People v. Bates
| Decision Date | 20 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 65057,65057 |
| Citation | 124 Ill.Dec. 407,124 Ill.2d 81,529 N.E.2d 227 |
| Parties | , 124 Ill.Dec. 407 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Frank BATES, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago (Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Kenneth T McCurry, James E. Fitzgerald, Nancy A. Donahoe, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellant.
Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Public Defender, Cook County, Chicago (Zaven Peter Tokatlian, Ronald P. Alwin, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee.
The State brings this appeal from a decision of the appellate court, which, by a Rule 23 order (107 Ill.2d R. 23), reversed the circuit court of Cook County's dismissal of the defendant's petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (). 152 Ill.App.3d 1163, 113 Ill.Dec. 907, 515 N.E.2d 1066 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Defendant was convicted of murder on December 13, 1972, and sentenced to 25 to 75 years' imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the appellate court (People v. Bates (1975), 25 Ill.App.3d 748, 324 N.E.2d 88), and this court denied leave to appeal.
At the time of the defendant's conviction, the post-conviction statute then in effect included a 20-year limitation period. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 122-1.) On January 1, 1984, an amendment to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act took effect, which shortened the limitation period to 10 years. Ill.Rev.Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-1.
On February 6, 1984, the defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. This filing took place just over 11 years after the defendant's conviction, and approximately 5 weeks after the new 10-year limitation period became effective. The circuit court applied the new limitation period and, accordingly, dismissed the petition as untimely.
The appellate court, first district, reversed and remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that when limitation statutes are shortened so as to instantaneously bar petitions which fall outside the new time period, persons affected must be given a reasonable time within which to file. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 107 Ill.2d R. 315.
The limitation provision in section 122-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides as follows:
"No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 10 years after rendition of final judgment, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence." (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-1.)
The preamendment provision was identical, except that the limitation period specified was 20 years.
The first question we must address is whether the shortened limitation period may be applied retroactively to convictions which occurred prior to its enactment. The appellate court held that it may, relying upon People v. Robinson (1986), 140 IllApp.3d 29, 94 Ill.Dec. 387, 487 N.E.2d 1264. We agree with that conclusion and, as discussed below, largely adopt the Robinson approach to this issue.
The logical starting point for our analysis is Orlicki v. McCarthy (1954), 4 Ill.2d 342, 122 N.E.2d 513. In that case, an amendment had reduced the time period for filing an action under the Dramshop Act, and this court considered whether the amendment could be applied retroactively. In answering that question affirmatively, several principles were stated which are of relevance here.
First, this court noted that the legislature, having created rights of action under the Dramshop Act, had the corresponding power to repeal those rights. In other words, persons had no "vested" rights in statutory remedies. (4 Ill.2d at 346, 122 N.E.2d 513.) Moreover, the power to repeal statutory enactments includes the lesser power to impose or modify time limitations for bringing actions under such acts. (4 Ill.2d at 353, 122 N.E.2d 513.) Finally, it was noted that statutes of limitation have historically been classified as procedural in character, and that procedural amendments are generally applied retroactively. 4 Ill.2d at 352-53, 122 N.E.2d 513, citing, e.g., Smolen v. Industrial Comm'n (1926), 324 Ill. 32, 154 N.E. 441; McQueen v. Connor (1944), 385 Ill. 455, 53 N.E.2d 435.
The principles in Orlicki have been reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions. (See, e.g., Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park (1972), 52 Ill.2d 354, 288 N.E.2d 423; Moore v. Jackson Park Hospital (1983), 95 Ill.2d 223, 69 Ill.Dec. 191, 447 N.E.2d 408 (Ryan, C.J., concurring).) They are also in accord with accepted law in other jurisdictions. See 2A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 41.09, at 281 (4th ed. 1986).
The defendant argues, however, that these rules should not apply in the case of amendments to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. He points to a series of cases in which we refused retroactive application of an amendment to the Act which lengthened the period of limitation. E.g., People v. Lansing (1966), 35 Ill.2d 247, 220 N.E.2d 218.
However, the decision in Lansing was not based upon any peculiar aspect of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act which would bar retroactive application of amendments to it, but rather on more general principles of statutory interpretation.
In Lansing, the defendant's conviction occurred while the limitation period under the Act was five years. He filed a petition under the Act approximately 5 1/2 years later, which was dismissed as untimely. During the pendency of his appeal, the limitation period was extended to 20 years, and the defendant argued that the amendment should apply retroactively to preserve his claim. In rejecting this contention, this court quoted the following language:
" 'In most jurisdictions the general rule is laid down, without exception or qualification, that, after an action has become barred by an existing Statute of Limitations, no subsequent legislation will remove the bar or revive the cause of action.' " (35 Ill.2d at 250, 220 N.E.2d 218, quoting Annot., 67 A.L.R. 297, 298 (1930).)
The court further quoted Justice Cardozo, who stated:
" " 35 Ill.2d at 250, 220 N.E.2d 218, quoting Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co. (1922), 233 N.Y. 213, 215, 135 N.E. 267, 267.
Thus, our cases, and cases from other jurisdictions, have drawn a distinction between the revival of a cause of action by extending the statute of limitations, and cutting off a cause of action by shortening the limitation period. The denial of retroactive application in the former instance does not preclude such application in the latter. (See also People v. Reed (1969), 42 Ill.2d 169, 246 N.E.2d 238; People v. Thomas (1970), 45 Ill.2d 68, 256 N.E.2d 794.) We therefore conclude that the shortened period as contained in the amendment should apply retroactively to the defendant's petition.
The defendant's final contention is that even if the new, shortened limitation period applies, he nonetheless is entitled to a reasonable time after its effective date within which to bring his action. This argument is based upon language from other cases considering the effect of retroactive application of amendments shortening limitation periods.
For example, in Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park (1972), 52 Ill.2d 354, 288 N.E.2d 423, we considered whether an amendment adding a limitation period to a zoning ordinance where no limitation had previously existed could apply retroactively. This court stated:
"So long as a reasonable time exists for the presentation of a claim after enactment of a statute shortening the time in which suit may be brought, the legislature may validly shorten the time as to pre-existing causes of action." 52 Ill.2d at 359, 288 N.E.2d 423.
More recently, we applied these principles to an amendment which shortened the period of repose for bringing medical malpractice actions. (Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital (1986), 111 Ill.2d 416, 95 Ill.Dec. 812, 490 N.E.2d 665.) We stated:
"Under the general rule, in the wake of a statute shortening a limitations period or providing one where one did not exist previously, a plaintiff whose cause of action arose before that date will be allowed a reasonable period of time in which to bring his action." 111 Ill.2d at 420, 95 Ill.Dec. 812, 490 N.E.2d 665, citing Hupp v. Gray (1978), 73 Ill.2d 78, 22 Ill.Dec. 513, 382 N.E.2d 1211; Meegan, 52 Ill.2d 354, 288 N.E.2d 423; Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf (1955), 6 Ill.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111.
The thrust of these decisions is that shortened statutes of limitations, even if retroactive, will not be applied to bar instantaneously an existing right of action. The "reasonable time" rule is a judicially created "safety valve" which prevents that result from occurring. Thus, defendant argues that he is at least entitled to a determination whether his petition was filed within a reasonable time after the effective date of the amendment.
There is, however, an important distinction between the limitation provision at issue here and the statutes interpreted in cases such as Meegan, Mega and Hupp. The limitation provision in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides that no action may be brought more than 10 years after rendition of final judgment, "unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence." (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-1.) The limitations statutes involved in the other cases discussed do not contain such a qualification. In our judgment, this language creates a special "safety valve," unique to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which acts as a substitute for the judicially imposed "reasonable time" rule.
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