6. On that date the representative from the drug store did not appear and the State requested that the cause be stricken with leave to reinstate. The defendant's counsel objected stating that the defendant demanded trial and wanted her name cleared. Over the objection of the defendant the court allowed the prosecutor's motion. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to vacate the order, claiming that the order striking the case with leave to reinstate over the objection of her counsel and her demand for jury trial violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the United States constitution and the constitution of the State of Illinois. The court denied the motion and defendant has appealed directly to this court. A substantial constitutional question is presented.
The defendant's claim is based principally upon Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1. In that case the defendant was indicated for the crime of criminal trespass. Trial commenced shortly after the indictment was returned but the jury was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared and the cause was continued. About a year later the prosecutor informed the defendnat that he intended to have a Nolle prosequi with leave entered. The effect of such an order under North Carolina law is to leave the indictment pending with implied consent for the prosecutor to reinstate it at any time for trial. The defendant opposed the entry of such an order and the prosecutor made a motion to continue the cause for another term, which motion was granted. At the next term the cause was not listed for trial on the calendar and the defendant filed a motion asking the court to inquire into the status of the charge to ascertain the intention of the State in regard to trial, and to have the charge permanently concluded as soon as was reasonably possible. When this motion was brought before the court the prosecutor moved for leave to take a Nolle prosequi with leave, and over defendant's objection the court granted the motion.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that a defendant had no right to compel the State to prosecute him if the prosecutor elected to take a Nolle prosequi but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. The court held that the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution was applicable to State court prosecutions and held that the State procedure violated that right. The court stated that the conclusion of the North Carolina Supreme Court that the right to a speedy trial does not afford affirmative protection against an unjustified postponement of trial for an accused discharged from custody had been explicitly rejected by every other State court which had considered the question. The defendant claims that the Klopfer case requires reversal of the judgment here on the ground that the order striking the indictment with leave to reinstate was identical with the practice condemned in Klopfer. We are unable to agree.
We do not read the opinion of the United States Supreme Court as a blanket condemnation of all State court procedures permitting the striking of an indictment with leave to reinstate. In that case trial had already been delayed for about 18 months over defendant's objection and the North Carolina practice permitted a stricken indictment to remain pending for an indefinite length of...
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People v. Sanders
...with leave to reinstate (SOL), the rule is that the statutory period continues to run after that disposition. (People v. Baskin (1967), 38 Ill.2d 141, 145, 230 N.E.2d 208; see People v. Griffin (1978), 58 Ill.App.3d 644, 646, 16 Ill.Dec. 256, 374 N.E.2d 1031; People v. Garcia; People v. Ton......
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People v. Woolsey
...or discuss whether or not the order to nol-pros with leave to reinstate was a final and appealable order. (See also People v. Baskin (1967), 38 Ill.2d 141, 230 N.E.2d 208 (court held that entry of an order striking the complaint with leave to reinstate at the same time that the defendant wa......
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People v. East-West University, Inc., EAST-WEST
...period because of an SOL assures that the State will not have the power to reinstate charges indefinitely. (See People v. Baskin (1967), 38 Ill.2d 141, 143, 230 N.E.2d 208 (speedy trial statute prevents a stricken charge from remaining pending for an indefinite period of time with the possi......
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People v. Love
...is on bail within 120 days from the date the defendant demands trial unless the delay is occasioned by the defendant. (People v. Baskin, 38 Ill.2d 141, 230 N.E.2d 208.) The State's failure so to afford trial will entitle the accused to be discharged. The operation of the statute typically w......