People v. Birkett

• Decision Date: 05 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. S062379,S062379
• Citation: 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205,980 P.2d 912,21 Cal.4th 226
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 980 P.2d 912, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6250, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8025 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Terry Eugene BIRKETT, Defendant and Appellant

Page 205

87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205

21 Cal.4th 226, 980 P.2d 912, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6250,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8025

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Terry Eugene BIRKETT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S062379.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 5, 1999.

Patricia J. Ulibarri, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster, Janelle Boustany and Marilyn L. George, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Preston, Steffen, Katzen, Gallagher & MacMorris and David Hewes Bent, Fresno, for California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

Proposition 8 states the People of California's "unequivocal intention" that "all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution" from the convicted criminals. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b) (article I, section 28(b)), italics added.) This measure requires restitution, absent compelling and extraordinary contrary reasons, whenever "a crime victim suffers a loss" (ibid., italics added), and it calls for implementing legislation (ibid.). The Legislature has enacted, and frequently amended, a bewildering array of responsive statutes. The narrow questions here arise under the statutory scheme as in effect in November 1994. ¹ The issues are (1) whether the 1994 laws governing mandatory restitution as a condition of adult probation gave insurers a right to restitution insofar as they had reimbursed their insureds for crime-related losses, and (2) if not, whether trial courts nonetheless had discretion to allocate mandatory probationary restitution awards between insurers and insureds to reflect such reimbursements.

We conclude that the 1994 laws gave only "direct [crime] victim[s]" a right to restitution from adult probationers, and insurers did not become such "direct victim[s]" by reimbursing crime losses under the terms of their policies. Moreover, while trial courts retained considerable discretion to order nonstatutory restitution as a condition of probation, they could not divert mandatory restitutionary awards from insureds to insurers, because the 1994 scheme gave "direct victim[s]" a right to restitution based on the full amount of their losses, without regard to full or partial recoupments from other sources except the Restitution Fund. We further determine that the scheme, as so limited, did not violate Proposition 8.

The Court of Appeal thus erred by upholding a trial court order which split a mandatory probationary restitution award for the full amount of certain "direct victim[s]' " losses between the victims themselves and the insurers who had partially reimbursed them. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, with directions to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

FACTS

On November 17, 1994, Steven Lang, a Murietta police officer, stopped Shirley Birkett, who was driving a tan Toyota truck with a cracked windshield. Lang knew Shirley from previous contacts and told her he had heard there was a stolen car at the residence she shared with defendant, who was her husband. With Shirley's permission, Lang accompanied her to the property and searched it.

The search, and other investigation, revealed several stolen vehicles, and parts of vehicles, on the Birketts' property. Defendant told investigators he had switched the vehicle identification numbers (VIN's) on at least two vehicles, including the tan Toyota truck.

An information charged defendant with one count of owning and operating a chop shop (Veh.Code, § 10801), one count of tampering with a VIN (id., § 10802), one count of receiving stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496), and one count of auto theft (Veh.Code, § 10851). Pursuant to a bargain, defendant pled guilty to the chop shop and auto theft counts. He agreed to pay restitution to victims Woodward, Shafer, Lanting, and Simpson, in amounts to be determined. In return, the remaining counts were dismissed, and petitioner received felony probation with the condition, among others, that he serve one year in county jail.

At a restitution hearing, the court took evidence about the amounts of the victims' vehicle losses. The evidence disclosed, among other things, that Wood-ward and Lanting had been partially reimbursed by insurance. Therefore, the court also entertained argument and briefing on whether the restitution scheme authorized awards to the reimbursing insurers.

The court ultimately ruled that under the law applicable to petitioner's crimes, insurance carriers were entitled to restitution. Accordingly, in its restitution order, the court awarded $800 to Woodward, $3,642.53 to Woodward's automobile insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), $250 to Lanting, and $3,095.42 to Lanting's automobile insurer, National General Insurance Company (National General).

In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed. The Court of Appeal reasoned, in essence, that restitution to insurers was authorized because, by reimbursing their policyholders, the carriers became subrogated to the policyholders' rights of recovery against third parties. By thus stepping into the shoes of their insureds who had suffered losses as the direct result of crime, the Court of Appeal concluded, the insurers themselves assumed the status of direct victims entitled to restitution under the 1994 statutes. In reaching this result, the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with People v. Sexton (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 64, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 (Sexton ), the only other then-published decision to address the effect of the 1994 amendments on insurers' entitlement to restitution.

We granted review. We now reverse.

DISCUSSION

On June 8, 1982, Proposition 8 was enacted by the voters. It added new article I, section 28(b) to the California Constitution. Article I, section 28(b) directed the Legislature to adopt, within one calendar year, laws implementing the "right" of "all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity" to receive "restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes," and ensuring that "[r]estitution shall be ordered" from convicted criminals "in every case ... in which a crime victim suffers a loss" unless "compelling and extraordinary reasons" weigh against restitution. The Legislature enacted responsive legislation in 1983, and has amended it frequently thereafter.

In November 1994, when defendant committed his crimes, mandatory restitution as a condition of adult probation was governed by former section 1203.04 of the Penal Code, as then recently amended. ² In general, this statute required such restitution from the probationer to the victims of his crimes. (Id., subds. (a)(2)(A), (d), (e).) Among other things, it declared that "[n]othing in this section shall prevent a court from ordering restitution to any corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime." (Id., subd. (j), italics added.)

Defendant and the People appear to agree that by reason of this latter subdivision, insurers were entitled to restitution from a probationer only as "direct victim[s]" of the probationer's crimes. Defendant contends, however, that an insurer who merely satisfied the contractual obligation to reimburse the crime-related losses of its policyholder was not such a "direct victim."

On the other hand, the People and their amicus curiae ³ advance the Court of Appeal's premise that an insurer became a "direct victim" by reimbursing its policyholder for a covered loss, because by right of subrogation, the insurer thus assumed the insured's direct rights against the criminal who caused the loss. In our view, both the plain language of former section 1203.04 of the Penal Code, and its legislative history, belie the People's argument.

In ascertaining the Legislature's intent, we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning. (People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 856 P.2d 1134 (Broussard ); People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 15, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843.) We must follow the statute's plain meaning, if such appears, unless doing so would lead to absurd results the Legislature could not have intended. (Broussard, supra, at pp. 1071-1072, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 856 P.2d 1134; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014.) If our examination of the statutory language leaves doubt about its meaning, we may consult other evidence of the Legislature's intent, such as the history and background of the measure. (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 29-30, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986; Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 751, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 896 P.2d 807.)

The plain language of former section 1203.04 of the Penal Code, as effective in November 1994, confirms defendant's view that the statute did not give insurers a right to restitution of amounts paid to reimburse the crime-related losses of their policyholders. With one anomalous exception, the 1994 section uniformly spoke of restitution to "victim[s]" of crime. (Pen.Code, former § 1203.04, subds. (a)(1) [Legislature's intent that "victim of crime" receive direct restitution for crime-related economic loss] & (2)(A) [probationer shall make restitution "[t]o the victim, if the crime involved a victim"], (d)(3) [restitution shall include "[w]ages or profits lost due to...