People v. Blair

• Decision Date: 21 March 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 114122.
• Citation: People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, 369 Ill. Dec. 126, 986 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2013)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Connie S. BLAIR, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2013 IL 114122

986 N.E.2d 75

369 Ill.Dec. 126

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Connie S. BLAIR, Appellee.

Docket No. 114122.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 21, 2013.

Prior Version Recognized as Unconstitutional

S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/18–2(b), 5/33A–2, 5/33A–3

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Terence M. Patton, State's Attorney, of Cambridge (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris and Jennifer Camden, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Santiago A. Durango, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice THEISdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[369 Ill.Dec. 128]¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether Public Act 95–688 (eff. Oct. 23, 2007), which amended the armed violence statute, revived the sentencing enhancement in the armed robbery statute that this court held unconstitutional in People v. Hauschild,226 Ill.2d 63, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1(2007).

¶ 2 For the reasons stated below, we hold that Public Act 95–688 revived the armed robbery sentencing enhancement.We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court(2012 IL App (3d) 100743–U, 2012 WL 7005217), and affirm the judgment of the trial court which applied the enhancement to defendant's sentence.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4DefendantConnie Blair was convicted by a Henry County jury of armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(2)(West 2008)), in connection with an incident in April 2009.The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 23 years' imprisonment which, over defendant's objection, included a 15–year enhancement pursuant to section 18–2(b) of the armed robbery statute.720 ILCS 5/18–2(b)(West 2008).Defendant appealed.

¶ 5The appellate court held that the trial court erred by applying the 15–year enhancement.2012 IL App (3d) 100743–U, ¶ 1.The appellate court rejected the State's argument that Public Act 95–688 could revive the sentencing enhancement in the armed robbery statute by amending the armed violence statute.Id.¶¶ 6–12(discussingPeople v. Manuel,94 Ill.2d 242, 68 Ill.Dec. 506, 446 N.E.2d 240(1983)).According to the appellate court, when Hauschild held the armed robbery sentencing enhancement in section 18–2(b) unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause, the enhancement was rendered void ab initio, and it “remains unavailable at sentencing until the legislature takes some action on section 18–2(b).”Id.¶ 12.The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing in accordance with the armed robbery statute as it existed prior to the adoption of the sentencing enhancement.Id.¶ 13.Under the appellate court judgment, on remand, defendant would be subject to a sentence of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment, rather than an enhanced sentence of 21 to 45 years' imprisonment.Compare720 ILCS 5/18–2(b)(West 1998), and730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3)(West 1998), with720 ILCS 5/18–2(b)(West 2008).

¶ 6We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.Ill.S.Ct. R. 315(eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 I

¶ 9 Whether Public Act 95–688 revived the sentencing enhancement for armed robbery held unconstitutional in Hauschild presents an issue of law, which we review de novo.People v. Clemons,2012 IL 107821, ¶ 8, 360 Ill.Dec. 293, 968 N.E.2d 1046.An understanding of this issue, as well as the parties' arguments, requires that we first review our proportionate penalties jurisprudence as it relates to the two statutes at issue here—the armed robbery statute and the armed violence statute.

¶ 10 II

¶ 11 In People v. Lewis,175 Ill.2d 412, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830(1996), we considered whether the penalties for armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon (a handgun)(720 ILCS 5/33A–1(West 1994)) and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18–2(West 1994)) are proportionate penalties under our state constitution(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).At that time, armed robbery, a Class X felony, was punishable by a term of imprisonment of 6 to 30 years.720 ILCS 5/18–2(b)(West 1994);730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3)(West 1994).Armed violence, predicated on robbery with a category I weapon, was also a Class X felony, but was punishable by a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years.720 ILCS 5/33A–2, 33A–3 (West 1994).Applying the identical elements test for proportionality review, we held that the penalty for armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon violated the proportionate penalties clause.Lewis,175 Ill.2d at 418, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830.Accordingly, the “State's Attorney had no authority to charge that offense.”Id. at 423, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830.

¶ 12 Four years after Lewis, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 91–404, which contained the so-called “15/20/25–to–life” sentencing enhancements.Pub. Act 91–404 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000).The new sentencing scheme mandated that 15 years, 20 years, or 25 years to natural life must be added to the Class X sentence for armed robbery (and several other offenses) where the offender was, respectively, armed with a firearm, discharged a firearm, or discharged a firearm causing great bodily harm or death.720 ILCS 5/18–2(West 2000).As a result of these mandatory add ons, the sentence for armed robbery while armed with a firearm became greater than the sentence for armed violence based on robbery with a category I or II weapon.Compare720 ILCS 5/18–2(b)(West 2000)(armed robbery sentences), with 720 ILCS 5/33A–3(West 2000)(armed violence sentences).

¶ 13Public Act 91–404 also amended the armed violence statute in two respects: (1) armed robbery, and certain other felonies, were expressly excluded as predicate offenses for armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A–2(West 2000)); and (2) the sentence for armed violence committed with a firearm was no longer dependent solely on the category into which the firearm belonged, but was also dependent on whether the offender discharged the firearm (720 ILCS 5/33A–2, 33A–3(b–5), (b-10)(West 2000)).

¶ 14We considered the constitutionality of the enhanced penalties for armed robbery in People v. Walden,199 Ill.2d 392, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928(2002).Utilizing the cross-comparison approach for proportionality review, we determined that armed robbery while in possession of a firearm, and armed violence predicated on aggravated robbery, shared an identical statutory purpose, but that the less serious offense—armed robbery—was punished more severely.Id. at 396–97, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928.Thus, we held the 15–year enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause and was “unenforceable.”Id. at 397, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928.

¶ 15 A few years later, in People v. Sharpe,216 Ill.2d 481, 519, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492(2005), we abandoned cross-comparison proportionate penalties analysis, and expressly overruled “[t]hose cases that used such an analysis to invalidate a penalty.”Walden was no longer good law.

¶ 16 Following Sharpe, the next opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the sentencing enhancement for armed robberypresented itself in Hauschild.There, the defendant was convicted of several offenses, including armed robbery while armed with a firearm.At the time of the offenses, the 15/20/25–to–life amendments were in effect.By the time of sentencing, however, Walden had been decided.And while the defendant's case was pending on direct appeal, Sharpe was decided.At issue in Hauschild was whether defendant was subject to the 15–year add-on penalty for his armed robbery conviction and, if so, whether that sentence was disproportionate to the sentence for armed violence based on robbery with a category I or II weapon.

¶ 17We first considered the effect of our holding in Sharpe, concluding that:

“Sharpe effectively ‘revived’ the constitutionality of the 15–year add-on penalty for armed robbery while armed with a firearm.[Citation.]Put another way, because cross-comparison proportionate penalties review was no longer part of our jurisprudence following Sharpe, * * * Walden * * * no longer supported a finding that the 15–year sentencing enhancement for armed robbery while armed with a firearm * * * violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.”Hauschild,226 Ill.2d at 76–77, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1.

We next concluded that Sharpe, which was of constitutional dimension, applied retroactively to the defendant's case ( id. at 78, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1), and that the defendant was thus subject to the 15–year add on ( id. at 81, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1).

¶ 18 Before examining the defendant's claim that the enhanced sentence for armed robbery violated the proportionate penalties clause when compared to the sentence for armed violence based on robbery with a category I or II weapon, we considered the status of the armed violence statute in light of our decision in Lewis.The appellate court in Hauschild's case believed that the armed violence statute“ ‘ceased to exist’ ” after Lewis, and that armed violence could not be used as a basis to conduct proportionality review.Id. at 84, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1(quotingPeople v. Hauschild,364 Ill.App.3d 202, 217, 300 Ill.Dec. 653, 845 N.E.2d 74(2006)).We rejected the appellate court's conclusion:

“While Lewis,175 Ill.2d at 423[222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830], found the sentencing scheme for armed violence predicated on armed robbery to be unconstitutional as penalizing the same conduct more severely than did the armed robbery statute, and therefore...