People v. Baugh
| Citation | 832 N.E.2d 903 |
| Decision Date | 18 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-03-2551.,1-03-2551. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Corey BAUGH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Laila M. Velkme, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for Defendant-Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James Fitzgerald, Paul A. Ruscheinski, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
A jury found defendant Corey Baugh guilty of first degree murder, four counts of home invasion, and attempted armed robbery. He was sentenced to consecutive 35- and 15-year prison terms for murder and home invasion, and a 10-year term for attempted armed robbery, to run concurrently to the home invasion term. Defendant contends on appeal that: (1) his home invasion conviction must be vacated because (a) he cannot be accountable for home invasion based on an entry into his own home, (b) home invasion was a lesser-included offense of felony murder, and (c) his conviction of four counts of home invasion may not rest upon a single entry into the home; (2) the trial court erroneously found him fit to stand trial despite expert opinions regarding his narcolepsy; (3) the State's evidence failed to prove his guilt; and (4) he was denied a fair trial by the State's cross-examination of defendant and closing arguments. We agree that defendant's separate conviction of home invasion must be vacated because it was the predicate felony of felony murder. We remand the cause for resentencing on the murder and attempted armed robbery counts but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On October 24, 2001, two unidentified gunmen entered the home at 233 North Lavergne Avenue in Chicago, attempted to rob the occupants, and shot and killed Kenneth Jones, defendant's brother. Thereafter, defendant was arrested and charged with 12 counts of first degree murder, four counts of home invasion, and one count of attempted armed robbery.
After defendant's case was set for trial, the defense raised the issue of defendant's fitness to stand trial based on his self-reported condition of narcolepsy. Specifically, in July 2002, defense counsel informed the court that defendant wanted a continuance, and defendant himself addressed the court and explained counsel did not interview two important witnesses in his case. Counsel explained why he and defendant disagreed regarding the importance of the two witnesses. Then, counsel added that he also requested a continuance due to defendant's narcolepsy, explaining that When the court remarked that defendant seemed perfectly lucid and able to communicate in front of the court, counsel responded that the narcolepsy manifested itself at different times and did not happen all the time. When counsel informed the court that defendant was discharged from the Navy as a result of narcolepsy, defendant corrected counsel, stating that he was discharged from the Army. The trial court ordered a fitness evaluation of defendant.
Three clinical interviews were performed on defendant. In her August 2002 report, psychiatrist Dawna Gutzmann opined that defendant was currently unfit to stand trial. She stated that defendant understood the charges against him and the nature of the courtroom proceedings, but suffered from an untreated sleep disorder that caused him to suddenly and unpredictably fall into a deep sleep several times a day. Dr. Gutzmann opined that defendant's disorder impaired him such that he was unable to assist his counsel in his defense. Dr. Gutzmann stated that defendant was not subject to involuntary admission but could be restored to fitness if he received appropriate treatment. In his October 2002 report, psychiatrist Fidel Echevarria essentially concurred with Dr. Gutzmann's earlier opinion, noted his concern that defendant was not currently receiving medication, and opined that the untreated illness had the "potential" to impair defendant's ability to assist his counsel.
In her February 2003 report, Dr. Gutzmann issued another opinion that was consistent with her earlier opinion. Dr. Gutzmann noted that defendant complained of feeling depressed and reported that he fell asleep suddenly three or more times each day and experienced occasional cataplexy (brief episodes of sudden bilateral loss of muscle tone, most often associated with intense emotion) and sleep paralysis (a situation where an individual awakens from sleep and is alert but unable to move his body). Dr. Gutzmann noted that defendant was appropriately groomed and cooperative and maintained appropriate eye contact throughout the interview. Moreover, defendant's speech, motor abilities and mood were normal. He denied any paranoid ideation and hallucinations. His thought processes were coherent and goal directed, and his memory, concentration reasoning, judgment, insight and impulse control were intact.
At the April 2003 fitness hearing, Dr. Gutzmann testified consistently with her written reports. She testified that defendant reported he could recall and describe the circumstances surrounding the charges against him. Dr. Gutzmann also testified that defendant said he, at times, would fall asleep while standing and lose all muscle tone and fall. Defendant, however, never identified any obstacles — including the narcolepsy — that would impede his ability to assist his attorney in his defense. Defendant told Dr. Gutzmann he would inform his attorney if he became confused about the courtroom proceedings. Dr. Gutzmann added that, during her August 30-minute and February 10-minute interviews with defendant, she never observed any symptoms of cataplexy and defendant did not fall asleep in her presence or appear to nod off. Only defendant's lawyers reported witnessing defendant fall asleep involuntarily. Dr. Gutzmann explained that emotional distress would not make defendant more likely to fall asleep; narcolepsy involved involuntary episodes of sleep and did not appear to be triggered by anything. Moreover, defendant's 1993 hospital medical records indicated that he was not compliant with taking his medication.
Dr. Gutzmann explained that her opinion in her reports that defendant suffered from narcolepsy was based upon his self-reporting, but her opinion at trial was also based upon her review of a 1993 hospital sleep study that confirmed the diagnosis of narcolepsy. Further, she testified that prescription medication could restore defendant to fitness within one to three months.
The trial court accepted the diagnosis of narcolepsy but ruled that there was no credible basis to conclude that narcolepsy impaired defendant to the extent that he was unable to assist counsel in his defense. Specifically, the trial court noted that defendant was present for numerous pretrial court proceedings and always appeared awake, alert and able to comprehend what was gong on. The court took judicial notice that defendant sat at the table with his counsel for 40 minutes during the fitness hearing and there was no indication that defendant ever fell asleep or became confused. Then, at the defense's request, the court signed an order referring defendant to medical services for a medication evaluation, stating:
At the trial in June 2003, the State presented evidence that in October 2001 defendant ran a sizeable drug business from the house at 223 North Lavergne. It was a well-known drug house, and defendant made about $1,000 a day selling cocaine to 100 people at that location. Defendant stayed at the drug house with his brother Kenneth Jones, his sister Sandra Jones, and his nephew Jeff Jones. Jeff operated a separate drug business out of the same house in competition with defendant.
Robert Hinman testified that he bought drugs from defendant at the drug house for at least six months. On the morning of October 23, 2001, Hinman was at the Erie Street apartment of defendant's mother with defendant and his cousin. About 3 or 4 p.m., defendant made a telephone call and told someone that Jeff was getting too pumped up over on Lavergne and to send somebody over there to take his money and his drugs. After someone delivered drugs to the apartment, Hinman drove defendant to the Lavergne drug house to sell his "stuff." Then, Hinman ran several errands for defendant. At the drug house Nathaniel Borden sold drugs for defendant, and Kenneth and Sandra usually worked for Jeff.
The house had no electricity and was illuminated by candles. During the early morning hours of October 24, defendant was alone in a back bedroom, and Jeff and his girlfriend were upstairs. Hinman, Kenneth, Borden, and others were sitting in the front of the house, and someone knocked on the door. Hinman was not paying attention, but suddenly two gunmen entered — one had a mask — and told everyone to get on the floor. The gunmen asked where Jeff was, and Sandra reluctantly told them. Then, someone began to beat loudly on the front door, and Kenneth asked the gunmen if he could answer the door. Kenneth answered the door and ran out of the house, and the gunmen ignored him. The masked gunman guarded the group on the floor while the other gunman went to get Jeff. Outside the house, however, Kenneth yelled and threw rocks at Jeff's window to warn him. Both gunmen ran outside, and Hinman heard four gunshots fired. The group thought Kenneth escaped but became concerned when he did not return to the house....
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Argumentative questions
...say, allow the jury to draw its own conclusions and then make a proper closing argument based on the testimony. But see People v. Baugh , 832 N.E.2d 903, 358 Ill.App.3d 718 (2005). A prosecutor’s improper question during the cross-examination of the defendant (asking the defendant whether a......
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Argumentative Questions
...say, allow the jury to draw its own conclusions and then make a proper closing argument based on the testimony. But see People v. Baugh , 832 N.E.2d 903, 358 Ill.App.3d 718 (2005). A prosecutor’s improper question during the cross-examination of the defendant (asking the defendant whether a......
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Argumentative Questions
...say, allow the jury to draw its own conclusions and then make a proper closing argument based on the testimony. But see People v. Baugh , 832 N.E.2d 903, 358 Ill.App.3d 718 (2005). A prosecutor’s improper question during the cross-examination of the defendant (asking the defendant whether a......
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Argumentative Questions
...say, allow the jury to draw its own conclusions and then make a proper closing argument based on the testimony. But see People v. Baugh , 832 N.E.2d 903, 358 Ill.App.3d 718 (2005). A prosecutor’s improper question during the cross-examination of the defendant (asking the defendant whether a......