People v. Beverly
| Decision Date | 03 March 1896 |
| Citation | 108 Mich. 509,66 N.W. 379 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. BEVERLY. |
Error to circuit court, Monroe county; Edward D. Kinne, Judge.
Clarence Beverly was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.
John O. Zabel and Ira G. Humphrey, for appellant.
Fred A Maynard, Atty. Gen., and H. A. Lockwood, Pros. Atty., for the People.
The defendant killed his wife by repeated shooting, under circumstances which clearly indicated murder, unless the defense of irresponsibility can be maintained. He was convicted of murder in the second degree. His counsel allege error upon the charge of the court, in that it did not sufficiently explain the offense of manslaughter, and it is claimed that it was so carelessly worded that it may have led the jury to infer that he could not properly be convicted of that offense. From our examination of the evidence (which is all incorporated in the bill of exceptions) we think that the defendant was guilty of murder, if any crime, and that the court might properly have said so to the jury. It therefore becomes unnecessary to discuss the points raised upon the subject of manslaughter.
Upon the trial, a dying declaration, made by the deceased, was read in evidence. Several reasons are alleged why this should have been excluded, viz.: (1) Because the exigencies of the case did not require it. (2) Because it was taken some days after the shooting occurred, and defendant had no notice. (3) Because counsel for defendant were not permitted to examine such statement until it was offered in evidence, and the intention to use it upon the trial was not indorsed upon the information with the names of witnesses for the prosecution. (4) Because the deceased was under the influence of opiates at the time it was taken, and was not certain that she would die. (5) Because a large portion of her statement was about matters remote as to time and place, and not a part of the res gest�. We do not find any authority supporting several of these claims, and see no occasion for discussing them at length. We know of no rule that makes the admissibility of a dying declaration depend upon the "exigencies of the case," or the fact that it was taken immediately after the injury; and we recall no case which holds that its admissibility depends upon notice of the intended taking of such statement to the defendant or his counsel, and we think it is not within the provisions of the statute requiring the names of witnesses to be indorsed upon the information. The condition of the witness at the time the statement was made was before the court and jury, both as to the influence of opiates and her belief in impending death. The judge was warranted in admitting the statement, and the jury were at liberty to give it such credence as it seemed worthy of. In the main it was in accord with undisputed facts, and as to those could not have injured the defendant. This statement alleged that the defendant had repeatedly threatened to kill his wife and others if she should leave him, but the court struck out that portion applying to others. The brief does not point out the objectionable matters, or show how the defendant was injured by them. But we suppose it was these threats that counsel objected to. Dying declarations are admitted in homicide cases upon the theory that the belief in impending death is equivalent to the sanction of an oath. They extend to statements of the cause and circumstances of the homicide. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 105; People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 435, and cases cited; 1 Rosc. Cr. Ev. p. 54; 1 Greenl. Ev. � 159. In this case the statement showed that the defendant repeatedly threatened to shoot his wife if she should leave him, or refuse to cohabit with him....
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