People v. Beachem

• Decision Date: 22 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 104976.,104976.
• Citation: 890 N.E.2d 515,229 Ill.2d 237
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Wade BEACHEM, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

890 N.E.2d 515

229 Ill.2d 237

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Wade BEACHEM, Appellee.

No. 104976.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 22, 2008.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter D. Fischer, Mary L. Boland, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Maria A. Harrigan, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Defendant, Wade Beachem, was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2004)) and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction and argued, inter alia, that he was entitled to credit for time served under section 5-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7 (West 2004)), for the time he spent in the Sheriff's Day Reporting Center program. The appellate court agreed with defendant and amended the mittimus to grant defendant 171 days of credit for the days he actually reported to the Day Reporting Center. 374 Ill.App.3d 145, 313 Ill.Dec. 78, 871 N.E.2d 805. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 612 (210 Ill.2d R. 612) and 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315). This court granted the State's petition, and, for the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on the evening of March 3, 2004, after police officers, executing a search warrant, discovered two plastic bags containing crack cocaine in defendant's closet. Defendant was charged by indictment with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2004)), a Class X offense.

Prior to trial, defendant was assigned to the Sheriff's Day Reporting Center program (Program) for 258 days and actually reported to the Day Reporting Center (Center) on 171 days.¹ The record before this court does not provide specific information concerning defendant's involvement in the Program. For instance, it does not specify when defendant was assigned to the Program, when defendant's enrollment was terminated, or the number of hours per day that defendant spent at the Center. However, despite these deficiencies, the parties do not dispute that defendant was assigned to the Program for 258 days and spent between three and nine hours at the Center on 171 days. Since neither party disputes the accuracy of these facts, we accept them as true for the purpose of the present appeal.

The Cook County sheriff operates the Program to comply with a consent decree that caps the number of inmates that the Cook County jail is allowed to house. See Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983). This consent decree requires the sheriff to release prisoners in order to keep the total jail population under this cap. To that end, the district court entered an order directing the sheriff to release "on their own recognizance the persons held in default of the lowest amount of bail, and among persons held on the same amount of bail the ones who have been confined for the longest time." Duran, 713 F.2d at 294.

For information on the Program, the parties have referred this court to the Cook County sheriff's office Web site. The Cook County sheriff's office Web site describes the Program as a "one-of-a-kind intensive supervision program that reduces overcrowding in Cook County Jail while providing services and direction for pretrial nonviolent participants." http://www. cookcountysheriff.org/dcsi/day.html (last visited April 21, 2008). The typical participant in the Program is "male, non-violent, and in pre-trial status usually on drug-related charges." http://www.cookcounty sheriff.org/dcsi/day.html (last visited April 21, 2008). Upon entry into the Program, each participant must complete an eight-day orientation. At the end of the orientation the participant is evaluated and placed onto a "program track." The tracks "vary in intensity from nine (9) hours to three (3) hours daily." http://www.cookcounty sheriff.org/dcsi/day.html (last visited April 21, 2008). "The basic concept is to acclimate the participant to the daily routine of reporting to a strictly supervised environment." http://www.cookcountysheriff.org/ dcsi/day.html (last visited April 21, 2008). "Every participant is subject to mandatory daily attendance and drug testing. Any offender who fails to adhere to the rules of the Program is reincarcerated. Such infractions include: excessive tardiness and absenteeism, new arrests, or disregard for [Program/Center] rules." http://www.cook countysheriff.org/dcsi/day.html (last visited April 21, 2008).

The Program is administered through the Cook County sheriff's office's Department of Community Supervision and Intervention. The Department of Community Supervision and Intervention administers "all programs * * * for inmates outside the Department of Corrections." http:// www.cookcountysheriff.org/dcsi/index.html (last visited April 21, 2008). The Department of Community Supervision and Intervention "maintains its own Fugitive Unit to locate and reincarcerate AWOLs from its programs." http://www.cookcounty sheriff.org/dcsi/index.html (last visited April 21, 2008).

Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver and sentenced to the minimum term of six years' imprisonment with a 26-day credit for time served. The 26 days of credit given by the trial court reflected the time defendant spent in actual physical confinement. The trial court made no mention of, nor was there any discussion of, giving defendant credit for his time in the Program and/or at the Center.²

On appeal, defendant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that defendant should have received additional credit for the time he spent in the Program prior to trial. 374 Ill.App.3d 145, 313 Ill.Dec. 78, 871 N.E.2d 805. The appellate court, citing this court's opinion in People v. Campa, 217 Ill.2d 243, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157 (2005), granted defendant credit for the 171 days he reported to the Center. In doing so, the appellate court declined to extend the logic of either People ex rel. Morrison v. Sielaff, 58 Ill.2d 91, 316 N.E.2d 769 (1974) (time spent while released on bond did not count as time in custody for purpose of credit for time served), or People v. Ramos, 138 Ill.2d 152, 149 Ill.Dec. 273, 561 N.E.2d 643 (1990) (time spent in home confinement as a condition of bond did not constitute being in "custody"), as neither case dealt with the Program. The appellate court also declined to follow an appellate court decision, People v. Martin, 357 Ill.App.3d 663, 293 Ill.Dec. 909, 829 N.E.2d 834 (2005) (holding that a defendant in the Program was not in custody for purposes of section 5-8-7). The appellate court noted that while Martin dealt with the Program, the opinion relied on Ramos and rejected the later affirmed logic of Campa. 374 Ill.App.3d at 151, 313 Ill.Dec. 78, 871 N.E.2d 805. Accordingly, the appellate court found that under the present circumstances, defendant was "in `custody' as the term is used in the sentencing credit provision of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2004))." 374 Ill.App.3d at 153, 313 Ill.Dec. 78, 871 N.E.2d 805.

However, the appellate court held that defendant was entitled only to credit for the days he actually reported to the Center. 374 Ill.App.3d at 153, 313 Ill.Dec. 78, 871 N.E.2d 805. The appellate court noted that a defendant who is held in custody for even part of a day is entitled to credit against his sentence for all of that day, but the court was "not prepared" to give defendant 258 days credit "for the entire period during which [defendant] was potentially subject to the restrictions of the sheriff's Day Reporting Center program." 374 Ill.App.3d at 153, 313 Ill.Dec. 78, 871 N.E.2d 805, citing People v. Quintana, 332 Ill.App.3d 96, 265 Ill.Dec. 462, 772 N.E.2d 833 (2002). Thus, while the appellate court gave defendant a full day's credit for the few hours defendant spent at the Center on 171 days, it denied credit for weekends, holidays, and excused court dates when defendant did not report to the Center.³

The State, as appellant, asserts that the appellate court erred in granting defendant credit for the time spent in the Center, claiming that defendant was not in "custody" within the meaning of section 5-8-7.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The fundamental question presented is whether defendant's participation in the Program constitutes being in "custody" as that term is contemplated by section 5-8-7. As this is a question of statutory interpretation and does not involve disputed facts, our review is de novo. People v. Cordell, 223 Ill.2d 380, 389, 307 Ill.Dec. 669, 860 N.E.2d 323 (2006); People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d 308, 314, 294 Ill.Dec. 110, 830 N.E.2d 522 (2005).

ANALYSIS

The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Perry, 224 Ill.2d 312, 323, 309 Ill. Dec. 330, 864 N.E.2d 196 (2007). This inquiry "must always begin with the language of the statute, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent." People v. Pullen, 192 Ill.2d 36, 42, 248 Ill.Dec. 237, 733 N.E.2d 1235 (2000). See also Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 252, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157, citing People v. Woodard, 175 Ill.2d 435, 443, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997). We construe the statute as a whole and afford the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning. People ex rel. Devine v. Sharkey, 221 Ill.2d 613, 617, 304 Ill.Dec. 348, 852 N.E.2d 804 (2006), citing People v. A Parcel of Property Commonly Known As 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, 217 Ill.2d 481, 499, ...