People v. Beattie

• Decision Date: 01 July 1992
• Citation: 587 N.Y.S.2d 585,80 N.Y.2d 840
• Parties: , 600 N.E.2d 216 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John F. BEATTIE, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 585

587 N.Y.S.2d 585

80 N.Y.2d 840, 600 N.E.2d 216

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John F. BEATTIE, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 1, 1992.

[80 N.Y.2d 841] [600 N.E.2d 217] Larry M. Himelein, Dist. Atty., for appellant.

J. Michael Shane, Olean, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of County Court should be reversed and the judgment of the Town Justice Court reinstated.

On October 2, 1990, defendant was issued three uniform traffic tickets charging him with failure to keep right (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1120[a] and two counts of driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2], [3]. A uniform traffic ticket meets the CPL requirements for a simplified traffic information (CPL 100.10[2][a]. Pursuant to CPL 100.25(2), defendant requested a supporting deposition, which was provided to him. In this deposition, Deputy L.C. Johnson of the Cattaraugus County Sheriff's Department alleged that defendant had been travelling at 71 miles per hour and was more than 50% in the officer's lane of traffic. Deputy Johnson further stated that after he pulled the defendant's car over and approached and addressed the defendant, he detected the smell of an alcoholic beverage.

By notice of motion dated November 1, 1990 and accompanying affidavit, defendant moved to dismiss the charges of driving while intoxicated. He argued that, in violation of CPL 100.25(2), there was no factual evidence in the supporting deposition to provide reasonable cause to believe that he had committed the offenses charged. The motion to dismiss was denied, and on May 15, 1991, defendant pleaded guilty to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2).

Defendant appealed to County Court, Cattaraugus County, arguing that the supporting deposition was jurisdictionally defective. County Court agreed that the factual allegations contained in the supporting deposition were insufficient to provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while he had .10 of one percentum or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2), the statute to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Further, County Court also agreed with defendant that this defect was jurisdictional in nature and was not waived by the defendant's guilty plea. Consequently, the simplified information and supporting deposition were dismissed and the conviction vacated. A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal.

We need not determine whether the factual allegations in the supporting deposition provided reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses with which he was charged, because we find that defendant waived the right to raise this claim when he pleaded guilty to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2).

"A guilty plea not only constitutes an actual waiver of certain rights associated with a trial, but also effects a forfeiture of the right to renew many arguments made before the plea" (People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755). Among these is a claimed deficiency in a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument(id., citing People v. Levin, 57 N.Y.2d 1008, 457 N.Y.S.2d 472, 443 N.E.2d 946; People v. Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584, 439 N.Y.S.2d 321, 421 N.E.2d 813). Conversely, it is clear that a defendant who pleads guilty does not waive the right to argue that an accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally defective (People v. Taylor, supra, 65 N.Y.2d at 5, 489...