People v. Bender
| Full Citation | People v. Bender, 20 Ill.2d 45, 169 N.E.2d 328 (Ill. 1960) |
| Decision Date | 29 September 1960 |
| Citation | 20 Ill.2d 45,169 N.E.2d 328 |
| Docket Number | No. 35598,35598 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. William BENDER, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
D. A. McGrady, Gillespie, for plaintiff in error.
Grenville Beardsley, Atty. Gen., and Paul C. Verticchio, State's Atty., Carlinville , for defendant in error.
William Bender, referred to herein as defendant, was indicted by the grand jury of Macoupin County for the crime of armed robbery in an indictment which charged a prior conviction of a felony. Counsel was appointed for him and this attorney filed a petition requesting a sanity hearing. The trial judge appointed two psychiatrists to examine defendant and following their examination a jury was impaneled and the sanity hearing was held. The jury returned a verdict finding that defendant was sane, and the case then proceeded to trial by a jury, resulting in a verdict of guilty upon which judgment was entered. Following his conviction and sentence, defendant filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, c. 38, pars. 826 et seq. A hearing was held and the trial court denied any relief in the post-conviction proceeding. Defendant then applied for a writ of error from this court to review the post-conviction judgment and also sought a writ of error under Rule 65-1, Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, c. 110, § 101.65-1. We granted both writs of error and consolidated them for disposition.
Several errors are assigned, but in the view which we take of the case, we find it necessary to consider only one of these assignments. Defendant contends that the procedure at the sanity hearing was so erroneous and irregular that he was deprived of due process of law. It is fundamental that a person charged with crime may not be tried while he is insane and that if an insane person is placed on trial it is a violation of due process of law. People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239; People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861. This principle was well recognized by the common law and has been implemented by the legislature, which has provided that an insane person shall not be tried for an offense during the continuance of his insanity. The statute in question provides for the impaneling of a jury to try the question whether the accused is insane at the time of the hearing. Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, par. 593. The sanity hearing which is thus prescribed is no empty formality, but is designed to preserve the constitutional right of a defendant not to be placed on trial while he is insane. It is, therefore, of great importance that such a hearing should be free from prejudicial error and that the hearing proceed in accordance with proper rules of evidence and that the jury be properly instructed as to the law. In People v. Finn, 17 Ill.2d 614, 162 N.E.2d 354, the defendant was indicted for the crime of burglary. Prior to trial, counsel for defendant petitioned for a sanity hearing. The petition was granted and a sanity hearing was held resulting in a verdict that the defendant was sane. He was thereafter tried by jury on the criminal charge, found guilty, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life as an habitual criminal. We held that certain remarks of the trial judge at the sanity hearing were so prejudicial that defendant was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial hearing and was deprived of due process of law. In People v. Scott, 326 Ill. 327, 157 N.E. 247, we also held that prejudicial errors at a sanity hearing deprived the defendant of due process of law.
In the present case, the two psychiatrists who had been appointed by the court and who testified at the sanity hearing both expressed an opinion that the defendant was insane at the time of the hearing. One of these psychiatrists had specialized in the field of mental illness for more than 35 years and had charge of the mental cases in the prison system of Illinois. In the course of his practice he examined more than 1000 prison inmates each year. The other psychiatrist had specialized in nervous and mental diseases for more than 20 years and was superintendent of the Alton State Hospital. Opposed to the opinions of the two psychiatrists were the opinions of three lay witnesses, a jailer, the sheriff and a deputy sheriff. They all testified that they had talked to defendant and had observed him and that they were of the opinion that he was sane.
Dr. Groves B. Smith, one of the psychiatrists, testified that he examined defendant and had examined his records, the defendant having previously been confined in the penitentiary. He had a lengthy interview with defendant at the jail to evaluate defendant's background and determine his attidude, his philosophies, and his manner of accepting his present situation. He found that defendant was a person of superior intelligence but that at the time of the examination his train of thought and manner clearly was not in conformance with his intelligence and background. He stated that the defendant was unable to get his mind on the questions which were asked him and could not recall any of the events leading up to the crime with which he was charged and could give no idea as to how he got in jail. Defendant's history showed that he was quite depressed and had twice attempted to commit suicide. The doctor was of the opinion that defendant was attempting to escape the reality of finding himself in jail and was not in a position to give any pertinent details which would have a bearing on his ability to stand trial. The doctor was of the opinion that defendant was the victim of a progressing condition of hysterical amnesia and was not in a position to confer with his counsel and plan an adequate defense. The doctor repeatedly expressed his opinion that the defendant was mentally ill, both from a medical and from a legal standpoint, and that he was unable to co-operate with his counsel. On cross-examination he stated that he had given the defendant the benefit of the doubt, and explained that his reason for doing so, in part, was because, if he were not given this benefit, in a year or two he could claim a denial of his constitutional rights. Following this statement by the doctor the State's Attorney asked the doctor whether he thought that it was fair to the People of the State of Illinois to bend over backwards in this case. The doctor replied that he did think so because of the enactment of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The State's Attorney stated that he did not see why that applied because the defendant was having a sanity hearing at that time. He also told the witness that if defendant was found sane at that sanity hearing he was not entitled to another hearing on the same proposition, and that he did not see why the legal end of it should enter into the doctor's decision. The doctor stated that it was his impression that the sanity hearing was an attempt on the part of the State to get the actual picture, and he stated that the actual picture at the time was that the defendant was in a state of hysterical amnesia which blocked off his abilities to confer with counsel. He stated that there was a possibility that the jurors might find that the man was sane but that certainly was not his opinion. The State's Attorney then stated that if the doctor would testify that defendant was perfectly sane the defendant would be brought to trial and it would not make any difference so far as any of the defendant's future legal rights were concerned. The doctor replied that it might lay a foundation for future legal attempts and that he was giving defendant the benefit of the doubt to take away any possibility of his making use of further remedies. The State's Attorney replied that he did not see why the defendant was entitled to the benefit of any doubt, that the State of Illinois had an interest in the matter, too, and that it would be a pretty serious matter that the State of Illinois would have to follow, if they followed the doctor's recommendations. The State's Attorney then asked the doctor if he understood that if the man was found insane he would be confined in a mental institution and then he would be entitled to another...
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