People v. Bishop

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FULTON
• Citation: People v. Bishop, 1 Ill.2d 60, 114 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. 1953)
• Decision Date: 24 September 1953
• Docket Number: No. 32846,32846
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BISHOP.

Page 566

114 N.E.2d 566

1 Ill.2d 60

PEOPLE v. BISHOP.

No. 32846.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 1953.

James Joy Bishop, pro se.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and James E. Bales, State's Atty., Dixon (Fred G. Leach, Decatur, and Harry L. Pate, Tuscola, of counsel), for the People.

FULTON, Justice.

On January 16, 1953, James Joy Bishop, hereafter referred to as the defendant, filed in the circuit court of Lee County his motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis seeking to set aside a judgment of that court entered on June 22, 1949, on his plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with the crimes of kidnapping and kidnapping for ransom, upon which he was sentenced to confinement in the Illinois State Penitentiary for the term of his natural life. The State's Attorney filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the allegations of defendant's motion were not matters for review by writ of error coram nobis. The court sustained the motion to dismiss. By this writ of error defendant questions the correctness of that ruling. He has presented here the common-law record in the original criminal proceeding as well as the record showing the proceedings in coram nobis. The only questions before us are whether the defendant's motion sets forth any facts which, if known to the trial court at the time, would have prevented the judgment of conviction and whether, assuming such facts exist, they were unknown to the court through no fault or negligence of the defendant.

A motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, while available in criminal as well as in civil cases, has the limited function of bringing to the attention of the court errors of fact of such character as would have prevented the rendition of the judgment. It lies to set aside a conviction obtained by fraud or duress. It is also available where the defendant has been deprived of a defense which he would have used at the trial and which, if known to the court, would have prevented conviction, but only under circumstances showing excusable mistake or ignorance of the accused and the absence of negligence on his part. Guth v. People, 402 Ill. 286, 83 N.E.2d 590; Greene v. People, 402 Ill. 224, 83 N.E.2d 582; Hawks v. People, 398 Ill. 281, 75 N.E.2d 686; People v. Bruno, 346 Ill. 449, 179 N.E. 129.

The allegations of defendant's motion pertinent here are that on June 4, 1949, he went to the city of Dixon in the county of Lee for the purpose of stealing an automobile; that he contacted an automobile salesman by the name of Frank Hoyle and made an appointment with him for that evening at 7:00 o'clock for a demonstration; that at the appointed time the defendant and Hoyle met and drove in an automobile owned by Hoyle's company to a point about three miles north of Dixon, where defendant produced a 32-caliber revolver, pointed it at Hoyle and made Hoyle turn over all his money amounting to about $80 in currency; that defendant then forced Hoyle to drive northeast to the village of New Milford, where he forced Hoyle to have the tank filled with gasoline; that thereafter they continued to drive; that at about 11:00 o'clock P.M. defendant released Hoyle upon a road east of Belvidere, after forcing him to hand over his wrist watch, pen-and-pencil set, socks and shoes; that the entire time defendant and Hoyle were together they were on the public streets and roads of the towns and...