People v. Bleakley

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Citation: 69 N.Y.2d 490,515 N.Y.S.2d 761,508 N.E.2d 672
• Parties: , 508 N.E.2d 672 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Timothy BLEAKLEY and Jeffrey J. Anesi, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 07 May 1987

Page 761

515 N.Y.S.2d 761

69 N.Y.2d 490, 508 N.E.2d 672

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Timothy BLEAKLEY and Jeffrey J. Anesi, Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 7, 1987.

Oren Root, Jr., and Patrick M. Wall, New York City, for appellants.

Carl A. Vergari, Dist. Atty., White Plains, (Richard L. Hecht and Anthony J. Servino, Scarsdale, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

We hold that it is reversible error when the Appellate Division manifestly avoids its exclusive statutory authority to review the weight of the evidence in criminal cases.

Each defendant, Timothy Bleakley and Jeffrey J. Anesi, has been found guilty by a jury at a joint trial of two counts of rape in the first degree, one count of sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree. By a divided court, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction.

The principal issue is whether defendants have been deprived of one of their available statutory standards of intermediate appellate court review, a review based on the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15[5] ). We discern that in this case they have been so deprived.

The very serious crimes for which both defendants stand convicted started out with some drinking in taverns late in the evening, then some social and amicable bar encounters in the early morning hours which evolved to an automobile setting where the victim and the two defendants planned to "do some coke" together. They did so. The versions of what happened thereafter differ sharply. The victim testified to a horrible and forcible double rape and sodomy. The defendants testified to one consensual sexual incident. There is other evidence of a circumstantial nature dealing with sexual conduct and possible forcible circumstances. There are also serious credibility and discrepancy assertions with respect to all the key witnesses.

Unquestionably, these features all relate principally to the jury's properly exercised function and its resolution in this respect eliminates any further relevant concern with respect to the evidentiary standard of sufficiency or reasonable doubt (this is not a People v. Ledwon, 153 N.Y. 10, 46 N.E. 1046, or People v. Santos, 38 N.Y.2d 173, 379 N.Y.S.2d 41, 341 N.E.2d 554, type case). But, based on what is before us on this record, the Appellate Division did not do the factual analysis of whether the jury determination was against the weight of the evidence, a review which may take place only in an intermediate appellate court (CPL 470.15 [5] ).

The complementary review scheme erected in our Constitution and statutes imposes a heavy duty on our important and overburdened intermediate appellate courts which speak the final word in most cases and especially with respect to review of fact issues. That is why the issue is so critical to the proper outcome of this case.

Unlike this court which, with few exceptions, passes on only questions of law, intermediate appellate courts are empowered to review questions of law and questions of fact. They do so in both civil cases (CPLR 5501[c] ) and criminal cases (People v. Redmond, 225 N.Y. 206, 121 N.E. 785; People v. Stevens, 104 N.Y. 667, 10 N.E. 527; CPL 470.15). Indeed, this unique factual review power is the linchpin of our constitutional and statutory design intended to afford each litigant at least one appellate review of the facts (Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals § 109, at 465 [rev.ed.] ).

On the criminal side, however, the history of this unique review power had been the subject of some confusion. For years an appellate determination that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence warranted only the ordering of a new trial, while sufficiency and reasonable doubt deficiencies necessitated the corrective action of dismissal of the criminal charges (see, e.g., People v. McCaleb, 25 N.Y.2d 394, 306 N.Y.S.2d 889, 255 N.E.2d 136; People v. Klose, 18 N.Y.2d 141, 272 N.Y.S.2d 352, 219 N.E.2d 180; People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E.2d 238; compare, People v. Holmes, 52 N.Y.2d 976, 438 N.Y.S.2d 284, 420 N.E.2d 82; People v. Robare, 109 A.D.2d 923, 486 N.Y.S.2d 393). The Criminal Procedure Law revisors recommended and the Legislature enacted a significant clarifying change upgrading the corrective action to dismissal of criminal charges under either standard of review (see, CPL 470.20[2], [5]; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787; People v. Kidd, 76 A.D.2d 665, 431 N.Y.S.2d 542). The change was justified because, in the words of the drafters, "[t]he People, having had full opportunity to prove their case at trial and having failed to do so, should not be accorded another chance" (Staff Comment to Proposed CPL 240.40, at 328 [1967] ).

This case presents a new difficulty. The Appellate Division (125 A.D.2d 687, 509 N.Y.S.2d 874 [2d Dept], lv. granted 69 N.Y.2d 744, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1047, 505 N.E.2d 246) was divided as to whether its review power was limited to a determination of the legal sufficiency of the evidence or whether it should also weigh the evidence and, if appropriate, reverse the judgments based on a factual determination that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In upholding the judgments of conviction, a majority of the court articulated the view that their function as an appellate court was...