People v. Black

• Decision Date: 17 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1–10–1817.,1–10–1817.
• Citation: 2012 IL App (1st) 101817,974 N.E.2d 231,362 Ill.Dec. 710
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Maceo BLACK, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 101,817

974 N.E.2d 231

362 Ill.Dec. 710

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Maceo BLACK, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–10–1817.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fourth Division.

May 17, 2012.

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Karl H. Mundt, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary L. Boland, and Eve Reilly, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[362 Ill.Dec. 711]¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Maceo Black was found guilty of the unlawful restraint of an 11–year–old boy, then sentenced to four years and six months in prison and required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Sex Offender Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 to 12 (West 2006)). This is the second appearance of this matter before us, the case having been previously remanded in People v. Black, 394 Ill.App.3d 935, 334 Ill.Dec. 517, 917 N.E.2d 114 (2009). There, we vacated the imposition of the sex offender requirement on defendant because the trial court failed to make a specific factual determination at sentencing that defendant's offense was sexually motivated, which was necessary to bring him within the purview of the Sex Offender Act. Black, 394 Ill.App.3d at 942, 944, 334 Ill.Dec. 517, 917 N.E.2d 114. On remand, the trial court held a hearing and determined defendant's unlawful restraint conviction was indeed sexually motivated. Defendant now challenges that decision, arguing that none of the facts or circumstances involved in this offense indicated he acted with an intent to engage in behavior of a sexual nature. Defendant also contends he was deprived of due process at his hearing.

¶ 2 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 At defendant's bench trial, the victim N.N. and his uncle testified for the State. The testimony of N.N.'s mother was admitted following a pretrial hearing under section 115–10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115–10 (West 2006)) to determine the reliability of N.N.'s hearsay statements. Their combined testimony established that on June 4, 2006, about 8 p.m., N.N., then age 11, was waiting for a bus along with defendant, a stranger, who was carrying several bags of groceries. Defendant, who was age 34, 6 feet tall and weighed 180 pounds, struck up a conversation with the minor about sports and asked if N.N. wanted to play on defendant's basketball team. When the bus arrived, defendant, who displayed no apparent physical incapacities or problems carrying the groceries from store to stop, asked for help carrying his grocery bags onto the bus, and N.N. complied. Defendant sat near N.N. and offered him money if the boy would help take the groceries up to defendant's apartment. N.N. agreed to help without compensation, but when the bus approached his stop, he pulled the cable line to signal his intent to get off the bus, telling defendant that his mother was expecting him. N.N. got up to exit, but defendant pulled N.N. by his arm back into his seat. N.N. told his mother defendant said, “no, you're going to help me with the bags.” N.N. then agreed to help with the groceries and remained on the bus with defendant.

¶ 4 They exited the bus at defendant's stop and walked across a street and through an alley to defendant's third-floor apartment. Defendant ordered N.N. to set the bags down, then unlocked his apartment door, opened it, and told N.N. to place the bags inside. Defendant closed the door and stood in front of it as N.N. placed the bags in the kitchen. Defendant offered N.N. $5 for helping with the bags, but N.N. refused the money. N.N. was on his “way out” when he heard defendant lock the door. N.N. told his mother that he then asked defendant why he was locking the door. N.N. felt scared and said he needed to get home. Defendant did not open the door, but rather blocked the door with his back against it and his hands on the knob. N.N. then pushed defendant “out of the way” and unlocked the door. N.N. told his mother defendant would not let him leave “without a struggle,” and he had to push him two times. Defendant grabbed his arm, but N.N. was able to flee.

¶ 5 N.N. ran eight blocks home. Appearing distraught, he reported the encounter to his mother and uncle, who called the police. Defendant was apprehended by the police around 10 p.m. as he was walking on the street, and N.N. identified him as the man who had restrained him.

¶ 6 Chicago police officer Andrew Kroll testified that a custodial search of defendant's person revealed he was carrying an adult pornographic magazine, wrapped in a newspaper. Defense counsel objected to the relevance of this evidence. The trial court withheld ruling on the admissibility of the evidence at that time, but later declared it inadmissible.

¶ 7 The State rested, and the defense did not present evidence. Following argument, the judge found defendant guilty of unlawful restraint.

¶ 8 At the sentencing hearing, N.N. read his victim impact statement into evidence. N.N. stated that defendant “took advantage” of the fact that N.N. liked “to help people,” but N.N. was glad his mom told him what to do so he “wouldn't be hurt and could get away.” After the offense, N.N. felt “bad inside and sad most of the time,” stayed in his room, did not talk to his family or friends, and did not do things he usually had enjoyed. He missed school, could not concentrate, and was embarrassedby the offense. He did not want other kids like him to be victims.

¶ 9 Defendant's presentence investigation report shows felony convictions for burglary and forgery and misdemeanor convictions for prostitution, in addition to arrests for both prostitution and solicitation. According to the report, defendant was a ward of the State from age 13 to 21. He reportedly lived in several group homes and was labeled an habitual runaway by the juvenile court system. Defendant also reportedly suffered severe physical abuse from his father owing to his family's belief that he was homosexual. Defendant was said to be emotionally damaged “in the long run,” and he was sexually abused when 16 by a teacher while residing in a group home.

¶ 10 Following evidence and argument, the judge observed that N.N. helped defendant with groceries, but the judge was unsure “what motivation there might have been” for defendant “to try to keep the boy in the apartment against his will.” The judge concluded “we'll never know what the motivation might have been but it certainly affected [N.N.].” The court noted that “fortunately nothing else happened,” and N.N. was “pretty sharp” to note in his victim impact statement that he did not want this to happen to any other kids. Taking into account the aggravating and mitigating evidence, the court sentenced defendant to four years and six months in prison. The trial court did not make any finding as to the presence or absence of a sexual motivation for the offense, but nonetheless, defendant was required to register as a sex offender.

¶ 11 As stated, defendant appealed the determination that he was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant argued the trial court should have entered a written finding that his unlawful restraint of N.N. was sexually motivated and, absent such a finding, he was required to register instead under the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (Offender Against Youth Act) (730 ILCS 154/1 (West 2006)). The Offender Against Youth Act lists as a qualifying offense unlawful restraint of a victim under 18 when the defendant is not a parent if, at sentencing, the court verifies the offense was not sexually motivated.730 ILCS 154/5(a)(1)(A), (b)(1), 86 (West 2006). As stated, this court determined the trial court was required to make a factual determination of whether defendant's crime was or was not sexually motivated for purposes of determining whether defendant had to register under the Sex Offender Act, or the Offender Against Youth Act. Black, 394 Ill.App.3d at 936, 944, 334 Ill.Dec. 517, 917 N.E.2d 114.

¶ 12 On remand, defendant, who already had served his term of imprisonment, appeared before the trial court with counsel, but did not offer any testimony. The court permitted the parties to argue their respective stances as to whether defendant's unlawful restraint of N.N. was sexually motivated. In arguing the court could not so find, defense counsel emphasized that the presentence investigation report was irrelevant and the only possible indication of sexual motivation was the magazine which the court previously ruled inadmissible. Defense counsel predictably put particular emphasis on the court's statement during the guilt phase of trial that it would not speculate as to defendant's motive. Defense counsel maintained that the absence of evidence of sexual motivation required a finding that defendant register under the Offender Against Youth Act.

¶ 13 The judge deflected this defense argument by stating that there had been no need to consider the motivation behind defendant's detention of N.N. for the purpose of finding defendant guilty of unlawfulrestraint (see 720 ILCS 5/10–3 (West 2006)) at trial. The judge clarified that when he stated he would not speculate as to motive, he did not mean to suggest the absence of any motivation. While noting that the nature of the hearing regarding defendant's sex offender status was different from his trial on the unlawful restraint charge, the court addressed the evidence in turn and found the offense was sexually motivated for three articulated reasons. First, the court stated that defendant's request that N.N. help him carry groceries to his apartment clearly was pretextual. The court noted that N.N. did not really want to go there, but when he did, defendant locked the door behind him and N.N. had to use ...