People v. Benson

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DAILY
• Citation: People v. Benson, 19 Ill.2d 50, 166 N.E.2d 80 (Ill. 1960)
• Decision Date: 31 March 1960
• Docket Number: No. 35452,35452
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. William BENSON, Jr., Plaintiff in Error.

Page 80

166 N.E.2d 80

19 Ill.2d 50

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. William BENSON, Jr., Plaintiff in Error.

No. 35452.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 31, 1960.

Harold S. Rosenfield and McCoy, Ming & Leighton, Chicago (George N. Leighton, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Grenville Beardsley, Atty. Gen., and Benjamin S. Adamowski, State's Atty., Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Francis X. Riley, and John T. Gallagher, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

DAILY, Justice.

Defendant, William Benson, Jr., was found guilty of murder after a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 25 years. He prosecutes this writ of error and contends initially that the trial court erred in denying a timely motion for discharge for want of speedy prosecution.

The record reveals that defendant was arrested January 11, 1958, and remained continuously in custody without being admitted to bail until his trial on June 17, 1958, a period in excess of five months. The chronological order of events occurring during the interim is as follows:

January 14-Leave granted in municipal court to Lucille Burton, a daughter of the deceased, to file a complaint for a preliminary examination in the case of People of the State of Illinois v. William H. Benson, Jr. The court took jurisdiction and, on motion of the People, set the hearing for February 11, 1958.

February 11-On motion of the People, the municipal court reset the hearing for March 7, 1958.

March 7-Cause continued to April 7, on motion of the People.

April 3-Indictment against defendant returned to the criminal court of Cook County.

April 7-Nolle prosequi entered in municipal court on motion of the People.

April 11-Defendant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and cause was set for trial on April 14, 1958.

April 14-Defendant demanded trial but, upon motion of the People, the cause was continued to April 30, 1958, with subpoenas.

April 30-On motion of the People, cause continued to May 2, 1958, with subpoenas. subpoenas; also, on motion of the People, the court ordered that defendant be examined by the Behavior Clinic and that the report be filed on or before May 2, 1958.

May 2-State's Attorney filed written motion requesting a continuance for sixty days, alleging it had come to his attention defendant had been recently confined to a mental institution, and that it was necessary for the prosecution to determine whether defendant's mental capacity was such as would enable him to stand trial. Over defendant's objection and demand for an immediate trial, a continuance was granted to June 17, 1958, with subpoenas.

May 20-Defendant filed motion for discharge under the provisions of section 18, division XIII of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 38, par. 748), alleging that he had been confined continuously since January 12, 1958, that he had neither been admitted to bail nor tried within four months thereafter, and that the delay did not occur on his own application. Although the judge hearing the motion expressed an opinion that defendant was entitled to a discharge, he denied the motion, as well as a motion demanding trial instanter, and the proceedings were adjourned to June 17, 1958.

June 6-Defendant filed motion to quash count 1 of the indictment and hearing on the same was continued to June 17.

June 13-Motion of People for defendant to be examined in Behavior Clinic and for report before June 17, 1958; motion granted.

June 17-Defendant's motion for discharge renewed and again denied, after which his trial and conviction followed.

To implement the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by section 9 of article II of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A., the legislature of this State has enacted section 18 of division XIII of the Criminal Code which provides in part as follows: 'Any person committed for a criminal or supposed criminal offense, and not admitted to bail, and not tried by the court having jurisdiction of the offense, within four months of the date of commitment, shall be set at liberty by the court, unless the delay shall happen on the application of the prisoner, or unless the court is satisfied that due exertion has been made to procure evidence on the part of the People, and that there is reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be procured at a later day in which case the court may continue the cause for not more than sixty (60) days.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 38, par. 748. This court has held that the statute is to be construed liberally since it is in conservation of the liberty of a citizen, (People ex rel. Woodruff v. Matson, 129 Ill. 591, 22 N.E. 456) that its salutary provisions cannot be nullified by technical evasions, (People v. House, 10 Ill.2d 556, 141 N.E.2d 12) and that its provisions are mandatory and confer upon an accused a substantial and absolute right under the constitution. People v. Stillwagon, 373 Ill. 211, 25 N.E.2d 795; People v. Emblen, 362 Ill. 142, 199 N.E. 281.

In the present case it is undisputed that more than four months elapsed between the date of defendant's commitment and his trial and, from the record, it may likewise be conceded that defendant neither occasioned nor consented to the delay, and that he did not waive his right to a speedy trial. The determinative question then is whether the delay requested by the People for the purpose of inquiring into defendant's sanity was a permissible delay.

Defendant takes the position that ascertainment of the sanity of an accused is not one of the statutory grounds for continuance provided in the four-month statute, and thus urges that the continuance granted for such purpose was ineffective to toll the running of the four-month period. The People, starting with the premise that the trial, adjudication, and sentence of a person charged with a criminal offense, while insane, is a violation of due process of law, (People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861) next call our attention to language of People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 368-369, 143 N.E.2d 239, which states that the sanity of a defendant should be settled before any further steps are taken, if at any time before, during or after trial, the court, either from its observation or upon suggestion of counsel, becomes aware of facts which raise doubt of the sanity of the accused. Because of these principles of due process, it is urged that the exception of the statute which permits delay 'to procure the evidence on the part of the People, ' must be construed to mean that a continuance may be granted to enable the People to procure such evidence as is necessary to prosecute an accused with full due process. Alternatively, and because of the language in the Burson case, it is contended that it is immaterial whether the People moved to delay or not, since, once a doubt appeared, the mental capacity of the defendant had to be determined in order to meet constitutional requirements of due process.

When measured by the plain meaning of the words employed, we think it obvious that the legislature, in authorizing a continuance 'to procure the evidence on the part of the People,' did not contemplate a delay for the purpose of inquiring into the sanity of the accused. However, the fact that a continuance for such purpose does not fall within the statute does not of itself entitle the defendant to discharge. The statute in question was enacted to implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. While language employed in Newlin v. People, 221 Ill. 166, 175, 77 N.E. 529, contains a suggestion that delay beyond the statutory time can be justified only on grounds expressly stated in the statute, that suggestion is not applicable here.

Considering the demands of due process, as outlined in People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239, it is our opinion that, in a proper case, a delay necessitated for the purpose of ascertaining a defendant's sanity and mental capacity to be subjected to criminal prosecution is a speedy trial, or violate the statute enacted infringe upon the constitutional right to a to implement the constitutional provision. to implement the constitutional provision. However, a mere arbitrary suggestion of insanity will not suffice, and whether such ground constitutes a good cause for delay in a given case must be a matter resting within the discretion of the trial court, to be resolved from the particular facts and circumstances before it. On review, the ruling will not be disturbed unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Kendall, 7 Ill.2d 570, 131 N.E.2d 519.

In the present case the People's verified motion for continuance alleged that defendant had been confined in a mental institution within the recent past, and that it was necessary to determine whether he had the mental capacity to stand a trial. These allegations under oath were not denied by defendant, nor a hearing demanded thereon, leaving the trial court with but little choice to grant the continuance prayed. This is particularly true since the allegation of confinement in a mental institution carried with it implications of an adjudication of insanity which the law presumes to continue until there is evidence to the contrary. See People ex rel. McElhaney v. Robinson, 413 Ill. 401, 108 N.E.2d 772. Having stood idly by when the continuance was granted, defendant was and is in no position to avail himself of the four-month rule. To overcome his inaction defendant now claims the People's motion for continuance was a mere subterfuge inasmuch as no determination of his sanity was ever made. The record, however, reveals that an examination and a report to the court were made before the trial...