People v. Belleci

Decision Date20 August 1979
Docket NumberCr. 20604
Citation24 Cal.3d 879,598 P.2d 473,157 Cal.Rptr. 503
Parties, 598 P.2d 473 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John P. BELLECI, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court

Paul Halvonik and Quin Denvir, State Public Defenders, Clifton R. Jeffers, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, and B. E. Bergesen III, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Eric Collins and Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant was charged by information with two counts of possession for sale of phencyclidine, a restricted dangerous drug. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) The incidents were unconnected, and occurred on June 11, 1976 (count I), and January 22, 1977 (count II). Defendant pleaded not guilty to both charges, and filed a timely motion to suppress the evidence on count II on the ground that it had been obtained by illegal search and seizure. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) The motion was granted, and the court ordered that all evidence on count II be suppressed; the prosecution did not seek to review the ruling, and count II was subsequently dismissed. Defendant then withdrew his plea of not guilty to count I and entered a guilty plea thereto, and the matter was referred to the probation department for a presentence report.

When that report was made available, however, it included a detailed statement of the prosecution's evidence on count II even though the court had ordered that evidence suppressed. In his evaluation of the case, moreover, the probation officer drew adverse inferences from the "fact" that defendant was found in possession of contraband "on two separate occasions, approximately six months apart," and relied on that evidence in recommending that probation be denied and defendant be committed instead to the California Youth Authority. 1

Defendant moved to strike those portions of the presentence report discussing the previously suppressed evidence and to resubmit the matter to the probation department for reconsideration without reference to that evidence. The prosecution vigorously opposed the motion, and after argument it was denied. 2 The court thereupon denied probation and committed defendant to the Youth Authority.

Defendant appeals from the judgment, challenging only the events following entry of his plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d).) In particular, he contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting, at the sentencing hearing, evidence that had previously been ordered suppressed. He asks that we hold all evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure to be inadmissible at sentencing hearings, either on constitutional grounds or as a judicially declared rule of evidence. As will appear, however, the disposition of this appeal is governed by statute, and it would therefore be inappropriate for us to reach at this time the broader issues raised by defendant.

We need not be detained by the Attorney General's preliminary claim that the evidence on count II was not illegally obtained. As noted, the superior court ruled to the contrary in granting defendant's motion to suppress. The Attorney General had two opportunities for timely review of that ruling: he could have promptly filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (O )), or he could have appealed from the subsequent order dismissing count II on this ground (Id., § 1238, subds. (a)(7) and (c)). But neither step was taken; indeed, at the hearing on defendant's change of plea the district attorney expressly declared "It's not my intent to appeal" from the order granting the motion to suppress. In the circumstances the Attorney General must be deemed to have waived his right to seek judicial review, and cannot be allowed to reopen the question on this appeal by defendant.

Turning to the merits, we find that the issue of the admissibility of this evidence at the sentencing hearing is resolved by the statute itself. Subdivision (d) of section 1538.5 declares that "If a search or seizure motion is granted pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section, the property or evidence shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing" unless the People seek reconsideration of the ruling by invoking other provisions of the section or by appeal. No such review was sought, and the question therefore is whether the sentencing proceeding is a "hearing" within the meaning of this statute.

The sentencing phase of a prosecution is a proceeding in which the court (1) rules on any claim in arrest of judgment, (2) receives and considers the probation or diagnostic reports or statements in aggravation or mitigation, (3) listens to argument, and may receive evidence, on the suitability of probation or on the appropriate term of imprisonment, and (4) determines whether to impose sentence and if so the proper punishment within the limits fixed by law. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1170 et seq., 1203 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 433.) It cannot seriously be doubted that such a proceeding is a "hearing" in every customary sense of the word, and the relevant statutes and rules repeatedly so describe it. 3 It is settled that "We are required to give effect to statutes 'according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' (Citations.)" (Paulos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 363, 580 P.2d 1155, 1159.) Stated otherwise, "When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it." (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 470, 561 P.2d 1148, 1158; accord, People v. Boyd (1979) 24 Cal.3d 285, 294, 155 Cal.Rptr. 367, 372, 594 P.2d 484, 489; Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155, 137 Cal.Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244.)

We have declined to follow the plain meaning of a statute only when it would inevitably have frustrated the manifest purposes of the legislation as a whole or led to absurd results. (See, e. g., Younger v. Superior Court (Mack ) (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113-114, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014; Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 845, 46 Cal.Rptr. 308, 405 P.2d 132.) Neither consequence is threatened here.

First, the broad goal of the Legislature in enacting section 1538.5 was to provide an orderly and unified procedure for (1) making pretrial challenges to the admission of evidence on the ground that it was the product of an unconstitutional search or seizure and (2) obtaining prompt appellate review of the rulings of the lower courts on such challenges. (See 22 Assem. Interim Com.Rep. (1965-1967) No. 12, Search and Seizure, pp. 13-22, 2 Appen. to Assem.J. (1967 Reg.Sess.); People v. Superior Court (Edmonds) (1971) 4 Cal.3d 605, 610, 94 Cal.Rptr. 250, 483 P.2d 1202; Moreno v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 932, 935-936, 146 Cal.Rptr. 35; Cornelius v. Superior Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 581, 585, 102 Cal.Rptr. 59; Nerell v. Superior Court (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 593, 597, 97 Cal.Rptr. 702; Kirby v. Superior Court (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 591, 596-597, 87 Cal.Rptr. 577.) It in no way frustrates that purpose to provide that the corollary of a successful motion to suppress shall be to bar the People from thereafter introducing the illegal evidence either at the trial or, if the defendant is convicted, at his sentencing hearing. On the contrary, it Would effectively nullify the statutory intent if, after the defendant secured a court order suppressing such evidence and the People failed to seek appellate review, the prosecution were nevertheless allowed to use that same evidence against him in subsequent proceedings: although the legislation is procedural in nature, its elaborate mechanism would obviously be superfluous if the result of invoking it were such a Pyrrhic victory.

The Attorney General advances three additional contentions relating to legislative intent, but none is meritorious. First he proposes his own construction of subdivision (d), to wit, that the provision is intended merely to foreclose the prosecution from relitigating the legality of a search or seizure at the trial level after the issue has been determined adversely to it in a pretrial hearing. Under this view the phrase "any trial or other hearing" in subdivision (d) means only a trial-level suppression proceeding at which, but for this provision, the People could litigate the search issue de novo.

The construction is both historically and analytically unconvincing. Nothing in the legislative history of section 1538.5 supports this restrictive reading; on the contrary, it appears that from the very beginning of the enactment process the purpose of the language in question was simply to round out the picture by providing what should be done with the illegally obtained property or evidence in the event the motion to suppress is granted. Thus in the early versions of the statute the prohibition against use of the evidence at trial was joined with a directive to return the property to the defendant if that could lawfully be done. These two provisions were eventually separated, but only as part of a reorganization of the statute from nine subdivisions into fifteen. Thereafter subdivision (d) was slowly expanded for purposes of clarity and completeness, and the addition of the phrase "or other hearing" was seemingly just one more step in that routine process. 4

Nor does the Attorney General's claimed construction fit the present wording of subdivision (d). If his view were correct the subdivision should have recited that when a motion to suppress is granted and the People do not seek appellate review, "the ruling shall be binding on the people" or "the people shall...

To continue reading

Request your trial
127 cases
  • Wilson v. Superior Court, Los Angeles County
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 23 Julio 1982
    ...In 1967 the California Legislature embalmed the rule in section 1538.5. The California Supreme Court in People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473 overruled decisions permitting limited use of suppressed evidence for purposes other than determination of guilt th......
  • Gregory v. City of San Juan Capistrano
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 20 Abril 1983
    ...or analyses which is not warranted by its language can change the plain meaning of the language used. (People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 886, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473, and cases cited; Hennigan v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1, 7, 125 Cal.Rptr. We also obs......
  • Patterson v. Tehama County
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 29 Agosto 1986
    ...aids. (See Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855, 866, 167 Cal.Rptr. 820, 616 P.2d 802; People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473.) Occasionally, however, literal language is disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent i......
  • People v. Edwards
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 25 Noviembre 1991
    ...is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it. (People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473.) We thus adhere to Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109. A capital defendant may waive......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 5 - §4. Evidence subject to exclusion under Fourth Amendment
    • United States
    • Full Court Press California Guide to Criminal Evidence Chapter 5 Exclusion of Evidence on Constitutional Grounds
    • Invalid date
    ...to suppress cannot be introduced into evidence at sentencing in the same case in which the hearing was held. People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 888. Later appellate-court decisions have noted, however, that Proposition 8 eliminated many of the rules of exclusion in criminal cases and h......
  • Punishment
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • 30 Marzo 2022
    ...cases is to refrain from initiating revocation proceedings until the related criminal prosecution is completed.” People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 888, n. 7, citing Coleman, supra , at 896. People v. Bolick, (2008) (H032425, Sixth Dist. COP, 10/27/08 Unpublished Opinion) held that a v......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Appendices
    • 30 Marzo 2022
    ...People v. Bell (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 249, §5:63.6 People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 596, §§9:05, 9:94 People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 888, n. 7, §10:94 People v. Bellomo (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 193, §7:46 People v. Bellomo (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 195, §8:22.1 People v. Belton (1979......
  • Table of Cases null
    • United States
    • Full Court Press California Guide to Criminal Evidence Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...5-A, §3.2.2(2) People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d 502, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129 (1989)—Ch. 4-C, §2.5.2(2)(c)[2] People v. Belleci, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473 (1979)—Ch. 5-A, §4 People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310 (1988)—Ch. 5-B, §2.2.2(3......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT