People v. Beamer
| Decision Date | 08 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-129,77-129 |
| Citation | 17 Ill.Dec. 369,376 N.E.2d 368,59 Ill.App.3d 855 |
| Parties | , 17 Ill.Dec. 369 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Woodrow BEAMER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Mary Robinson, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Michael Mulder, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for defendant-appellant.
Daniel D. Doyle, State's Atty., Rockford, Phyllis J. Perko, William L. Browers, State's Attys., Appellate Service Commission, Elgin, for plaintiff-appellee.
The defendant was convicted of armed robbery, following a bench trial, and was sentenced to a term of four to twelve years in prison. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress two statements which he gave police, since, (1) the State failed to prove that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the assistance of counsel, and (2) the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the statements were voluntary, since it failed to produce all witnesses material to the issue of voluntariness. We affirm.
On September 2, 1975, Will Todd robbed a 7-Eleven store in Loves Park, Illinois, at gunpoint. Two boys saw the robber leave in a "late model, light-colored T-bird". Immediately thereafter, defendant and Will Todd were stopped while riding in a 1969 or '72 Ford Thunderbird. The defendant was driving the car. Merchandise taken from the 7-Eleven store and a .22-caliber pistol were found in the car. The defendant and his companion were advised of their "rights" and then transported to the Sheriff's office.
At 2:00 a. m. on September 3, 1975, shortly after the defendant was arrested, he was interviewed by Detective Rodney Roop of the Winnebago County Sheriff's Police. Roop first read the defendant a "waiver of rights" form. The defendant was asked if he understood his rights and responded that he did, and signed the form. In response to questioning by Roop, the defendant made some inconclusive remarks, and then stated that he would like to "think about it awhile" before making a statement, and "possibly contact a lawyer." Questioning was immediately terminated and later that day the defendant was taken before a judge who "fully explained" his rights and appointed the Public Defender to represent the defendant. The defendant's preliminary hearing was set for September 10, 1975, at 2:45 p. m.
On September 9, 1975, Detective Meyers of the Sheriff's department interviewed the defendant. He began by orally advising the defendant of his "constitutional rights." He then advised the defendant that law enforcement agencies in Tennessee and other states were making inquiries regarding the defendant, and that "they would possibly have charges coming up against him for armed robbery in those other states." The defendant was asked if he wanted to say anything about the robbery of the 7-Eleven, and responded that he "was involved in this armed robbery" and that he "did it with Willie Todd." Meyers asked him to reduce his statement to writing, but the defendant declined, stating that he would "like to spend the night in jail and think about it." The defendant asked Meyers to contact him the next day and stated that he would let Meyers know then whether or not he would give a written statement.
The next day, prior to the scheduled preliminary hearing, the defendant was brought to the Detective Bureau of the Sheriff's office. He first talked to two "city officers" for approximately an hour. The State did not call the "city officers" as witnesses, and there is no testimony as to what occurred during the interview. After the "city officers" had finished talking to the defendant, at approximately 1:00 p. m., Detective Meyers brought the defendant to his office and advised him of his constitutional rights by reading a "waiver of rights" form to him. Meyers read the defendant his rights "one at a time", pausing after each "right" to ask the defendant if he understood. After Meyers finished giving the defendant his "rights" he explained them again in "laymen's" terms, telling the defendant that if he said anything, it could be taken into court and used "to convict him of the crime of armed robbery." At the conclusion of these admonitions, the defendant stated that he understood his rights and desired to make a statement "since he thought about it all night and wanted to tell the truth."
He then signed a waiver of rights form and shortly thereafter signed a written statement, admitting that he was "in on the robbery with Will Todd" and that "when we went to the store our intentions were to rob it."
The defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that he knowingly waived his right to counsel prior to making the oral statement on September 9, and that the written statement on September 10 was the product of the "tainted" statement made on the 9th. The defendant argues that even though Detective Meyers testified that he orally advised the defendant of his "constitutional rights", prior to questioning him on September 9, this testimony was not sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant was informed of his right to counsel.
We begin by noting that although the police knew, or should have known, that defendant was represented by an attorney on September 9, they arranged for and conducted the interview without notice to the defendant's attorney. While this court has refused to hold that statements obtained in the absence of counsel, even though counsel has been retained or appointed, are per se inadmissible, we observe that the State has a higher burden to show waiver of the presence of counsel, once counsel has been appointed, than in cases wherein interrogation takes place, prior to the appointment of counsel. People v. Sandoval (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 741, 353 N.E.2d 715.
Nonetheless, where such an issue is raised by a motion to suppress a confession, the State's burden of proof is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (E. g., People v. Noblin (1973), 15 Ill.App.3d 1060, 305 N.E.2d 658. Here, arguably, the arresting officers' testimony that the defendant was advised of his "rights" at the scene of the arrest, or Detective Meyers' testimony that he advised the defendant of his "constitutional rights" on September 9, constituted obvious references to the customary Miranda warnings which, of course, are a familiar litany to virtually every...
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