People v. Bone
| Decision Date | 15 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 52109,52109 |
| Citation | 412 N.E.2d 444,45 Ill.Dec. 93,82 Ill.2d 282 |
| Parties | , 45 Ill.Dec. 93 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael L. BONE, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Patrick M. Walsh, State's Atty., Decatur , for the People.
Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellee.
Defendant, Michael Bone, pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated battery in the circuit court of Macon County and was sentenced to probation for a period of two years. Subsequently, by information, it was charged that on July 20, 1977, he had committed the offense of unlawful delivery of PCP and cocaine (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 561/2, par. 1401) and on August 2, 1977, the offense of unlawful calculated criminal drug conspiracy (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 561/2, par. 1405). A report that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by committing the offenses was filed in the circuit court. The People's pleading in the proceeding to revoke defendant's probation, titled "Third Report of Violation of Probation," charged that defendant committed certain violations of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, and copies of the informations charging the violations were attached to and by reference incorporated in the report. At the probation-revocation hearing the People presented evidence pertaining to the July 20, 1977, occurrence but offered no evidence concerning the alleged offenses on August 2, 1977. Upon conclusion of the hearing the circuit court, finding that the charges had not been proved, denied the People's request for revocation.
Approximately three months later a four-count indictment was returned in the circuit court of Macon County charging defendant with two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 561/2, par. 1401), one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 561/2, par. 1402), and one count of unlawful calculated criminal drug conspiracy (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 561/2, par. 1405). The offenses charged were allegedly committed on August 2, 1977.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had previously been placed in jeopardy for the charges alleged "and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents his conviction therefor."
The count charging unlawful calculated criminal drug conspiracy was dismissed prior to trial. In a jury trial defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful possession and one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Following the conviction, a second notice of violation of probation was filed. Defendant moved to dismiss the report on the ground that in the earlier revocation proceeding he had been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. That motion was denied and the circuit court, taking judicial notice of defendant's conviction for the August 2, 1977, violations, revoked the probation and sentenced him to a two-year term of imprisonment to be served consecutively to concurrent three-year terms imposed for unlawful delivery and possession. The court also ordered that he receive no credit for the time previously served on probation. Defendant appealed the appellate court reversed both the convictions on the possession and delivery charges, and the order of revocation (70 Ill.App.3d 972, 27 Ill.Dec. 511, 389 N.E.2d 575), and we allowed the People's petition for leave to appeal.
One of the justices of the appellate court concluded that "since the State decided to include both the July 20 and August 2 transactions in the initial petition to revoke defendant's probation, jeopardy attached, and the State was prohibited from bringing those allegations in a subsequent criminal prosecution or a subsequent petition to revoke probation." (70 Ill.App.3d 972, 976, 27 Ill.Dec. 511, 514, 389 N.E.2d 575, 578.) The second justice, relying on Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, thought the principle of collateral estoppel was applicable and that it served to bar further prosecution.
The People contend that the prosecution of defendant for the offenses committed on August 2, 1977, was not barred by either double jeopardy or collateral estoppel and that the judgment of the appellate court should be reversed.
In his brief defendant states that he does not contest He argues that the probation-revocation hearing here "was not conducted in a legitimate matter but rather in a way that offended the principles of fairness and finality that are the embodiment of the double jeopardy clause." Quoting from the concurring opinion in the appellate court (70 Ill.App.3d 972, 976-77, 27 Ill.Dec. 511, 389 N.E.2d 575) he argues that because the People's conduct was unfair and did not follow the procedure "employed in a legitimate probation revocation, jeopardy attached and the subsequent prosecution was barred." He argues, too, that because the same witnesses could testify concerning the identification of defendant in both occurrences, the circuit court's finding constituted a collateral estoppel on that issue. He contends further that because the People included both violations in the petition to revoke probation and offered no testimony with respect to the events of August 2, 1977, res judicata applies.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are judicial doctrines designed to protect litigants from the burden of retrying an identical cause of action or issue with the same party or privy, and to enhance judicial economy by prohibiting repetitive litigation. (Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (1979), 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, 559.) There is, however, a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand and the effect of a judgment as an estoppel in another suit between the same parties on a different...
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