People v. Bickley

• Decision Date: 25 October 2012
• Citation: 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07155,99 A.D.3d 1113,952 N.Y.S.2d 675
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Theodore BICKLEY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

99 A.D.3d 1113

952 N.Y.S.2d 675

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07155

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Theodore BICKLEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Oct. 25, 2012.

Aaron A. Louridas, Delmar, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Kenneth C. Weafer of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, KAVANAGH, STEIN and EGAN JR., JJ.

KAVANAGH, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.), rendered March 1, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree.

Defendant was found in possession of counterfeit United States currency and was charged with criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree. After a jury trial, he was convicted and subsequently sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 6 to 12 years. Defendant now appeals.

Defendant claims that his conviction was not supported either by legally sufficient evidence or by the weight of the credible evidence introduced at trial. For such a conviction to be supported by legally sufficient evidence, it must be proven that defendant possessed this counterfeit currency “with knowledge that it [was] forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another” (Penal Law § 170.30; see People v. Bailey, 13 N.Y.3d 67, 70, 886 N.Y.S.2d 666, 915 N.E.2d 611 [2009] ). Defendant acknowledges that the currency found on his person (18 $50 bills) was counterfeit, but claims that it was not established at trial that he knew the currency was counterfeit or that he possessed it with the intent to deceive others. We disagree.

Evidence establishing an intent to deceive another can “ ‘be inferred from the act itself ... [or] from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances' ” ( People v. Rodriguez, 71 A.D.3d 450, 452, 897 N.Y.S.2d 42 [2010],affd.17 N.Y.3d 486, 933 N.Y.S.2d 631, 957 N.E.2d 1133 [2011], quoting People v. Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094 [1977] [citation omitted] ). Here, evidence was presented that a week prior to his arrest, defendant used a counterfeit $50 bill to pay for a food order at a fast-food restaurant. When he was challenged about the integrity of this currency, defendant tendered a new bill to pay for the food order and returned the change he had received when he used the counterfeit $50 bill. After the police were notified, defendant abruptly left the restaurant without his entire food order, but later returned to inquire of an employee as to whether she had given his name to the police.¹ Therefore, legally sufficient evidence was presented at trial from which the jury could rationally infer that defendant possessed the counterfeit currency with the intent to defraud or deceive others ( see People v. Rodriguez, 17 N.Y.3d 486, 489–490, 933 N.Y.S.2d 631, 957 N.E.2d 1133 [2011];compare People v. Bailey, 13 N.Y.3d at 72, 886 N.Y.S.2d 666, 915 N.E.2d 611) and that the jury's verdict was supported by the weight of the credible evidence introduced at trial ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007];People v. Monteiro, 93 A.D.3d 898, 900, 939 N.Y.S.2d 629 [2012],lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 964, 950 N.Y.S.2d 116, 973 N.E.2d 214 [2012] ).

Defendant also argues that what transpired at the fast-food restaurant constituted evidence of a prior bad act and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. Evidence of uncharged crimes or prior bad acts may be presented to establish, among other things, a defendant's intent and identity ( see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286 [1901];People v. Buchanan, 95 A.D.3d 1433, 1436, 944 N.Y.S.2d 378 [2012];People v. Lindsey, 75 A.D.3d 906, 908, 906 N.Y.S.2d 161 [2010],lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 922, 913 N.Y.S.2d 649, 939 N.E.2d 815 [2010] ), and is also admissible when it is “inextricably interwoven” with the conduct that is the subject of the defendant's trial ( People v. Burnell, 89 A.D.3d 1118, 1120, 931 N.Y.S.2d 776 [2011],lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 922, 942 N.Y.S.2d 461, 965 N.E.2d 963 [2012] ). Defendant's conduct at the restaurant and, in particular, his use of a counterfeit bill was undeniably relevant to establish that he knew the currency seized from him at the time of his arrest was counterfeit and that he possessed it with the intent to defraud others. Any prejudice that may have resulted from the admission of this evidence at trial, in our view, was far outweighed by its probative value and it was properly admitted at trial ( see id. at 1121, 931 N.Y.S.2d 776).

Defendant further argues that it was error to allow a police officer to testify at trial that, when arrested, defendant had been operating a motor vehicle with a suspended driver's license. However, this evidence was relevant to explain why defendant was stopped by the police and how the counterfeit currency was found on his person. Given the appropriate limiting instructions that County Court gave the jury regarding the use of this evidence, we see no error in its admission ( see People v. Johnson, 233 A.D.2d 761, 763, 650 N.Y.S.2d 408 [1996],lv. denied89 N.Y.2d 1012, 658 N.Y.S.2d 250, 680 N.E.2d 624 [1997] ).

We also reject defendant's challenge to County Court's Sandoval ruling permitting him to be cross-examined...