People v. Beauchamp

Decision Date09 March 2009
Docket NumberNo. 1-07-2247.,1-07-2247.
Citation904 N.E.2d 1014
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert BEAUCHAMP, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Office of the State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn-Deputy Defender, Steven W. Becker-Assistant Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Anita Alvarez-State's Attorney-Cook County, Chicago, IL, James E. Fitzgerald and John E. Nowak, of Counsel, for Appellee.

Presiding Justice ROBERT E. GORDONdelivered the opinion of the court:

After a bench trial, defendant Albert Beauchamp appeals from his conviction for burglary. He contends the State failed to prove the element of entry and that we must reverse or, alternatively, reduce the conviction to theft. We modify the judgment to reflect a conviction for theft and remand for resentencing.

Pamela Little testified that she parked her 2004 Chevrolet Trailblazer sport utility vehicle (SUV) in a Metra parking lot on the morning of January 29, 2007. She went to pay for her parking spot and noticed a white vehicle had pulled in behind her SUV. When she pushed her vehicle alarm button on its remote control, instead of activating lights and beeps, nothing happened. She then observed a man standing at the hood of her vehicle. Little started screaming and ran across the street to a fire station where she told a police officer someone was trying to steal her SUV.

When Little returned to her vehicle, she saw that the lock to open the hatchback was gone, as well as the hatchback window.

On cross-examination, Little explained that with the push of a button on the back of the SUV, the window could be "lifted" up and "held" up by two hydraulic arms. The window could only open outward, away from the SUV.

Police officer Freddy Frazier testified that he was directed to the Metra parking lot, where flashing lights from the SUV caught his attention. Two men, later identified as defendant and Michael Jones, were entering a vehicle next to the SUV and attempting to start it. Frazier blocked the vehicle with his police vehicle. He saw a window in the vehicle's backseat. Looking at the SUV, Frazier noted the back window was missing. One hydraulic arm was on the ground, and one hydraulic arm was dangling from the vehicle, and the door lock was punched. Frazier concluded that the window in defendant's vehicle was the window from the back of the SUV. Later, Little confirmed that that window belonged to her SUV.

At the end of the State's case, defendant moved for a directed finding, arguing that the State failed to prove an "entry" into the SUV, a necessary element of burglary. Defendant contended there was no evidence that anyone needed to access the interior of the vehicle to remove the window. Defendant specifically argued that the State failed to prove that the hydraulic arms were attached to the interior of the window. The State countered that defendant must have reached into the SUV to remove the window from the frame, without any elaboration as to why that was the case.

After a break, the parties presented additional argument.

The State drew the court's attention to authorities holding that reaching under the hood of a vehicle to take its battery constituted an entry, as did reaching into the open flatbed of a truck to take an object lying in it. The State suggested that the instant case was similar, in that defendant and Jones would have had to reach into the vehicle to remove the window, even if the window had already opened out. The State argued that this had to have been the case, because Frazier testified that the arms were attached inside the SUV.

Defendant responded that Frazier merely testified that a hydraulic arm was dangling, without specifying whether from inside or outside of the SUV. He further argued that the window, in fact, would have been outside of the SUV at the time of its removal, because the button on the back of the vehicle moved the window away from the SUV's frame.

In ruling on defendant's motion, the court appeared to detect a frontal challenge as to whether the removal of a vehicle's window would ever constitute a burglary. The court concluded that removing a vehicle's window must generally constitute an entry because the object removed has both "an inside and an outside." The court further, independently, determined that the punching of the door lock constituted an entry. Finally, the court ruled that the evidence showed the hydraulic arms were on the inside of the vehicle, so that an entry must have occurred to remove the window. The court then denied defendant's motion.

Following closing arguments, the court convicted defendant of burglary and sentenced him to three years of incarceration.

On appeal, defendant repeats his arguments from his motion for a directed finding: that no evidence directly demonstrates or allows an inference of an entry into Little's SUV, as required for a burglary conviction. The State, however, contends that we may infer an entry into the SUV by the short amount of time between the commission of the offense and police intervention, but defendant's possession of the window, and by the damage to the SUV. We find defendant's argument persuasive.

To determine whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and then determine if a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the State proved the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cox, 195 Ill.2d 378, 387, 254 Ill.Dec. 720, 748 N.E.2d 166 (2001). A reviewing court will not retry the defendant. People v. Green, 322 Ill.App.3d 747, 754, 255 Ill. Dec. 916, 751 N.E.2d 10 (2001). In a bench trial, the trial judge serves as the trier of fact, determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony and resolving any conflicts in the evidence presented. People v. Slim, 127 Ill.2d 302, 307, 130 Ill.Dec. 250, 537 N.E.2d 317 (1989). Although the determinations of the trier of fact are not conclusive, they are entitled to great deference, so that a conviction will only be overturned where the evidence "is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt." People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill.2d 236, 259, 256 Ill.Dec. 530, 752 N.E.2d 410 (2001).

"A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters * * * [a] motor vehicle * * * or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft." 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2006). Thus, "[t]he offense of burglary is complete when the illegal entry is made with the requisite intent." People v. Moore, 375 Ill.App.3d 234, 239, 313 Ill.Dec. 757, 873 N.E.2d 381 (2007). Unlawful entry is "the essence of the crime" (People v. Davis, 3 Ill.App.3d 738, 739, 279 N.E.2d 179 (1972)), and distinguishes the offense of burglary from theft which does not require an entry (People v. Poe, 385 Ill. App.3d 763, 766, 324 Ill.Dec. 667, 896 N.E.2d 453, (2008)).

An "entry" may occur in one of two ways. First, any insertion of any body part by the offender into a statutorily designated area will constitute an entry. See People v. Palmer, 83 Ill.App.3d 732, 736, 39 Ill.Dec. 262, 404 N.E.2d 853 (1980). Second, the insertion of an instrument into the designated space may constitute an entry, but only if the instrument is inserted "for the immediate purpose of committing the [intended] felony or aiding in its commission and not merely for the purpose of making an opening to admit the hand or body, or in other words, for the sole purpose of breaking." Davis, 3 Ill. App.3d at 740, 279 N.E.2d 179. "[W]hether an entry is made depends upon the facts of an individual case." Davis, 3 Ill. App.3d at 739, 279 N.E.2d 179.

In our view, the facts of this case parallel the facts of Davis. In Davis, police observed the defendant and two other men pounding a hole through the wall of a television store. The perpetrators then attempted to leave, but were stopped and arrested. Davis, 3 Ill.App.3d at 739, 279 N.E.2d 179. In setting out our analytical framework for the defendant's burglary conviction, we stressed "[i]t is not the size of the hole [made in a building wall] that is determinative [in proving burglary] but * * * whether a hand or instrument was actually inserted into the hole for the purpose of committing the felony." Davis, 3 Ill.App.3d at 739, 279 N.E.2d 179. We vacated the burglary conviction and imposed a conviction for a lesser offense because the evidence showed no insertion of any part of the body, or an instrument for the purpose of committing a felony, through the hole in the store wall by any of the three men. Davis, 3 Ill.App.3d at 740, 279 N.E.2d 179. In the case at bar, the evidence only shows the creation of means by which a body part or instrument might pass, not any actual passage.

There is no direct evidence that any part of defendant's person entered the interior of the vehicle while removing the window or that any tool wielded by defendant entered the SUV where his objective was to deprive Little of her possession of the vehicle's window. Further, what circumstantial evidence there is allows for no reasonable inference of such intrusion by defendant's body or a tool he employed into the interior of the vehicle during the removal of the window. Neither Little's nor Frazier's trial testimony established that the window's hydraulic arms were attached to the interior of the vehicle. In fact, Little's testimony suggested the opposite. She stated that the arms "lifted" the window up, implying an exterior hinging, as opposed to if the arms "pushed" the window up. If the hydraulic arms were on the exterior of the vehicle, then defendant would not have needed to enter the SUV to separate the window from the frame. Defendant could have pulled the window away from the SUV's frame by manipulating the arms....

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3 cases
  • People v. Brant
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 22, 2009
    ... ... As defined in section 19-4, criminal trespass to a residence does not require force and is completed the moment one enters the residence without authority. 720 ILCS 5/19-4(a)(2) (West 2006); see People v. Beauchamp, 389 Ill.App.3d 11, 14, 328 Ill.Dec. 504, 904 N.E.2d 1014 (2009) (stating that a burglary is complete upon entry without authority and with the requisite intent). Whether one acts with or without force is irrelevant under section 19-4. Moreover, criminal trespass to a residence is not a crime ... ...
  • People v. Beauchamp
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 3, 2011
    ...court's judgments to reflect convictions for theft and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. People v. Beauchamp, 389 Ill.App.3d 11, 328 Ill.Dec. 504, 904 N.E.2d 1014 (2009); Jones, No. 1–07–2248 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons set forth below, we re......
  • People v. Beauchamp
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 1, 2009
    ...No. 108335 (Above consolidated with causes No. 108350). Supreme Court of Illinois. Sepetmber 1, 2009. Appeal from 389 Ill.App.3d 11, 328 Ill.Dec. 504, 904 N.E.2d 1014. Disposition of Petition for Leave to Appeal* * For Cumulative Leave to Appeal Tables see preliminary pages of advance sheet......

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