People v. Batchelor

• Decision Date: 17 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1-87-3618,1-87-3618
• Citation: 559 N.E.2d 948,202 Ill.App.3d 316
• Parties: , 147 Ill.Dec. 608 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randall BATCHELOR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 948

559 N.E.2d 948

202 Ill.App.3d 316, 147 Ill.Dec. 608

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randall BATCHELOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-87-3618.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Sixth Division.

Aug. 17, 1990.

Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Paul D. Bellendir, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Cecil A. Partee, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Sara Dillery Hynes, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice RAKOWSKI delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant Randall Batchelor was found guilty of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1)) and sentenced to a term of 35 years.

On appeal, he contends that: (1) the State racially discriminated during jury selection; (2) the court made rulings which denied defendant a fair trial by (A) limiting defendant's opening statements and cross-examination, (B) limiting defendant's impeachment efforts, and (C) allowing a photo of the dead victim to go to the jury; (3) the court improperly gave instructions on accountability; (4) the State made improper remarks in closing; (5) the court refused to send the jury additional instructions; and (6) the court improperly sentenced defendant to 35 years imprisonment. We affirm.

On February 16, 1986, Batchelor, his co-defendant Ricky Walls, and Tyrone Bufkin were walking in the vicinity of 101st and Luella in Chicago. A .38 caliber revolver was fired and Bufkin was killed.

The following facts are undisputed. One witness told police he had seen the three boys together shortly before the shooting and that Batchelor had a gun. Two other witnesses told police they had seen three people, had heard shots, and had seen two people flee. After the shooting, Walls and Batchelor went to the home of Charles Joseph. Both Joseph and his cousin William Johnson were present and later testified that Batchelor told them he had shot a boy. Batchelor left a gun at the Joseph home. Later the police recovered bullets from Bufkin's body which matched bullets from that gun.

Defendant was tried twice. At the first trial, the State introduced a confession by Batchelor, and the defense argued that the confession was the product of police coercion. That trial ended with a deadlocked jury and a mistrial.

At the beginning of the second trial, the judge told the jury that the indictment charged both Ricky Walls and Randall Batchelor with the murder of Tyrone Bufkin. He further explained that the defendants were being tried separately for legal reasons. Shortly afterward, the court granted the State's motion to exclude Ricky Walls from the courtroom.

Dr. Mitra Kalelkar, deputy medical examiner for Cook County, described the findings of her autopsy on Bufkin including the location of four entrance wounds and the identification of two bullets recovered from his body. She gave her expert opinion that Bufkin died of multiple gunshot wounds.

Batchelor testified in his own defense and stated that on the night of the killing he was walking Tyrone Bufkin home with co-defendant Ricky Walls lagging behind. When they reached the corner of 101st and Luella, Walls asked Bufkin why he had "flipped" (joined another gang). Bufkin replied that he hadn't and, besides, what did Walls plan to do about it. At that point, Batchelor testified, Walls pulled out a gun and started shooting. Batchelor fled with Walls to the home of Charles Joseph.

In the defense closing, counsel suggested that Ricky Walls was in command on the night of the killing and that witnesses Joseph and Johnson had been intimidated by Walls. Defense counsel also showed the jury a picture of Bufkin and argued that the wounds in the picture simply did not support the story of Batchelor shooting Bufkin in the back.

I.

Batchelor first alleges that the State discriminated by excluding three black jurors during four peremptory challenges. He contends that the State did not meet its burden of establishing race neutral reasons for excluding black jurors.

The State maintains that Batchelor waived this issue by failing to preserve an adequate record so that a reviewing court could determine whether discrimination occurred. People v. Mitchell (1987), 163 Ill.App.3d 58, 69, 114 Ill.Dec. 345, 516 N.E.2d 500.

We find Mitchell to be distinguishable from the instant case. In Mitchell, the defendant failed to preserve any record about the racial makeup of the venire except the fact that one or more blacks had been excluded from the selected jury. In this case, defendant failed to preserve the makeup of the original venire, his own six peremptory challenges and the final two selected jurors. He did, however, preserve the record for the ten jury members selected up to the point of his challenge and the four peremptory challenges made by the State. See, e.g., People v. Mays (1988), 176 Ill.App.3d 1027, 1045, 127 Ill.Dec. 14, 532 N.E.2d 843.

Furthermore, Illinois policy and law on waiver applies the plain-error rule "where the record clearly shows * * * an alleged error affecting substantial rights." (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 46, 131 Ill.Dec. 86, 538 N.E.2d 461; see also, 107 Ill.2d R. 615(a).) This rule serves the dual purposes of "correcting serious injustices" and preserving "the integrity and reputation of the judicial process." Young, 128 Ill.2d at 46, 131 Ill.Dec. 86, 538 N.E.2d 461.

We will review the Batson issue here because the right to an unbiased jury is so intimately related to justice and the integrity of the court system that we will not consider it waived simply because the defendant failed to preserve all relevant details for review.

In Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 82, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1714, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, the Supreme Court examined "the evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury."

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." (Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721 citing Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229, 239-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597.) To establish his prima facie case, the defendant: (1) must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) must demonstrate that the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to remove members of the group; (3) may rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice which permits discrimination by those "who are of a mind to discriminate;" and (4) must show "that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; see also People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill.2d 388, 412-13, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172.

The relevant circumstances for a prima facie showing of racial exclusion include but are not limited to: a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against blacks; the absence of any common traits among the excluded blacks except their race; and the race of the defendant, the victim, and the witnesses. (Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d at 413, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172.) Mere numbers do not establish the prima facie case. Nor does the fact that a trial court invited the State to give reasons for the questioned challenges. (Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d at 414, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172.) Furthermore, racial issues in jury selection are minimized when both the defendant and victims are black. People v. Holman (1989), 132 Ill.2d 128, 177, 138 Ill.Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124.

If a court has determined that the defendant failed to met his prima facie burden, this finding will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d at 413, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172, citing People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill.2d 50, 71, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360.

Once the defendant has met his prima facie burden, the burden shifts and the State must demonstrate that "permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result." (Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721, quoting Alexander v. Louisiana (1972), 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536.) The prosecutor must show more than an intuitive judgment that black jurors will favor black defendants. Even so, his explanations "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." (Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.) Instead, the prosecutor need only "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724.

The jury traits which may justify a peremptory challenge include but are not limited to: courtroom demeanor, employment status and type of job, connections with those who do criminal defense work, social relationships with judges and lawyers, age, status as renter or homeowner, and arrest record. (People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 240-43, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107.) The State's use of one of these traits to exclude blacks is not race neutral if the State retains white veniremen having that same trait, and there is no additional trait to distinguish the white veniremen who were retained from the black veniremen who were challenged. On the other hand, prosecutors usually challenge jurors because of a combination of traits, so that a trait which might justify exclusion of one juror might be acceptable in another who has a different combination of traits. Mack, 128 Ill.2d at 239, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107.

If a trial court has determined that the State met its burden in a Batson challenge, the...