People v. Blyden
Court | New York Court of Appeals |
Citation | 432 N.E.2d 758,55 N.Y.2d 73,447 N.Y.S.2d 886 |
Parties | , 432 N.E.2d 758 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Herbert X. BLYDEN, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 16 February 1982 |
Leonard J. Klaif, Buffalo, for appellant.
Edward C. Cosgrove, Dist. Atty. (Kurt T. Sajda, Buffalo, of counsel), for respondent.
After a jury trial, defendant Herbert X. Blyden was convicted of assault in the first degree (Penal Law, § 120.10). The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. On appeal to this court, defendant, who is black, argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to discharge for cause a prospective juror who voiced hostility to racial minorities. Because the juror never expressly and unequivocally stated that his feeling toward minorities would not affect his verdict and that he could render an impartial verdict based on the evidence, this court reverses defendant's conviction and remits for a new trial.
Defendant's trial began on December 4, 1979. During an early phase of the jury selection process, a prospective juror responded to a general question by the Judge regarding racial prejudice by indicating that he wished to speak to the Judge. At proceedings in chambers, the juror was questioned by the Judge and attorneys about his feelings toward minorities.
When asked by the Judge to 'state your feelings', the juror responded, He stated that the cause of his feelings was that
Upon the Judge's first inquiry as to whether the juror's feelings would affect his deliberations, the juror replied, The juror repeated these misgivings under questioning by the prosecutor. He then told defense counsel that He added,
Finally, in response to the court's thrice-repeated question whether he could put aside his feelings about minorities, the juror stated, 'Yes, I think I could,' 'I think I could,' and, 'Yes, I think I could.' He also stated 'absolutely not' when asked by the Judge if he had made up his mind 'about this case on the sketchy information that I gave you'.
Defense counsel challenged the prospective juror for cause, but the Trial Judge denied the challenge. Defendant's attorney then used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Because defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges before the completion of jury selection, the claimed error in denying his challenge for cause may be considered on this appeal (see CPL 270.20, subd. 2).
In determining whether the trial court erred in refusing to discharge the challenged juror for cause, it is necessary to look first to CPL 270.20 (subd. 1, par. which authorizes a challenge for cause where the juror 'has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial'. * This provision reflects the long-standing recognition of 'the fundamental rule that an accused person is entitled to be tried by a fair and impartial jury' (People v. McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 300, 18 N.E. 156; see People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645, 652, 415 N.Y.S.2d 985, 389 N.E.2d 467; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155, 25 L.Ed. 244). Questioning of prospective jurors on voir dire, of course, is crucial to the selection of an impartial jury (see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46; Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054).
In light of the prospective juror's initial comments, the Trial Judge in this case appropriately permitted further voir dire and took part himself in the exploration of the subject. The question to be resolved is whether the juror's answers to these subsequent questions overcame the clear indication of bias in the juror's previous statements.
At common law, a prospective juror's expression of an opinion or impression bearing on the guilt or innocence of a defendant was conclusive grounds for disqualification (see People v. McQuade, supra). In 1872, however, the Legislature enacted the predecessor of the current Criminal Procedure Law provision (L.1872, ch. 475, § 1). Codified as subdivision 2 of section 376 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, the statute provided that a previous expression of opinion or impression indicating 'actual bias' could be overcome if the prospective juror 'declare on oath, that he believes that such opinion or impression will not influence his verdict, and that he can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence, and the court is satisfied, that he does not entertain such a present opinion or impression as would influence his verdict.'
When the Criminal Procedure Law superseded the old code in 1971, all references to the 'expurgatory oath' were deleted (see CPL 270.20). The District Attorney asserts that the oath maintains its vitality, while defendant contends both that it is no longer applicable and that even if it was applicable, it was not satisfied in this case.
In People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 104, n. 2, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381, 305 N.E.2d 469 this court, although dealing with a case falling under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, noted that under the Criminal Procedure Law 'the talismanic expurgatory oath has been abandoned, so that there is no longer any facile method for purging a prima facie showing of bias' and that 'the new law gives the Trial Judge greater flexibility and a greater responsibility in determining which veniremen should be excused for cause.' This flexibility is also reflected in the language of the new provision (CPL 270.20, subd. 1, par. which focuses on whether the juror 'has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict' without...
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