People v. Block

• Decision Date: 07 December 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 15575
• Citation: 103 Cal.Rptr. 281,499 P.2d 961,6 Cal.3d 239
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 499 P.2d 961 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Frank Michael BLOCK, Defendant and Respondent. In Bank

Page 281

103 Cal.Rptr. 281

6 Cal.3d 239, 499 P.2d 961

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.Frank Michael BLOCK, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 15575.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 7, 1971.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attys.Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph P. Busch, Jr., Dist. Atty., Harry Wood and Donald J. Kaplan, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.

Howard E. Lowe and Dennis Shapiro, Beverly Hills, for defendant and respondent.

BURKE, Justice.

Defendant was charged by information with felonious possession of marijuana (Health & Saf.Code, § 11530) and with being in a place where narcotics are smoked or used, a misdemeanor (Health & Saf.Code, § 11556).Defendant's motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995 was granted by the superior court on the theory that the evidence against defendant on the felony charge was obtained during an improper warrantless search of defendant's house conducted for the purpose of determining whether additional participants in the felony were on the premises.The People herein appeal from the order of dismissal.(Pen.Code, § 1238, subd. 1.)We have concluded that under the particular circumstances of this case, the search for additional suspects was proper, and that accordingly the order of dismissal must be reversed.

The following facts were adduced at the preliminary examination: At 10:30 p.m. on the night of March 14, 1970, Officers Galloway and Marco were notified by police radio that there was a possible narcotics suspect at a specified address.The officers proceeded to that address and knocked on the door.Defendant opened the door and the officers immediately detected the odor of burning marijuana emanating from within.The officers identified themselves and told defendant that they had received a call regarding a possible narcotics suspect or narcotics party.Defendant admitted that he lived in the house.After a lapse of 30 seconds or so, the officers entered the house and observed a smoking marijuana roach in a metal clip on a coffee table in the living room, along with two pipes, one of which was warm and appeared to contain marijuana.The officers thereupon arrested defendant and three other persons found in the living room.Officer Marco went into an adjacent dining area and arrested two other persons.¹

Marco observed that at least four of the six suspects had dilated eyes and pupils, and an odor of marijuana upon their breath.The suspects were left in Marco's custody while Galloway went upstairs 'to see if there were any other people in the house.'Galloway testified before the committing magistrate that 'because of the number of the defendants in the house, I believed there was a possibility of more defendants' upstairs.The house was 'quite large,' containing three or possibly four bedrooms.Lights were turned on to illuminate the stairs leading to the second floor and the upstairs hallway.On the second floor, Galloway looked in one bedroom, a bathroom, and then a second bedroom.The light in the second bedroom was off and the door partially opened.Galloway turned on the light, looked behind the door to see if anyone was hiding there, and then surveyed the room.He then observed a clear plastic vial lying in plain sight on a table and containing what appeared to be marijuana.He also saw an open jewelry box and, looking into it, discovered pieces of tin foil, a plastic bag, and a match box.He opened these items and found more marijuana.

Defendant contends that the marijuana found upstairs ² was the product of a search which exceeded in scope the permissible limits set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.On the other hand, the People argue that since Officer Galloway was not conducting a search for contraband but instead was looking for additional narcotics suspects, Chimel is inapplicable and Galloway was entitled to seize contraband lying in plain sight and discovered during the course of his investigation.We agree that Chimel does not preclude the seizure of evidence found in plain sight during the course of a lawful investigation.Moreover, although we question the propriety of conducting in every case a general exploratory search for 'possible suspects,' nevertheless the instant search was justified under the particular facts and circumstances appearing to the arresting officers herein.

In Chimel, the police arrested defendant in his home for burglary and, incident to the arrest, conducted a warrantless search of his home, attic, garage and workshop, gathering numerous items of evidence.The court found 'ample justification * * * for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.(Par.)There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs--or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.'(395 U.S. at p. 763, 89 S.Ct. at p. 2040.)

It is clear, therefore, that had Officer Galloway been conducting an evidentiary search of defendant's residence, that search would have exceeded the limits prescribed in Chimel, for the upstairs area of the house certainly lay beyond the area within the immediate control of the persons arrested in the living and dining rooms.However, one of the 'well-recognized exceptions' referred to in Chimel, is the rule that 'objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.(Citations.)'(Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067;seeCoolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465--466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564;Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 699, 707, 94 Cal.Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84;People v. Bradley, 1 Cal.3d 80, 85, 81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129.)

A corollary of the 'plain sight' rule, and one which is pertinent to the instant case, is that 'During a lawful search of premises for persons believed to be in hiding, police officers may seize contraband evidence 'in plain sight.'(Citations.)Under such circumstances there is, in fact, no search for evidence.(Citations.)'(People v. Marshall, 69 Cal.2d 51, 56, 69 Cal.Rptr. 585, 588, 442 P.2d 665, 668;seePeople v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 707, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365(rev. on other grounds);People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 378--379, 303 P.2d 721.)Although the foregoing cases were decided prior to the Chimel decision, nothing in Chimel casts doubt upon their continued vitality.³The question remains, however, whether or not the instant search was indeed 'a lawful search' for additional suspects.

As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer's conduct is dependent upon the existence of facts available to him at the moment of the search or seizure which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.(Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21--22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, involving police 'stop and frisk' procedures.)And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given not to his unparticularized suspicions or 'hunches,' but to the reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience; in other words, he must be able to point to specific and articulable facts from which he concluded that his action was necessary.(Id., at pp. 21--22, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868;Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63--64, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917;Remers v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 659, 664, 87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11(probable cause to arrest);Cunha v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 352, 355--356, 85 Cal.Rptr. 160, 466 P.2d 704(cause to detain, 'pat down,' and arrest);People v. Collins, 1 Cal.3d 658, 662--663, 83 Cal.Rptr. 179, 463 P.2d 403('pat down' search).)

The rationale underlying the foregoing rule is concisely set forth in Terry v. Ohio, Supra, 392 U.S. 1, 21--22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, as follows: 'The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in the light of the particular circumstances.(Fn. omitted.)And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?(Citations.)Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.(Citation.)'(SeePeople v. Collins, Supra, 1 Cal.3d 658, 663, 83 Cal.Rptr. 179, 463 P.2d 403.)

In the instant case, it seems evident that Officer Galloway had reasonable cause to believe, based upon facts available to him at the time he acted, that additional persons might be on the premises.The presence of six or seven persons downstairs, four of whom bore signs of recent marijuana use, together with the immediate detection of burning marijuana smoke and the discovery of a smoking marijuana roach and two pipes lying in plain sight on a coffee table reasonably indicated that a 'pot party' was in progress, involving an undetermined number of participants.The lights which illuminated the stairway and upstairs hall justified the further...