People v. Bole

• Decision Date: 15 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 73220,73220
• Citation: 613 N.E.2d 740,155 Ill.2d 188,184 Ill.Dec. 423
• Parties: , 184 Ill.Dec. 423 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Frederick J. BOLE, Jr., Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 740

613 N.E.2d 740

155 Ill.2d 188, 184 Ill.Dec. 423

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Frederick J. BOLE, Jr., Appellee.

No. 73220.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 15, 1993.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Thomas F. Baker, Chicago, State's Attorney, Woodstock (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Sol. Gen., Terence M. Madsen and Bradley P. Halloran, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, William L. Browers, and Cynthia N. Schneider of the office of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Second Judicial Dist., Elgin, of counsel), for the People.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Ingrid Lehnert, pro bono counsel, of the office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee.

Chief Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Frederick J. Bole, Jr., pleaded guilty in the circuit court of McHenry County to three counts of criminal sexual assault. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of 10, 10, and 8 years' imprisonment for the convictions. The appellate court vacated the sentences and remanded the cause for resentencing, concluding that the trial judge had erroneously believed that any prison terms imposed in this case must run consecutively. (223 Ill.App.3d 247, 165 Ill.Dec. 739, 585 N.E.2d 135.) We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (see 134 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

The defendant was charged in a seven-count indictment with seven acts of criminal sexual assault, violations of section 12-13(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 12-13(a)(3)). As alleged in the indictment, the offenses occurred during the period from February 19, 1989, to March 5, 1989; the victim in each instance was the defendant's 14-year-old stepdaughter, who was then residing in the defendant's household. On July 24, 1989, the defendant pleaded guilty to counts I, III, and VI of the indictment, and the State nol-prossed the four remaining charges. A sentencing hearing was conducted on October 13, 1989. Following the parties' presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence, the judge sentenced the defendant to prison terms of 10, 10, and 8 years for the three convictions. The judge found that the offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct and thus ordered the sentences to run consecutively, as he believed he was required to do by section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(a) ("The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, * * *, or where the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12-13 or 12-14 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively").) The trial judge later denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

The defendant appealed, raising a number of challenges to his plea and sentences. (223 Ill.App.3d 247, 165 Ill.Dec. 739, 585 N.E.2d 135.) The appellate court first considered whether the consecutive-sentences provision of section 5-8-4(a) is applicable only if the subject offenses are committed as part of a single course of conduct. Analyzing the statutory language, its legislative history, and the relevant case law, the appellate court concluded that section 5-8-4(a) is limited in scope to instances in which multiple offenses occur in a single course of conduct. On an examination of the defendant's convictions, the appellate court disagreed with the trial judge's finding, however, that the offenses occurred in a single course of conduct. The appellate court thus found the statute to be wholly inapplicable in the present case. In addition, the appellate court rejected the defendant's challenge to certain evidence introduced by the State at the sentencing hearing. In light of its result on the principal issue, the appellate court found it unnecessary to address several alternative arguments raised by the defendant. The appellate court remanded the action for a new sentencing hearing. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), which brings before us as well the defendant's requests for cross-relief (134 Ill.2d R. 318(a)).

At the time of the defendant's offenses, section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections provided, in pertinent part:

"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12-13 or 12-14 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(a).)

We note that the statute discusses offenses "committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective." For our purposes here, we shall refer to this proviso in an abbreviated manner, as simply "offenses committed as part of a single course of conduct." It is unclear from the statute whether the additional language, "during which there is no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective," is meant to define, or describe, the phrase "single course of conduct," or whether it is intended instead to limit that phrase. We need not resolve that question here.

The principal issue before us is whether the defendant is a candidate for consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4(a). The State contends that the consecutive-sentences provision of section 5-8-4(a) applies regardless of whether the subject offenses are committed in a single course of conduct. In the alternative, the State argues that, if the scope of the statute is restricted to offenses occurring in a single course of conduct, the offenses here were committed in that manner, thus making the statute applicable in the present case.

We shall decide the State's alternative argument first, and determine whether the present offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct. Section 2-4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines the term "conduct" as "an act or a series of acts, and the accompanying mental state." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 2-4.) The phrase "course of conduct" is not separately defined. Given the meaning of "conduct" and the normal acceptation of "course of conduct," we conclude that the phrases could include a range of activity and that it is not necessarily confined to a single incident.

Each of the three counts to which the defendant pleaded guilty charged him with criminal sexual assault, a violation of section 12-13(a)(3) of the Criminal Code. According to the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, these offenses were part of a longstanding pattern of sexual abuse inflicted by the defendant against the victim. We do not believe, however, that the defendant's offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct, as that phrase is used in section 5-8-4(a). The present offenses occurred on three different days: February 22, 1989, February 27, 1989, and March 1, 1989. They were separate events, committed several days apart, with substantial interruptions in time. For these reasons, we conclude that the defendant's offenses were not committed in a single course of conduct.

The State's principal contention in the present appeal is that section 5-8-4(a) is applicable whether or not the subject offenses occur in a single course of conduct. In the proceedings below, the appellate court, second district, rejected the same theory, concluding that the plain language of the statute limits its application to offenses that are committed as part of a single course of conduct. The same result was reached in another case, People v. Dooley (3d Dist.1992), 227 Ill.App.3d 1063, 170 Ill.Dec. 432, 592 N.E.2d 1112 (second district sitting as third district).) Two other districts of the appellate court, however, have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that consecutive sentences are mandatory regardless of whether the subject offenses are committed as part of a single course of conduct. (People v. Glass (4th Dist.1992), 239 Ill.App.3d 916, 928-30, 179 Ill.Dec. 823, 606 N.E.2d 655; People v. Carter (4th Dist.1992), 232 Ill.App.3d 905, 905-06, 174 Ill.Dec. 90, 598 N.E.2d 287; People v. Ewald (4th Dist.1991), 210 Ill.App.3d 7, 8-10, 154 Ill.Dec. 451, 568 N.E.2d 451; People v. Hough (5th Dist.1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 447, 453-55, 164 Ill.Dec. 51, 582 N.E.2d 259; People v. Haun (5th Dist.1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 164, 176-77, 163 Ill.Dec. 710, 581 N.E.2d 864.) Finding the statutory language to be ambiguous, the appellate panels in those cases have determined that the legislative history indicates that the statute is not limited to offenses occurring in a single course of conduct and, moreover, have believed that imposing such a limitation on the provision would produce the odd result of making consecutive sentences mandatory only in less serious circumstances.

The question before us is one of statutory construction. Our task here is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (Croissant v. Joliet Park District (1990), 141 Ill.2d 449, 455, 152 Ill.Dec. 561, 566 N.E.2d 248; People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill.2d 263, 271, 113 Ill.Dec. 236, 515 N.E.2d 45.) Our inquiry appropriately begins with the statutory language. (People v. Hare (1988), 119 Ill.2d 441, 447, 116 Ill.Dec. 664, 519 N.E.2d 879.) We may consider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and the objects it was designed to...