People v. Blanchett

Citation55 Ill.App.2d 141,204 N.E.2d 173
Decision Date01 February 1965
Docket NumberGen. No. 10569
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Junior Lee BLANCHETT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Robert J. Bier, Quincy, for appellant.

Donald G. Adams, State's Atty., Quincy, William A. Brown, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee.

CRAVEN, Justice.

The Defendant, Junior Lee Blanchett, having waived indictment and trial by jury, was convicted and found guilty by the Circuit Court of Adams County on an information charging him with armed robbery. The motion in arrest of judgment by the Defendant was overruled and the Defendant was sentenced to the State Penitentiary for a period of not less than two nor more than five years. This is an appeal from that judgment.

The Defendant contends that the information is lacking in substantial allegations required by Sec. 111-3 of Ch. 38, Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, and further that the evidence does not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Both of these contentions were set forth in the Defendant's motion in arrest of judgment.

A consideration of the first contention by the Defendant does not necessitate a recitation of the facts nor a weighing of the evidence. The information, so far as here applicable, charged that on January 15, 1964, Junior Lee Blanchett 'at and within the County of Adams, in the State of Illinois, did commit armed robbery.'

Sec. 111-3 of Ch. 38, Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, provides in part:

'(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by:

'(1) Stating the name of the offense;

'(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated;

'(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;

'(4) Stating the time and place of the offense as definitely as can be done; and

'(5) Stating the name of the accused * * *.'

The issue in this case, simply stated, is whether the quoted language of the information complies with the statutory requirement set forth at No. (4) above.

The case of People v. Williams, 30 Ill.2d 125, 196 N.E.2d 483, considered the sufficiency of an indictment wherein the Defendant allegedly attempted to break and enter a building in Cook County described in the indictment as '* * * 'a certain building, to-wit: factory of Jacob Vondracek there situate' * * *.' The Court held the indictment was insufficient to define the nature and cause of the accusation under the provisions of Sec. 9, Art. II of the Illinois Constitution, S.H.A. In reaching the conclusion there stated, the Court took judicial notice of the metropolitan and industrial character of Cook County.

The question here, however, is not the sufficiency of this information under the provisions of the constitution considered in the Williams case. That constitutional provision has as its purpose the giving of information to the Defendant so that he will know the nature of the accusation against him and will be able to fully prepare his defense and to plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

The statutory provision here under consideration, however, is more than the constitutional requirement of Sec. 9, Art. 2. Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether the information meets the broad substantive requirements of the constitution but whether it complies with the express requirements of the statute.

No distinction need be made between urban or rural areas. The statute here under consideration is not a mere requirement of notice pleading nor the same as Sec. 9, Art. 2 of the constitution. Rather, this provision of the Criminal Code requires the stating of the time and place of the offense as definitely as can be done. This is made a substantial requirement of the statement of the offense and is uniform in application regardless of rural of urban areas.

The proof showed that the victim was robbed at his place of residence, 937 1/2 Maine Street, Quincy, Illinois. The People do not deny knowledge of the exact place of the alleged offense, but rather contend that they are not required to plead this fact to state a valid charge.

We cannot ignore or attempt to judicially interpret this statute to mean something other than what it states in clear terms. The information did not state the time and place of the offense as definitely as could be done and, therefore, did not meet the requirements of Sec. 111-3 of Ch. 38, Ill.Rev.Stat.1963.

It is next contended by the People that the Defendant waived his objection to the sufficiency of the indictment by proceeding to trial and failing to assert his objection in a motion to dismiss as provided for in ...

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10 cases
  • People v. Petropoulos
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 6, 1965
    ...... People v. Minto, 318 Ill. 293, 296, 149 N.E. 241. We feel obliged, therefore, to examine the indictments as to their legal sufficiency, and particularly in the light of the recent decision in People v. Blanchett, 55 Ill.App.2d 141, 204 N.E.2d 173 (Fourth Dist., 1965). .         In Blanchett the court held that, on defendant's motion after a trial in which the defendant was found guilty of robbery, judgment should have been arrested because the information did not state the street address or other ......
  • People v. Baze, 40762
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • November 26, 1969
    ...... Thereafter, in March, 1965, the court allowed defendant's motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it lacked specificity respecting the time and place of the burglary under the ruling in People v. Blanchett, 55 Ill.App.2d 141, 204 N.E.2d 173. Defendant was immediately reindicted for the same offense with greater specificity. The cause was tried on May 10, 1965, and evidence was heard in aggravation, but not in mitigation of the sentence, after which defendant was sentenced to not less than six nor ......
  • People v. Haun
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 6, 1966
    ......38, Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, sec. . Page 473. 111--3, for failing to set forth time and place of the offense 'as definitely as can be done.' This issue has been resolved by our Supreme Court in People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill.2d 527, 212 N.E.2d 97 (1965), wherein it reversed a decision of this Court entertaining the views here advocated by the defendant. (55 Ill.App.2d 141, 204 N.E.2d 173 (1965)).         The basic issue in this case, from the standpoint of substantial justice, is the issue of insanity ......
  • People v. Powell
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 20, 1965
    ......        This indictment was returned prior to January 1, 1964, the effective date of the new Criminal Code, and sec. 111-3 of ch. 38, Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, and therefore People v. Blanchett, 55 Ill.App.2d 141, 204 N.E.2d 173, is inapplicable. The requirements to charge an offense are specifically set out in sec. 111-3 and are considerably more narrow and technical than the broad substantive protection afforded by the constitution. The provisions of sec. 111-3 reflect a legislative ......
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