People v. Beaudin, Docket No. 68199

• Citation: 417 Mich. 570,339 N.W.2d 461
• Decision Date: 24 October 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 68199
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick J. BEAUDIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 461

339 N.W.2d 461

417 Mich. 570

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick J. BEAUDIN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 68199.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 24, 1983.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Karl E. Kraus, Pros. Atty., and Mary C. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for the People.

John S. Gilbreath, Jr., P.C., Manchester, for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

We are asked to decide whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding specific intent ¹ in the case of a defendant charged with endangering the lives of persons traveling on a railroad. ² We hold that the instruction should have been given.

I

The defendant and another man were accused of endangering lives by removing four bolts from a section of railroad track near Ubly, Michigan, on May 6, 1978. The accomplice was granted immunity and testified against the defendant at a jury trial in the Huron Circuit Court. According to the witness, he came upon a loose bolt and removed it from a rail, handing it to the defendant upon request. The defendant loosened and removed three more bolts. The two men then threw the bolts into a river.

A locomotive engineer with the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company testified that he was alerted to a problem with the track four days later when his train lurched sideways. The next day he slowed the train to ten miles per hour as it neared the section, and he spotted a raised rail. Had the train been traveling at its normal speed, a derailment would have been likely, he said.

The defendant testified in his own behalf that he and the accomplice had been walking along the railroad tracks and drinking wine. He contended that it was the accomplice who removed the bolts and threw them into the river.

The defendant was convicted as charged and placed on probation for 36 months. He also was assessed $450 in fines and court costs. The defendant's probation was revoked following a hearing on September 17, 1979, and he received a prison term of 30 to 60 years on the underlying charge of endangering a railroad. ³

The defendant argued on appeal ⁴ that the offense with which he was charged requires a showing of specific intent and that the trial judge erred in not so instructing the jury. The judge based his decision partly on the fact that, under the statute, no particular person need be the target of the endangering act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction, agreeing with the trial judge that the offense at issue only requires proof of general intent. ⁵ 110 Mich.App. 147, 312 N.W.2d 187 (1981).

II

This Court recently reaffirmed the validity of the general versus specific intent dichotomy in the context of the availability of an intoxication defense. People v. Langworthy and its companion case People v. Lundy, 416 Mich. 630, 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982). ⁶ The majority opinion reiterated that the distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes is that the former involves a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, while the latter involves merely the intent to do the physical act.

We believe that the inescapable conclusion is that the offense considered by us today is a specific intent crime and that jury instructions which do not include that element are deficient.

The statute under which Beaudin was charged provides in pertinent part:

"If any person shall, by the placing of any impediment upon the track of any railroad, or by any other means whatsoever, throw from said track any engine or cars used thereon, or attempt so to do, whether such engine or cars be thrown from said track or not, or shall by any other means whatsoever willfully endanger or attempt to endanger the lives of persons engaged in the work of said road, or persons traveling on the engine or cars of said road, he shall be subject to imprisonment in the state prison during his natural life, or any number of years, in the discretion of the court. And it shall not be necessary for the people to allege or prove in any such case that the person thereby intended to injure or endanger the life of any particular person or persons." M.C.L. Sec. 466.12; M.S.A. Sec. 22.271.

Thus, under the statute, the defendant would be guilty if he threw or tried to throw a train from the tracks or willfully endangered or tried to endanger the lives of persons working or traveling on the railroad. The information filed against the defendant charged him under the latter theory, i.e., willfully endangering lives. ⁷

Performance of the physical act proscribed in the statute is not enough to sustain a conviction. The act must be coincident with an intent to bring about the particular result the statute seeks to prohibit. In order for Beaudin to be guilty of this crime, he must have removed the bolts from the rail with the specific intent to endanger lives. Such an intent may be express or it may be inferred from facts and circumstances. We disagree with the trial judge that only a general intent is required by the statute because the statute does not indicate that a particular person need be the target of the endangering act. All this means is that a defendant need not intend to endanger specific persons, but may intend only to injure people in general. However, it is the nature of the intent required to violate the statute which must be examined. For the reasons outlined above, we have concluded that that intent must be a specific one.

There is no question that the jury in this case could have properly concluded from the evidence that Beaudin intentionally removed the bolts and threw them into a river. However, without the guidance of a specific intent instruction, the jury also could have improperly concluded that the intentional removal of the bolts was enough to convict the defendant. This potential confusion is not mere speculation. Shortly after the jurors began deliberations, they sent a note to the trial judge concerning the question of intent. The judge responded by rereading the pertinent parts of the statute under which the defendant was charged. The jurors apparently remained confused, however, as illustrated by the following exchange with the trial judge:

"Juror Adams: Well, I am still puzzled about the willful intent. In other words, by removing the bolt, or whatever obstruction, you are thereby willfully intending, or do you have to prove otherwise, that there is willful intent to harm?

"The Court: It is not an easy statute to understand. It doesn't say willful intent, it says 'willfully endanger', it says: 'Whether such engineer or cars be thrown from said track or not, or shall by any other means whatsoever, willfully endanger', so you have to decide if the defendant did willfully endanger or attempt to endanger the lives of persons engaged in the work of the railroad or persons traveling on the engines or cars of the road.

"Juror Adams: Does that mean that he premeditatedly thought he was--

"The Court: It doesn't say premeditated, it just says 'willfully endanger'.

"Juror Adams: In other words, he had to be thinking he was going to endanger somebody by doing it. Was it just--you know--we are just trying to decide was it just a prank with no thought given to the consequences or was there a willful desire to harm somebody.

"The Court: I think willful [sic ] endanger means that he had to have some thought in his mind, or should have had, as to what consequences would arise from what he did."

The jury returned approximately 45 minutes later with a guilty verdict.

We conclude that the offense of endangering the lives of persons on a railroad is a specific intent crime and that the trial judge erred in not so instructing the jury.

Accordingly, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Huron Circuit Court for a new trial at which instructions on specific intent are to be given. We do not retain jurisdiction.

KAVANAGH, LEVIN, RYAN, CAVANAGH and BRICKLEY, JJ., concur.

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

While I agree with the majority's conclusion that the offense of endangering the lives of persons traveling on a railroad is a specific intent crime, I do not agree that the trial judges' instructions were inadequate.

The defense attorney requested a specific intent instruction as set forth in the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions. See CJI...