People v. Blalock
| Decision Date | 22 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-91-0561,2-91-0561 |
| Citation | 607 N.E.2d 645,239 Ill.App.3d 830 |
| Parties | , 180 Ill.Dec. 576 The PEOPLE of The State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel BLALOCK, Sr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Patrick M. Carmody (argued), Office of State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Daniel Blalock, Sr.
Michael J. Waller, Lake County State's Atty., Waukegan, William L. Browers, Deputy Director, Martin P. Moltz (argued), State's Atty. Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.
A jury found defendant, Daniel Blalock, Sr., guilty of six counts of first-degree murder under section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)) and two counts of armed violence under section 33A-2 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 33A-2). Defendant was sentenced to a term of natural-life imprisonment. The following issues are raised on appeal: (1) whether the mittimus must be amended to reflect convictions of two counts of first-degree murder; (2) whether the trial court infringed on defendant's right to due process of law when it told a witness for the defense that testifying could possibly result in self-incrimination; (3) whether the prosecutor misstated the law in closing argument; (4) whether error occurred if the trial court failed to consult with defense counsel after receiving three notes from the jury during deliberation; and (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to appoint new counsel after defendant alleged in a post-trial motion that counsel was ineffective.
On February 18, 1988, the police discovered the bodies of Santos Escobedo and Domingo Garcia, Jr., in an apartment building in Zion, Illinois. Defendant, Theodore Knox, Oscar Parham, Ronald Walker and Daniel Blalock, Jr., were charged, inter alia, with first-degree murder.
The evidence adduced at trial showed that the killings resulted from a drug deal gone awry. Defendant was "The Godfather" of a drug dealing "family" comprised of him, Blalock, Jr., Knox, Parham, and Walker. Walker testified that the family was at the apartment of Katrina Conner, Parham's girlfriend, which was a frequent hangout for the family. Around noontime, Knox came to the apartment and informed the group that someone wanted to sell them marijuana. The group smoked a sample of the marijuana and agreed that they would purchase the marijuana. Defendant, Parham, Knox and Blalock, Jr., took a scale into the laundry room of the apartment building, adjacent to Conner's apartment, to consummate the deal. Walker testified that he stayed behind in Conner's apartment.
Walker further testified that he heard gunshots a few minutes after the group left. Knox called to Walker. Walker entered the laundry room and saw Knox struggling with an Hispanic male. A second Hispanic male was lying on the floor with a gunshot wound in his head. No one else was in the room. Walker threw the Hispanic male off Knox, and Knox shot him in the head. Knox then shot the other Hispanic male who was on the ground two or three times. Walker also acknowledged that "a set-up" meant robbery in the family jargon.
On February 21, 1988, defendant was interviewed by Detective Don Tessmann of the Waukegan police department. Defendant stated that he arranged a drug deal involving the victims, but went to Chicago after introducing the parties. When he arrived in Chicago, he heard that the deal had gone bad and some people had been killed.
Officer Frank Messina, a Chicago police officer, took a robbery report from defendant at the corner of California and Courtland in Chicago on February 17, 1988. Defendant claimed that three Hispanic males robbed him, Blalock, Jr., and Parham at approximately 2:45 p.m. Defendant stated that the three individuals took money, six rings, a silver rope chain and a fur coat. Blalock, Jr., reported as stolen a black vest and various forms of identification.
David Caples, an inmate at the Joliet Correctional Facility, testified about a conversation he had with defendant when defendant was incarcerated late in 1988. Defendant told Caples that the drug deal on February 17, 1988, was "a set-up." Defendant stated that the victims were "narc agents" and had to be killed. Defendant further stated that Knox was a coward and did not want to participate when the others were shooting.
Tim Allen, incarcerated at the Lake County jail with defendant in the summer of 1990, testified that defendant stated that he knew the victims were police because Defendant subpoenaed Knox to testify in his defense. Knox's attorney filed a motion to quash the subpoena. He argued that even though Knox was willing to testify, Knox's attorney believed that Knox was going to testify because he feared defendant. The trial judge met with Knox, Knox's attorney, and the attorneys in the case in the judge's chambers. Knox told the trial judge that he wanted to testify. The trial judge explained Knox's fifth amendment rights to him and stated that it would be "foolish" for Knox to testify because of the potential danger of self-incrimination. Defense counsel stated that he did not anticipate calling Knox until the following day, and Knox was given until the next day by the trial court to contemplate his decision. When Knox returned the following day, he exercised his privilege against self-incrimination.
[180 Ill.Dec. 579] they did not check the merchandise. After the victims did not check it, defendant picked up his cocaine and left. Defendant stated that if he thinks someone is a cop, he will kill him. Referring to the murders, defendant said "we did it" and at other times said "they did it." Defendant told Allen that the police "ain't got nothin" to tie him to the murders. Defendant stated if he was worried that someone would talk to the police he would kill him, even if it was a family member. He said it would be nothing personal, but would be business
After the jury retired to deliberate, the common-law record reflects that the jury asked the court three questions. A response to one question was given, apparently written by the trial judge. The question was whether the transcripts from Tuesday could be reviewed. The response was: No written response was given to the other two questions, which were a request for the judge to explain legal terms and a request for a dictionary. The report of proceedings contains no testimony concerning these exchanges.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on six counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed violence. At defendant's post-trial hearing, defense counsel informed the court that defendant wished to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel argument in his post-trial motion. Defense counsel moved to withdraw his representation. The trial court denied the motion, stating that it would do an injustice to defendant because defense counsel was most familiar with the case. After defendant's post-trial motions were denied, he filed a timely appeal.
We initially note that both the State and defendant agree that defendant's mittimus should be amended to reflect convictions of two counts of first-degree murder. The number of murder convictions should equal the number of victims killed. (People v. Waldron (1991), 219 Ill.App.3d 1017, 1038, 162 Ill.Dec. 586, 580 N.E.2d 549.) Here, there can be two convictions for the two murders. However, when multiple convictions arise out of a single act, the sentence is imposed for the most serious offense. (Waldron, 219 Ill.App.3d at 1038, 162 Ill.Dec. 586, 580 N.E.2d 549.) Thus, we remand for the correction of defendant's mittimus to reflect convictions of two counts of first-degree murder under section 9-1(a)(1) of the Code, one conviction for each victim. The convictions under sections 9-1(a)(2) and 9-1(a)(3) of the Code should be vacated. The mittimus should continue to reflect the convictions of two counts of armed violence.
The State has argued that defendant has waived review of issues II (witness incrimination), III (improper closing argument) and IV (ex parte communication) for failing to include them in his post-trial motion. Generally, the failure to include an issue in a post-trial motion results in waiver. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Plain errors may be reviewed although not brought to the attention of the trial court. (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a).) Reviewing such errors preserves the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. (People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill.2d 195, 210, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1.) Thus, we will review issues II, III and IV under the plain error doctrine.
At issue is whether the trial court infringed upon defendant's due process rights when informing Knox of the danger of self-incrimination if he testified. Defendant claims that the trial judge's remarks effectively drove the witness off the witness stand. He argues that although the trial court may have been well-intentioned, it overstepped the bounds of permissible judicial intervention.
While in the trial judge's chambers, Knox stated that he wished to testify on behalf of defendant. During the conversation, the trial judge made these statements:
"If you were to testify and if some of the questions that were asked were of an incriminating nature, I can only encourage you to exercise those rights that are given you and refuse to answer.
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This is a right you have, and it is a very valuable and important right. From what I have gathered in this case, I think it would be foolish for you not to exercise your right.
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We'll have you back tomorrow to see what your response is; but for your information and edification,...
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