People v. Beeson, E029397.

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Citation: 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384,99 Cal.App.4th 1393
• Decision Date: 11 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. E029397.,E029397.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donald Lynn BEESON, Defendant and Appellant.

122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384 99 Cal.App.4th 1393 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Donald Lynn BEESON, Defendant and Appellant. No. E029397. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2. July 11, 2002. Review Denied September 25, 2002.

[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 386]

[99 Cal.App.4th 1395]

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

[99 Cal.App.4th 1396]

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda L. Cartwright-Ladendorf, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Matthew Mulford and Robert M. Foster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

GAUT, J.

1. Introduction

Donald Lynn Beeson (defendant) appeals from the trial court's judgment granting the People's petition for defendant's continued involuntary treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). Defendant claims that the court erred in ordering defendant's continued confinement because insufficient evidence supported one of the criteria set forth in the MDO law,¹ namely, that defendant's mental disorder could not be kept in remission without treatment. Defendant further claims that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it should presume that defendant was not an MDO for purposes of the proceeding.

We conclude that, based on the testimony of the staff psychiatrist at the mental hospital where defendant received his treatment, substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that defendant could not be kept in remission within the meaning of the statute. As to defendant's second claim, we conclude that, in the context of a proceeding on a petition for continued treatment under the MDO law, the court was not required to instruct the jury to presume that defendant was not an MDO for purposes of the current proceeding. Based on these conclusions, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

2. Factual and Procedural History

Defendant, who was 32 years old at the time of trial, first entered a state mental hospital at the age of 16 for committing an attempted rape offense. In the late 1980's, defendant committed a grand theft offense, during which he brandished a knife at his father in an effort to steal his father's television set. At about the same time, defendant was convicted of robbery for beating and taking $1.35 from a person at a bus stop. In 1993, defendant was

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convicted of committing mayhem for severely beating a woman causing her to lose an eye and sustain skull fractures.

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During his incarceration for the 1993 offense, defendant exhibited psychotic behavior, including one incident when he smeared his own feces. After that incident, defendant was transferred to Atascadero State Hospital (Atascadero). During his placement at Atascadero, defendant was under a one-year court order to take his medications. After the court order expired, defendant's condition deteriorated and he began to experience visual and command hallucinations.

Based on psychological reports, defendant was certified by the Board of Prison Terms as an MDO in 1997. The court continued his placement at Atascadero.

In 2000, the Department of Mental Health transferred defendant to Patton State Hospital (Patton). In June of that year, defendant was placed under the care of Dr. Sanobar Baig, a staff psychiatrist at Patton.

Defendant's maximum term of commitment ended in April of 2001. On January 11, 2001, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition for defendant's continued treatment under the MDO law. During the hearing on the petition, Dr. Baig provided testimony concerning defendant's mental illness and treatment.

Consistent with defendant's earlier records, Dr. Baig testified that he had diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia. Dr. Baig stated that the overt symptoms of schizophrenia included hallucinations, hearing voices and commands, experiencing paranoia, and losing contact with reality. In defendant's case, however, Dr. Baig stated that defendant's overt symptoms were controlled with medication. Under Dr. Baig's care, defendant was taking Olanzapine, an antipsychotic medication.

Dr. Baig, however, also described the negative symptoms of defendant's illness, including being suspicious and guarded, lacking emotional responses, and thinking in an irrational manner. Even on medication, Dr. Baig explained, defendant exhibited some of these negative symptoms.

In addition to schizophrenia, Dr. Baig also diagnosed defendant with antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance dependence. Unlike schizophrenia, these two conditions were not considered to be serious mental disorders.

During some of his discussions with Dr. Baig, defendant denied having a mental illness. Instead, defendant characterized his problems as nervous breakdowns. At times, defendant told Dr. Baig that he did not need his

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medication. Dr. Baig explained that, because defendant failed to acknowledge his mental illness, defendant did not have a relapse prevention plan—a plan to prevent the reoccurrence of the overt symptoms of his illness. Defendant also resisted treatment by refusing to attend therapy sessions. Dr. Baig opined that defendant would not follow a treatment plan on a voluntary basis. Dr. Baig also opined that, without his medication, defendant would revert back to exhibiting the overt symptoms of hallucinations, paranoia, and aggressive or violent behavior.

Dr. Michael Kania provided testimony for the defense. After reviewing defendant's records and an hour-and-a-half-long interview, Dr. Michael Kania, a clinical and forensic psychologist, agreed with Dr. Baig's diagnosis that defendant suffered from schizophrenia. Dr. Kania also agreed with Dr. Baig that defendant did not exhibit any overt symptoms of his illness. Dr. Kania, however, testified that defendant acted as a reasonable person in

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his situation in voluntarily complying with his treatment plan. Dr. Kania also testified that defendant, after his release, would continue to take his medication.

The jury found that defendant met the criteria of being a MDO within the meaning of section 2970. The court then ordered that defendant remain in the custody of Department of Mental Health for another period of one year.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant claims that insufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that he was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment within the meaning of section 2962.

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—to support the jury's finding.²

Under the MDO law, continued treatment requires that the person satisfy certain criteria: that (1) he continues to have a severe mental disorder; (2) his mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; and (3) he continues to present a substantial danger of

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physical harm to others.³ In this case, defendant challenges the jury's finding as to the second element. As to that element, the word "remission" is defined as "... a finding that the overt signs and symptoms of the severe mental disorder are controlled either by psychotropic medication or psychosocial support."

⁴ Also, a person that cannot be kept in remission without treatment includes situations where the person has been in remission for the past year, but also has exhibited unexcused physical violence, has threatened another with substantial physical harm, intentionally has caused property damage, or has failed to voluntarily follow his treatment plan.⁵ Therefore, under the last exception, by establishing that the defendant has failed to voluntarily follow his treatment plan, the People can show that defendant's mental disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment.

The record of the hearing on the petition for continued treatment reveals substantial evidence of defendant's noncompliance. We apply a reasonable person standard in determining whether a person has followed his treatment plan.⁶ Although defendant argues that any lack of cooperation was well within what would have been expected of a reasonable person, the People's evidence indicates that defendant was inconsistent in acknowledging his mental illness and his need for medication and treatment. A reasonable person, whose mental disorder can be kept in remission with treatment, must, at minimum, acknowledge if possible the seriousness of his mental illness and cooperate in all the mandatory components of his treatment plan.

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Dr. Baig testified that, during his last interview with defendant, about two weeks before the hearing, defendant denied that he had a mental illness. Defendant also told Dr. Baig that his illness was in remission and he did not require any medication. Defendant has expressed the same sentiments on prior occasions. Although Dr. Baig explained that defendant required medication to control the symptoms of his illness, defendant's perception of his illness and his need for medication has been inconsistent. At times, defendant has characterized his condition as simply a drug problem or a nervous breakdown.

At Patton, defendant's treatment plan consisted of various components, including medication, therapy, and mandatory and recommended group meetings and activities. Dr. Baig testified that defendant was sporadic or

99 Cal.App.4th 1400

inconsistent in his attendance and level of participation at certain meetings. For example, defendant had failed to cooperate fully during his psychological evaluation. On another occasion, defendant stopped attending group meetings with a rehabilitation therapist because he believed that the therapist was...