People v. Blanchett
| Decision Date | 19 November 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 39232,39232 |
| Citation | 33 Ill.2d 527,212 N.E.2d 97 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Junior Lee BLANCHETT, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William G. Clark, Atty.Gen., Springfield, and Donald G. Adams, State's Atty., Quincy (Fred G. Leach, Asst.Atty.Gen., of counsel), for appellant.
Gerald W. Getty, Chicago (Frederick F. Cohn and James J. Doherty, Chicago, of counsel), as amicus curiae. Harry G. Fins, Chicago, also as amicus curiae, for appellee.
An information was filed in the circuit court of Adams County charging the defendant, Junior Lee Blanchett, with the crime of armed robbery in Adams County. He was tried by the court without a jury resulting in a finding of guilty and a sentence to the penitentiary for a term of not less than two nor more than five years. Defendant then filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the information did not state an offense. The motion was denied by the trial court. On appeal the Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed on the ground that the motion in arrest of judgment should have been allowed. We have granted leave to appeal, recognizing an apparent conflict between this decision and People v. Petropoulos, 59 Ill.App.2d 298, 208 N.E.2d 323.
At the outset we must determine the right of the State to appeal from the judgment of the appellate court reversing defendant's conviction. This right is not questioned by the defendant, but the question has been raised by amicus curiae and we must determine sua sponte the limits of our own jurisdiction.
The judicial article expressly states "that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal." (Ill. Const. art. VI, sec. 7, S.H.A.) Amicus curiae argues that the unqualified reversal by the appellate court constitutes a judgment of acquittal within the meaning of the constitution. With this we do not agree. While the decision of the appellate court would entitle defendant to a discharge, it is not the equivalent of acquittal. We have considered the statement from 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1673, p. 1128, cited by amicus curiae, that a reversal of a conviction has the effect of a not-guilty verdict entitling defendant to discharge, and the case cited in support of that statement. We are convinced that this broad language is of no persuasive force in determining the effect of the appellate court decision.
The real effect of the appellate court decision is that of an order or judgment "arresting judgment because of a defective information." Subparagraph 4 of Rule 27 of this court specifically provides that the State may appeal from such order or judgment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1964 Supp., chap. 110, par. 101.27(4).) We therefore conclude that the State may appeal from an order arresting a judgment of conviction because of a defective indictment or information. The mere fact that the arrest of judgment occurred in the appellate court rather than the trial court does not alter our opinion. The broad language of Rule 32 and Rule 27(13) gives the State the same right to petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court as any other litigant where the Appellate Court judgment has the effect specified in Rule 27(4). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1964 Supp., chap. 110, pars. 101.27(13), 101.32.) We conclude that this court has jurisdiction of this appeal.
Upon reaching the merits of the controversy we find that the issue involved in this case requires the construction of certain sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Section 111-3, entitled "Form of Charge", provides in part as follows (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38 par. 111-3.): "(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: *** (4) stating the time and place of the offense as definitely as can be done." Section 114-1 provides in part as follows (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 114-1): Section 116-2 provides in part as follows (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 116-2): "(a) A written motion in arrest of judgment shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty *** (b) The court shall grant the motion when: (1) the indictment, information or complaint does not charge an offense ***."
The information, insofar as pertains to the issue on this appeal, states that on January 15, 1964, the defendant "at and within the County of Adams, in the State of Illinois" did commit armed robbery. In the evidence the exact street address of the robbery was proved and the State does not contend that it lacked knowledge of this address at the time the information was filed. The appellate court held that this allegation did not comply with the requirements of section 111-3(a)(4) in that it did not state the time and place of the offense as definitely as could be done. The court also held that because the place of the offense was not more definitely alleged the information was insufficient to state an offense and therefore, under the provisions of section 114-1(b), the failure to move to dismiss prior to trial did not operate as a waiver of the right to assert this claim in a motion in arrest of judgment. The question presented here is whether the information was so defective that it did not charge an offense so that the sufficiency of the information could be raised by a motion in arrest of judgment filed after trial.
Prior to enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the Criminal Code provided that the time and place of committing a crime should be stated "with reasonable certainty". (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, par. 716.) In construing that section we held that in all cases where the place of the commission of the offense was not an element of the offense an indictment was sufficient if it alleged that the crime occurred within the boundaries of a certain county. We further held that such an allegation complies with the constitutional provision that an accused shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him. (People v. Burns, 403 Ill. 407, 86 N.E.2d 197.) However, in People v. Williams, 30 Ill.2d 125, 196 N.E.2d 483, which also arose under the old statute, we affirmed an order quashing an indictment for burglary which alleged only that a building owned by a named person and allegedly entered was situated in Cook County, holding that such an indictment did not give the defendants sufficient information to prepare their defense. We have re-examined our opinion in Williams and are of the opinion that it was incorrect. Accordingly, People v. Williams, 30 Ill.2d 125, 196 N.E.2d 483, is overruled. See People v. Reed, Ill., 213 N.E.2d 278.
However, because of the difference in the language in the new Code of Criminal Procedure setting forth the form of a charge, the cases decided under the former Code are not necessarily conclusive. The defendant argues, and the appellate court held, that the requirement of the new Code that the indictment state the time and place of the offense as definitely as can be done imposes a stricter requirement than the command of the former statute that the time and place be stated with reasonable certainty. The problem is one of statutory construction and no constitutional issue is presented, for if an indictment under the former Code, alleging only the county where the offense occurred, was constitutionally sufficient, the constitution requires no more by reason of the change in the statute.
In construing the provisions of the new Code, reference to the comments of the committee which drafted the new Code is instructive. In the comments following section 111-3, it is said: ...
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