People v. Bell

• Decision Date: 21 July 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 125375. Calendar No. 2.
• Citation: 473 Mich. 275,702 N.W.2d 128
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marlon BELL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

702 N.W.2d 128

473 Mich. 275

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marlon BELL, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 125375. Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued December 8, 2004.

Decided July 21, 2005.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing September 23, 2005.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, Detroit, MI, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Douglas W. Baker), Detroit, MI, for the defendant.

OPINION

CORRIGAN, J.

In this case, we consider whether the trial court failed to follow the three-step process of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), when it prohibited defendant from exercising his right to two peremptory challenges and, if so, whether that error is structural and, thus, requires automatic reversal. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that a peremptory challenge to strike a juror may not be exercised on the basis of race. Id. at 89, 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court set forth a three-step process for determining whether a challenger has improperly exercised peremptory challenges. First, the opponent of the challenge must make a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race. Id. at 94-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Next, once the prima facie showing is made, the burden then shifts to the challenging party to come forward with a neutral explanation for the challenge. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the challenge has proven purposeful discrimination. Id. at 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

In this case, a prima facie showing was made that two of defendant's peremptory challenges were based on race. The trial court initially erred in failing to allow defendant to provide race-neutral reasons for the challenges. The trial court subsequently cured this error by allowing defendant to provide reasons for the challenges. Defendant's reasons were race-conscious rather than race-neutral. Accordingly, the trial court disallowed the challenges. Because the trial court's initial error was subsequently cured and because defendant's reasons were race-conscious, we conclude that the trial court did not fail to follow the three-step Batson procedure and did not err in disallowing the challenges in question. We further conclude that the trial judge's initial error does not require automatic reversal. We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 29, 1999, defendant was involved in the robbery and shooting deaths of Chanel Roberts and Amanda Hodges, killing both victims. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; two counts of armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.529; and one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.529 and M.C.L. § 750.157a. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of mandatory life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree felony murder convictions and life imprisonment for the armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery convictions.

Defendant is African-American and the two victims were Caucasian. During jury selection, defense counsel attempted to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike potential juror number ten, who is Caucasian. Juror ten stated during voir dire that three of his friends were high-ranking police officers, but that he "wouldn't think" that this fact would affect his ability to be fair and impartial. When defense counsel attempted to excuse this juror peremptorily, the trial court disallowed the challenge, concluding that counsel had exercised the challenge on the basis of race. The trial court initially refused to allow defense counsel to make a record, but reconsidered after defense counsel expressed dissatisfaction with the trial court's refusal. Defense counsel then furnished a race-conscious, rather than race-neutral, reason for the challenge and the trial court continued to disallow the challenge.

Jury selection continued. After several more defense peremptory challenges, the prosecutor objected when defense counsel attempted to excuse juror number five. The prosecutor claimed that defense counsel was attempting to strike juror five on the basis of race, contrary to Batson. The trial court excused the jury in order to make a record regarding the challenge. The prosecutor noted that the current challenge was defense counsel's third consecutive strike on a Caucasian male and that defense counsel was attempting to exclude Caucasian males from the jury. Defense counsel replied that the prosecution's argument would have some merit if no other Caucasian males remained on the jury. Defense counsel also noted that the majority of the remaining jurors was Caucasian. Defense counsel offered no other explanation for his challenge. The trial court found defense counsel's explanation race-conscious and disallowed the challenge. Consequently, both jurors five and ten sat on the jury that convicted defendant.

On appeal, defendant raised several claims of error, including the claim that the trial court failed to follow the three-step procedure mandated in Batson in disallowing his peremptory challenges of jurors five and ten. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, agreed that the trial court failed to follow the Batson procedure, but, nevertheless, upheld defendant's convictions.¹ Judges Zahra and Wilder concluded that the trial court's Batson error was not of constitutional dimension and was subject to harmless error analysis, while Judge Fitzgerald would have held that the error was structural and required automatic reversal.

Defendant sought reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted defendant's motion and vacated its prior opinion.² On reconsideration, the Court held that a denial of the statutory right to a peremptory challenge is error per se.³ Judges Zahra and Wilder concurred, stating that they were "duty-bound" to follow the holdings in People v. Miller, 411 Mich. 321, 307 N.W.2d 335 (1981), and People v. Schmitz, 231 Mich.App. 521, 586 N.W.2d 766 (1998).

The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal, contending that the alleged denial of defendant's statutory right to remove prospective jurors peremptorily was not error requiring automatic reversal.

We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal.⁴ The prosecution contends that the trial court did not err in failing to follow the procedures set forth in Batson. Alternatively, the prosecution argues that even if the trial court erred in failing to follow the Batson procedures, the error was harmless.

Defendant argues that the trial court denied him his right to exercise two peremptory challenges by arbitrarily disallowing the challenges without following the mandated Batson procedures. Defendant further argues that the denial of this right requires automatic reversal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case requires us to determine whether the trial court failed to follow the procedures set forth in Batson in disallowing two of defendant's peremptory challenges. We review de novo issues regarding a trial court's proper application of the law. People v. Goldston, 470 Mich. 523, 528, 682 N.W.2d 479 (2004). We review for clear error a trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent under Batson. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 341 (C.A.6, 1998).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Batson Rule

In Batson, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that a peremptory challenge to strike a juror may not be exercised on the basis of race. Batson, supra at 89, 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The prosecution in Batson attempted to exclude African-American jurors solely on the basis of their race. Id. at 82-83, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court determined that the prosecution's actions violated the Equal Protection Clause. It set forth a three-step process for determining an improper exercise of peremptory challenges. First, there must be a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race. Id. at 94-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, the opponent of the challenge must show that: (1) the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) peremptory challenges are being exercised to exclude members of a certain racial group from the jury pool; and (3) the circumstances raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Batson Court directed trial courts to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether a prima facie showing has been made. Id.

Once the opponent of the challenge makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the challenging party to come forward with a neutral explanation for the challenge. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The neutral explanation must be related to the particular case being tried and must provide more than a general assertion in order to rebut the prima facie showing. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. If the challenging party fails to come forward with a neutral explanation, the challenge will be denied. Id. at 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, the trial court must decide whether the nonchallenging party has carried the burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Since Batson, the Supreme Court has commented that the establishment of purposeful discrimination "comes down to whether the trial court finds the ... race-neutral explanations to be credible." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). The Court further stated, "Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the ... [challenger's] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted...