People v. Beltran

• Court: New York County Court
• Writing for the Court: Michael J. Worden, J.
• Citation: People v. Beltran, 180 N.Y.S.3d 859 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 2022)
• Decision Date: 12 December 2022
• Docket Number: Docket No. 06110005
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Dalvin BELTRAN, Defendant

180 N.Y.S.3d 859

The PEOPLE of the State of New York

v.Dalvin BELTRAN, Defendant

Docket No. 06110005

Justice Court, New York, Town of Deerpark, Orange County.

Decided on December 12, 2022

For the People: John E. Bach, Esq., Town of Deerpark Special Prosecutor, 420 Route 209, Huguenot, New York 12746

For the Defendant: Zev Goldstein, Esq., Law Offices of Zev Goldstein, PLLC, 450 Route 304, New City, New York 10956

Michael J. Worden, J.

Procedural History

Defendant filed a motion with this Court to vacate his 2006 guilty plea to a violation of § 1180B of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New York entered on November 27, 2006, in the Deerpark Town Court. Defendant asserts, inter alia , that his lifetime driving privileges in the State of New York are permanently revoked because he has accumulated more than twenty points within a twenty-five-year period, pursuant to a rule promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles in 2012. Defendant states that, had he known that such a plea would subject him to a lifetime revocation, he would not have pled guilty to the speeding violation. The People, by way of an Affirmation of Opposition, filed by John E. Bach, Jr., Esq., oppose the motion and request the relief sought by defendant be denied. Defendant filed a Reply Affirmation to the People's opposition.

Findings of Fact

Defendant was issued a Simplified Traffic Information on or about October 29, 2006, for speeding, 69 mph in a 55mph zone, in violation of § 1180B of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the charge by mail and was fined $125.00 with a $55.00 surcharge. As a result of his guilty plea, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles assessed four (4) points on his driving license. The original ticket was later physically disposed of by the Town Clerk of the Town of Deerpark pursuant to the approval of the Office of Court Administration. An electronic record of the docket is maintained in this Court's management software.

On September 25, 2012, 15 NYCRR 136 was amended to impose a 25 year "look back" period which authorized the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles [herein after referred to as "the Commissioner"] to deny an application for relicensing under specific, enumerated circumstances. Relevant herein is supra 136.5(b)(2) which authorizes the Commissioner to deny relicensing if "the person has three of four alcohol or drug related driving convictions or incidents in any combination within the 25 year look back period and, in addition, has one or more serious driving offenses within the 25 year look back period" (supra at 136.5(b)(2)). A serious driving offense includes "20 or more points from any violations" (supra at 136.5 (a)(2)(iv)).

According to defendant's lifetime driving abstract, he has three (3) alcohol related convictions, to wit:

May 5, 2009, in Sullivan County, Town of Liberty

October 25, 2001, Orange County, U.S.M.A. West Point Court

September 5, 2001, Orange County, Village of Washingtonville

Additionally, defendant has accumulated a total of 35 points between May 21, 1997, and November 27, 2006. The lookback period, pursuant to the rules of the Commissioner, commences "25 years before the date of the revocable offense" (supra at 136.5 (a)(3)). Here, defendant's revocable offense was a conviction on May 5, 2009, for operating a motor vehicle with .08% or more alcohol in blood, making the lookback period commencing on May 5, 2009, and looking back 25 years to May 5, 1984. Accordingly, all of the defendant's 35 accumulated points fall within the 25 year look back period.

Under the Commissioner's rules as promulgated in 15 NYCRR at 136.5(b)(2), the combination of defendant's alcohol related convictions and accumulated points make him ineligible for relicensing in the State of New York.

Analysis

In the present matter before the Court, defendant seeks to vacate his guilty plea which resulted in a conviction entered on or about November 27, 2006. In the motion filed with this Court, defendant concedes to the facts of the case, and elaborates that "he understood that the ticket carried 4 points, and that his drivers’ license would not be suspended until he reached 11 points." In support of the motion, defendant raises several issues in support of his motion to vacate the judgment:

1. Defendant "never dreamed that he could receive a lifetime drivers’ license revocation predicated on this conviction." Defendant "did not understand that his plea of guilty would cause a lifetime revocation." Defendant pled guilty "to this speeding ticket without any notice of a potential lifetime driver's license revocation."

2. The defendant's accumulated points and combination of alcohol related convictions subject him to the "draconian lifetime consequence" of being ineligible for relicensing.

3. "To the extent that original records are no longer available, this prejudice should be charged to the State, not to the Defendant."

4. Defendant's loss of driving privileges "have critically hurt his ability to earn a livelihood."

Furthermore, defendant affirmed that he "would not have pled guilty if [he] would have known that [his] license would be revoked forever." Further, defendant affirmed that the loss of "driving privileges have critically hurt [his] ability to earn a livelihood." Defendant also asserts that he has "recovered from alcoholism."

Relevant Law

§ 510 of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law affords the Commissioner the discretion to reissue a license that has been revoked. 15 NYCRR 136.1(a) identifies the intent of the Commissioner's rules as, inter alia, "keeping with his responsibility to provide meaningful safeguards for the general public who are users of the highways" and to establish "criteria to identify problem drivers, the application of which shall result in a presumption, in certain cases, that the involved driver would present a potential danger to himself or other users of the highway if allowed to be licensed or relicensed."

The New York State Appellate Division, Second Department addressed the changes to 15 NYCRR 136 in Argudo v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles , 149 A.D.3d 830, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589 (2017). In Argudo , petitioner/plaintiff Hugo Argudo, had three alcohol related offenses, and had accumulated 27 points on his driving record during the lookback period. Argudo was denied relicensing under the 2012 amendments, and a DMV Appeals Board subsequently upheld the denial. Argudo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles , 149 A.D.3d 830, 831, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589 (2017).

Hugo Argudo sought relief, which was ultimately denied, via a hybrid Article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action in the Nassau County Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia , that in denying relicensing, the "Department of Motor Vehicles and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (DMV) acted unconstitutionally, arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his application" Argudo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles , No. 14258/13, 2014 WL 4481486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 2014).

On appeal, the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the Department of Motor Vehicles did not usurp the legislature's authority by enacting the emergency regulations; the Department of Motor Vehicles had the statutory authority to enact the emergency regulations; the denial of defendant's application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution; and denial of defendant's application was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Argudo v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 149 A.D.3d 830, 832, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589 (2017).

The New York State Court of Appeals settled challenges to 15 NYCRR 136 in Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017). In Acevedo , the Court of Appeals considered appeals by three Appellants with multiple convictions for an alcohol related driving offense, "the third for petitioners Kevin B. Acevedo and Caralyn A. Matsen, and the sixth for petitioner Michael W. Carney." Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles , 29 N.Y.3d 202, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017).

The Court of Appeals, in Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017), held that the regulations were not inconsistent with a recidivist drunk driver's statutory rights regarding relicensing; the regulations did not contravene DMV Commissioner's statutory mandate to exercise discretion on a case by case basis; the regulations did not encroach on legislature's fundamental policy-making responsibility, in violation of constitutional separation of powers; the regulations were not irrational with respect to treatment of prior offenses; the definition of "alcohol- or drug-related driving conviction or incident" was not irrationally underinclusive; and the regulations were civil in nature and therefore were not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017).

Coram Nobis

The legislature has codified coram nobis relief in Article 440 of the New York State Criminal Procedure Law. CPL § 440.10 subdivision one provides a mechanism for persons convicted of an offense to petition the trial court to exercise its inherent power to set aside the judgment of conviction on the basis of several enumerated circumstances ( CPL § 410.10 (1) [a-k] ). Some cases, however, may not fit within the enumerated circumstances of CPL § 410.10 (1) [a-k]. Under these circumstances, an application to set aside a judgment of conviction may be made by relying upon the common law writ of coram nobis People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593, 516 N.Y.S.2d 623, 509 N.E.2d 318 (1987).

The legislature did not eliminate the common law writ of coram nobis with the enactment of § 440.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law. "In its modern context a motion for a writ presupposes a violation of the...