People v. Bondurant

• Citation: 296 P.3d 200
• Decision Date: 07 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 07CA2481.,07CA2481.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jason William BONDURANT, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

296 P.3d 200

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Jason William BONDURANT, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 07CA2481.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. I.

March 29, 2012.

Rehearing Denied June 7, 2012.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Cory D. Riddle, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.

Opinion by Judge TAUBMAN.

¶ 1 Defendant, Jason William Bondurant, appeals the trial court's judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder after deliberation, second degree murder, first degree felony murder, first degree burglary, false imprisonment, theft, two counts of menacing, and four counts of child abuse.¹ His primary contentions concern the constitutionality of sections 16–8–103.6, 16–8–106, and 16–8–107(3)(b), C.R.S.2011, a statutory scheme requiring defendants wishing to present expert testimony concerning their mental condition to undergo a court-ordered mental examination. His constitutional challenges on separation of powers and vagueness grounds are matters of first impression. We reject Bondurant's constitutional challenges and other contentions and therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 Bondurant fathered three sons with his ex-girlfriend, Sarah Cole, before the couple separated. Cole moved to the house of her mother and stepfather, Peggy and Fred Hawkins, with the boys.

¶ 3 During this time, on various occasions, Bondurant arranged with Cole to visit his sons at the Hawkinses' residence.

¶ 4 Sometime after her separation from Bondurant, Cole was briefly hospitalized. Bondurant visited her and, suffering from depression and anxiety attacks, threatened to take his life. He had recently learned that Cole had become intimately involved with a young man, C.R. Bondurant was then detained at the hospital for three days.

¶ 5 Shortly after his release, on August 25, 2007, Bondurant traveled by bus and taxi to visit his children at the Hawkinses' residence. He carried a gun which he had taken from his roommate. Although he spoke with Cole by phone earlier that day, he did not mention his intention to visit. Rather, he told her in a voice message that he would soon leave for Ohio.

¶ 6 A short while later, Bondurant arrived without any notice, and entered the house with the gun in hand.

¶ 7 Bondurant ordered everyone he saw into the living area. Quickly, C.H., Cole's stepbrother, lunged for the gun. It went off, killing C.H. Bondurant then fatally shot C.R. five times. After Bondurant talked with Cole, the police arrived and arrested him.

¶ 8 At trial, Bondurant admitted to fatally shooting the two victims, but denied that he could be convicted of the various charges because he lacked the culpable mental state. In support, Bondurant presented an expert witness in psychiatry who testified that Bondurant was severely depressed and, on the date of the charged offenses, suffered a panic attack which impaired his ability to form the intent to commit those crimes. This evidence and the court-ordered psychiatric examination required prior to its introduction are the focus of this appeal.

¶ 9 The jury found Bondurant guilty as noted above. The trial court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of life in prison without parole for the crimes of murder, to be served concurrently with sentences in the aggregate of sixteen years for the remaining counts. This appeal followed.

II. Constitutional Challenges

¶ 10 Bondurant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to undergo a psychiatric examination pursuant to section 16–8–106 after he proposed to introduce expert testimony on his mental condition because the statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Specifically, he contends that conditioning the introduction of such evidence on a defendant's cooperation with a court-ordered mental health examination and permitting disclosure of information obtained therefrom at trial facially violates the separation of powers doctrine, a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the right to present a defense, and the right to effective assistance of counsel, and is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied.² For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo. City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.2000). Because “declaring a statute unconstitutional is one of the gravest duties impressed upon the courts,” we presume that the General Assembly comports with constitutional standards in enacting a statute. Id.

¶ 12 A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a heavy burden to demonstrate its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

¶ 13 If a statute is susceptible of different interpretations, we adopt the one which comports with constitutional standards. People in Interest of C.M., 630 P.2d 593, 594 (Colo.1981).

¶ 14 Generally, a statute is unconstitutional on its face only “if the complaining party can show that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications.” Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 625 (Colo.2010) (noting an exception in the First Amendment free speech context). Even a facially constitutional statute may be held unconstitutional as applied to an individual under the circumstances in which he or she has acted or proposed to act. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404, 410–11 (Colo.App.2006) (a statute held unconstitutional as applied may not be applied in a similar context, but is not rendered entirely inoperative).³

B. Separation of Powers

¶ 15 Bondurant contends, as a matter of first impression, that section 16–8–107(3)(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Colorado Constitution. He contends it constitutes a purely procedural statute and thus usurps the judiciary's exclusive rulemaking power. Alternatively, he maintains, even if the rule does not invade the judiciary's sole province, it substantially conflicts with Crim. P. 11(e) and Crim. P. 16, part II, and thus with the judiciary's powers. We are not persuaded.

¶ 16 The Colorado Constitution divides the powers of government into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. Colo. Const. art. III. The doctrine of separation of powers generally prohibits one branch from exercising powers that the constitution exclusively vests in another branch. Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 205 (Colo.2006).

¶ 17 Colorado Constitution article VI, section 21 vests the supreme court with the power to “make and promulgate rules governingthe administration of all courts and ... governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases.” Rules adopted for the purpose of encouraging courts to function efficiently are procedural and generally fall within the inherent rulemaking power of the judiciary. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo.1993). In contrast, the General Assembly has the power to enact statutes “directed to substantive matters” relating to public policy. Id.

¶ 18 In that regard, the power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability is vested with the General Assembly, which “is also empowered to formulate principles of criminal responsibility and justification and, within constitutional limitations, to restrict defenses to particular crimes.” People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 627 (Colo.1987); see also People v. Quick, 713 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Colo.1986) (General Assembly may limit affirmative defenses to a particular category of crimes without offending due process). Thus, the General Assembly may establish affirmative defenses and limit the circumstances in which they apply, as long as they do not intrude on other constitutional protections. Id.

¶ 19 The separation of powers doctrine “does not require a complete division of authority among the three branches, however, and the powers exercised by different branches of government necessarily overlap.” Crowe, 126 P.3d at 205–06 (quoting Dee Enters. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 89 P.3d 430, 433 (Colo.App.2003)). The authority of the judicial and legislative branches commonly overlaps because the distinction between procedural rules and substantive law is often blurred. See Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 436 (holding that statutes of limitation, although indirectly affecting court procedure, primarily concerned a matter of public policy); People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 371, 585 P.2d 275, 277 (1978) (rape shield statute was neither purely procedural nor purely substantive, but “ ‘mixed’ in nature”).

¶ 20 Section 16–8–107(3)(b) provides, in relevant part:

[A] defendant shall not be permitted to introduce evidence in the nature of expert opinion concerning his or her mental condition without having first given notice to the court and the prosecution of his or her intent to introduce such evidence and without having undergone a court-ordered examination pursuant to section 16–8–106.... Such notice shall be given at the time of arraignment; except that the court, for good cause shown, shall permit the defendant to inform the court and prosecution of the intent to introduce such evidence at any time prior to trial.

Although Bondurant contends that this statute is purely procedural, and therefore entirely within the rulemaking authority of the courts, we are not persuaded.

¶ 21 In Gray v. District Court, 884 P.2d 286 (Colo.1994), the supreme court discussed the legislative history of section 16–8–103.6, C.R.S.2011, concerning waiver of the claim of confidentiality or privilege for criminal defendants using insanity or impaired mental condition as a defense. The Gray court noted that the General Assembly's purpose in requiring court-ordered psychiatric examinations was to prevent defendants from manipulating...