People v. Bilus
Decision Date | 22 November 2005 |
Docket Number | NA 5193/05 |
Citation | 804 N.Y.S.2d 670,2005 NY Slip Op 25498,10 Misc.3d 761 |
Court | New York District Court |
Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. MITCHELL BILUS, Defendant. |
Legal Aid Society of Nassau County, Hempstead (Kent Moston and Kevin McGrath of counsel), for defendant.
Denis E. Dillon, District Attorney, Hempstead (Jamie Brody of counsel), for plaintiff.
The defendant is charged under District Court informations with violating Penal Law § 195.05, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, and Penal Law § 120.45 (3), stalking in the fourth degree. The defendant moves, inter alia, to dismiss the informations as facially insufficient pursuant to CPL 170.30, 170.35, 100.15 and 100.40.
For the reasons that follow, those branches of the defendant's motion to dismiss the informations are granted and the informations are dismissed.
The informations charge the defendant as follows:
The supporting deposition of the complainant, which is attached to each of the informations, states the following:
Defendant argues that the obstruction charge must be dismissed because "a person cannot be charged with violating Penal Law § 195.05 for disrupting the administration of the Federal Government" (McGrath affirmation ¶ 16). According to the defendant, a postal worker is not a "public servant" under the Penal Law. Moreover, the "accusatory instrument fails to contain any language that describes how the defendant's actions interfered with a governmental function" (McGrath affirmation ¶ 18).
With regard to the stalking charge, defendant argues that two incidents occurring six months apart do not constitute a course of conduct. In addition, defendant asserts that there is no allegation that his actions were likely to cause the complainant to be in reasonable fear that her employment would be threatened (McGrath affirmation ¶¶ 24-26). Last, defendant argues that the accusatory instrument is defective because it fails to allege that he was present at the post office solely to stalk the complainant (McGrath affirmation ¶ 27).
In response, the People argue that the complainant is a public servant under the Penal Law and that defendant's actions "impaired the administration of a government function," as asserted in the supporting deposition of complainant (Brody affirmation ¶¶ 6, 7, 8), wherein she stated that defendant's actions prevented her from performing her duties and disrupted the general operation of the post office.
Regarding the charge of stalking, the People assert that two incidents can establish a course of conduct sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The People further argue that defendant's conduct was of such a nature that it reasonably put the complainant in fear of losing her job. In addition, the People assert that irrespective of the fact that the post office is open to the public and that the defendant may have complained about Ms. Varma, such "does not negate defendant's intentions to go there with the sole intent to stalk Ms. Varma" (Brody affirmation ¶¶ 13, 14).
The information charging the defendant with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree is facially insufficient in that neither it nor the supporting deposition establishes with nonhearsay allegations every element of the offense charged (see CPL 100.40 [1] [b], [c]). Significantly, the allegations do not establish an impairment of state governmental function or interference with the performance of official functions by a public servant.
Penal Law § 195.05 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act . . . ."
Section 195.05 was enacted in 1965 as part of a comprehensive revision of the Penal Law. The section represented an effort to combine several provisions of the Penal Law which proscribed interference with the official actions of various state and local officers: former section 196 ("Interference with officers") prohibited the interference with actions of constables, police officers or officers or agents of any society for the prevention of cruelty to animals; former section 490 ("Duty of officers"), requiring police officers and constables, and allowing officers or agents of any society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, to arrest persons violating the article, and making it a crime to interfere with such arrests; former section 1320 (); former section 1323 (); former section 1824 () proscribed interference with executive officers; former section 1825 ("Resisting officer"), again, dealing with executive officers; former section 1851 ().
Considering the statutory derivation of section 195.05 and viewing it in conjunction with Penal Law § 10.00 (15), which defines the term "public servant," it is evident that the...
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