People v. Blankenship

• Decision Date: 26 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 97CA2225.,97CA2225.
• Citation: 30 P.3d 698
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin L. BLANKENSHIP, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

30 P.3d 698

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin L. BLANKENSHIP, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97CA2225.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division IV.

October 26, 2000.

Certiorari Denied September 10, 2001.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Laurie A. Booras, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Richard A. Hostetler, Marks and Hostetler, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.

Defendant, Kevin L. Blankenship, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder, second degree kidnapping, aggravated robbery, robbery of an at-risk adult, two counts of second degree burglary, two counts of conspiracy, criminal trespass, and theft. He also appeals the sentences imposed. We vacate two convictions, affirm the balance of the judgments of conviction, vacate one of the sentences imposed, modify another of the sentences to run concurrently, and remand for resentencing and correction of the mittimus.

In the parking lot of a store, the sixteen-year-old defendant and his accomplice kidnapped an elderly woman and forced her into the trunk of her car. They then drove to an isolated rural area where they left the victim after tying her to a concrete structure and piling heavy objects on top of her. She subsequently died from hypothermia.

Over the next three days, defendant and his accomplice ransacked the victim's house and stole jewelry, money, and other valuables. They also broke into the garage of another house in the area and stole guns.

Following his arrest, defendant gave the police a description of the place where he and his accomplice had left the murder victim. Based on that description, the police found the victim's body and charged defendant and his accomplice with first degree murder and other offenses in connection with her death. In addition, the two were charged with burglary and related offenses stemming from the theft of the guns from the second victim's house.

Defendant and the accomplice were tried separately. The jury found defendant guilty on all of the charged offenses. For the offenses involving the deceased victim, the court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the murder counts along with concurrent sentences for the remaining counts, and a consecutive sentence for robbery of an at-risk adult. On the convictions stemming from the burglary of the second victim, the court imposed sentences to run concurrently with the life sentence on all the counts except the second degree burglary count. On that count, the court imposed a twenty-four-year sentence to be served consecutively to the other sentences.

I.

Defendant first contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements he made to the police. We disagree.

Following his arrest, the police initially questioned defendant regarding his age and where he lived. When they learned that he was sixteen years old and had most recently lived with his stepmother in Illinois, they questioned him further regarding whether he was a runaway. After determining that defendant was a runaway, the police gave him warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant then signed a form waiving his constitutional rights.

During subsequent questioning, defendant made incriminating statements regarding his involvement in the crimes and eventually described the location where he and his accomplice had left the murder victim.

A.

Defendant initially contends the statement he made to police following the Miranda warnings was involuntary and the trial court's failure to make findings regarding the voluntariness of his statement necessitates a reversal of his convictions. We disagree.

Confessions, admissions, and statements are not admissible for any purpose unless they are made voluntarily. Whether a statement is voluntary is a determination to be derived from reviewing the totality of the circumstances, which must demonstrate that the accused's statement is the product of his or her free and unconstrained choice. People v. Mounts, 784 P.2d 792 (Colo.1990).

Statements must not be the result of official coercion, intimidation, or deception. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879 (Colo.1993). Official coercion includes any sort of threats, or any direct or implied promises or improper influences, however slight. People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810 (Colo.1990).

The term "totality of the circumstances" refers to the significant details surrounding and inhering in the interrogation under consideration. They include the following: whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of his or her situation; whether Miranda warnings were given before any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his or her Miranda rights; whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else before the interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately before and during the interrogation, as well as his or her educational background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal justice system. People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo.1991).

Essentially, in order to find that a statement was involuntary, a court must find that the conduct of officers was coercive and that a defendant's will was overborne. People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208 (Colo.1998).

Once the trial court has made factual findings concerning the totality of the circumstances, it must then determine as a matter of law whether a defendant's confession was voluntary. While a trial court's findings of historical fact are entitled to deference and will not be overturned if adequately supported by competent evidence in the record, it is critical that the trial court, in making its findings, expressly resolve on the record any contested factual issues. People v. Gennings supra.

Here, the trial court concluded that defendant's statements were voluntary, but it made few express factual findings relative to that issue. Nevertheless, the historical facts surrounding the making of the statement are largely undisputed. And, as to those issues that were disputed, the court did make factual findings.

Thus, the issue presented is whether the undisputed facts and those factual findings the court did make support the court's ultimate conclusion. See People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239 (Colo.1999)

(while appellate court defers to a trial court's findings of disputed fact, the application of a legal standard to historical fact is a matter for de novo appellate review).

The court found, on supporting evidence, that defendant was a runaway from Illinois on a "joy ride" to Colorado; that he was a "streetwise kid," who had a relatively significant history of being involved with the law; that he was of average intelligence and was not mentally retarded; and that he gave sophisticated responses to the detective's questions. It also found that defendant understood the rights he was giving up when he gave the statement.

The defendant's videotaped statement also establishes that, at the time he made the statements, he was in custody and was aware of his situation, Miranda warnings had been given to him, and he had waived his Miranda rights. However, he did not have the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else before giving the statement. Nevertheless, while the statement was made in the course of interrogation, defendant indicated several times that he wanted to speak with the police.

Further, there is no evidence that there were any concessions or incentives offered to induce defendant to speak with the police. In addition, defendant does not assert that the method and style employed in questioning him was hostile. Our review of the videotaped statement reveals that the questioning proceeded in a calm and non-threatening manner. Also, defendant did not pause or hesitate during his conversation with the police and the tone of the questioning was conversational, not confrontational.

It appears defendant had no physical limitations or impairment before and during the interrogation, which occurred in the police station where two detectives were present.

Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he gave the statement. Concerning his educational level, the court rejected testimony by defendant's expert that defendant had a very low-level reading ability. The prosecution's expert witness testified, after reviewing school records, police reports, and the tests administered by the defense psychologist, that defendant understood what he was doing when he waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed.

There was no evidence disclosing defendant's employment status.

Defendant asserts that we should pay special attention to the fact that he was a minor, that Colo.Sess.Laws 1989, ch. 169, § 19-2-210, requires the presence of a parental figure during questioning under most circumstances, and that he had not conferred with anyone before speaking with the police. Citing Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo.1999), he further notes that juveniles are generally considered to lack the capacity to make legal decisions alone.

We agree that these are appropriate factors to consider. However, such factors are not alone determinative. Moreover, as we conclude below, because defendant was a runaway, the protections afforded by § 19-2-210 did not apply to him.

Based upon all of the above, we conclude that defendant's statement was...