People v. Borgetto

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HOOKER, J.
• Citation: People v. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, 58 N.W. 328 (Mich. 1894)
• Decision Date: 20 March 1894
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BORGETTO.

58 N.W. 328

99 Mich. 336

PEOPLE v. BORGETTO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 20, 1894

Error to circuit court, Dickinson county; John W. Stone, Judge.

John Borgetto was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

R. C. Flannigan, for appellant.

F. J Trudell, Pros. Atty., for the People.

HOOKER J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree.

Counsel for the defendant assigns error upon the instructions to the jury upon the subject of confessions and malice. Counsel, in his brief, says: "The court commented on the alleged confession when instructing the jury, saying, 'It is generally agreed that deliberate confessions of guilt are among the most effectual proofs in the law.' The language of the court, above quoted, was argumentative, and therefore erroneous." We are not cited to the page of the record where this language is found, but think we have not overlooked the language actually used by the court. This is but a small portion of what the court said upon the subject, and is, in itself, a correct statement of the law, so far as it goes. The judge would hardly have been warranted in stopping with what is quoted above, and in fact did not, but, in careful and well-considered language pointed the jury to the dangers of false confessions, and the uncertainty of such evidence, as appears from the following quotation: "It is claimed here by the prosecution that the respondent has confessed the crime charged, or the act which is claimed to have been committed. The court advises you that the confessions of a prisoner are received as evidence of guilt, upon the presumption that a person will not make an untrue statement against his own interests. The evidence of verbal confession of guilt is to be received with great caution; for, besides the danger of mistake, from the misapprehension of witnesses, the misuse of words, the failure of the party to express his own meaning, and the infirmity of memory, it should be recollected that the mind of the prisoner himself is often oppressed by the calamity of his situation, and that he is often influenced, by motives of hope or fear, to make an untrue confession. Subject to these cautions in receiving and weighing them, it is generally agreed that deliberate confessions of guilt are among the most effectual proofs in the law. Their value depends on the supposition that they are deliberate and voluntary, and are on the presumption that a rational being will not make admissions prejudicial to his interest and safety, unless when urged by the promptings of truth and conscience. The degree of credit to be given to the confessions in this case or the alleged confessions, is for the jury, under the circumstances of the case, and the manner in which they were made. Look over the testimony, gentlemen, with reference to these confessions. Were they made deliberately, intelligently, and with understanding, on the part of the respondent? The weight of them is for the jury."

Again upon the question of malice, error is assigned upon the following: "The court erred in charging the jury as follows: 'Malice is here used in a technical sense, including, not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every unlawful and unjustifiable motive. It is not confined to particular ill will to the deceased, but it is intended to denote an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt motive; a thing done, as the books say, 'malo animo."' After defining the different degrees of homicide, the court treated the question of malice as follows: "Manslaughter is principally distinguishable from murder in this: that, though the act which occasions death be unlawful, yet the malice, either express or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is presumed to be wanting, and is wanting, in manslaughter. To constitute murder in either degree, the killing must be committed with malice aforethought. 'Malice' is here used in a technical sense, including, not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. It is not confined to particular ill will to the deceased, but is intended to denote an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt motive; a thing done, as the books say, 'malo animo;' where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indication of a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent upon mischief. And therefore malice is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another, however sudden. The time within which the wicked purpose is formed is immaterial. 'Malice aforethought' does not imply deliberation, or the lapse of considerable time between the formation and execution of the intent to take life, but rather denotes purpose and design. It means malice existing at any time before the act, so as to be its moving cause or concomitant. In considering this subject, you should carefully weigh the evidence bearing on the act charged, and all of the surrounding circumstances, the means or instruments used, if any were used, and all facts throwing light upon the nature of the act charged to have been committed. In...