People v. Boyd

• Docket Number: 1-18-2584
• Decision Date: 24 June 2021
• Citation: 2021 IL App (1st) 182584,197 N.E.3d 200,458 Ill.Dec. 787
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2021 IL App (1st) 182584

197 N.E.3d 200

458 Ill.Dec. 787

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Lawrence BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-18-2584

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Filed June 24, 2021

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Emily E. Filpi, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Andrew D. Yassan, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Lawrence Boyd, was convicted of armed robbery while armed with a firearm ( 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014)), armed robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, to wit: a bludgeon (id. § 18-2(a)(1) ), aggravated battery causing great bodily harm (id. § 12-3.05(a)(1)), two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (id. § 12-3.05(f)(1)), and aggravated battery on a public way (id. § 12-3.05(c)). Defendant was acquitted of a single count of aggravated unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3.1).

¶ 2 After the trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial, the case proceeded to a sentencing hearing. Before the imposition of sentence, however, defendant requested a "stay" in order to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Krankel counsel (see People v. Krankel , 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984) ) was appointed to represent him and, acting in such capacity, filed a second motion for new trial. This second motion for new trial claimed, inter alia , that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's entry of judgment on both count I, which alleged armed robbery with a firearm, and count II, which alleged armed robbery with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, to wit: a bludgeon.

¶ 3 The trial court denied the motion and, after holding a second sentencing hearing, imposed sentence only on count I. Defendant was sentenced to 17 years in prison for the armed robbery and an additional 15 years for possessing a firearm pursuant to the mandatory sentencing enhancement provision of section 18-2(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2014)).

¶ 4 On appeal, defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his armed robbery conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to object to the entry of legally inconsistent judgments, and (3) his 32-year sentence is excessive.

¶ 5 For the reasons that follow, we affirm both defendant's conviction and sentence.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 On November 23, 2015, at approximately 10 p.m., Marlante Jackson was at his home at 5501 West Washington, preparing to go to his job at UPS. His girlfriend and the mother of his child, Desiree Weaver, was at home with him. Seated behind the security guard desk of the building's lobby, Marlante saw an individual whom he would later identify as defendant, Lawrence Boyd.

¶ 8 As Marlante walked to his car, defendant approached him and asked Marlante whether he knew Desiree. When Marlante replied that he did not, defendant said "Yes, you do, because Thomas told me." At trial, testimony would establish that "Thomas" is Desiree's brother.

¶ 9 Defendant then grabbed Marlante and began choking him. In the process, defendant pulled a gun from his "side" and pinned Marlante against his car by shoving his elbow into Marlante's neck. Marlante—who had previously seen, handled, and fired guns at a gun range—testified that defendant's gun was a chrome .38-caliber revolver, about 12 to 14 inches in length, and that it was made of steel.

¶ 10 When Marlante tried, without success, to grab the gun from defendant's right hand, defendant shoved Marlante up against his car and struck Marlante's face with the barrel of the gun several times. Marlante's face began to bleed, felt heavy, and started to go numb. While defendant held Marlante pinned against the car, a second man went through Marlante's pockets, taking Marlante's house keys, phone, wallet, and $20. Defendant then told Marlante to get into his car and drive away or else defendant would shoot him.

¶ 11 Marlante got into his car and drove to his mother's house. The drive was difficult for Marlante because he was unable to see clearly since his face was covered in blood.

¶ 12 In response to seeing Marlante speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign, Officers John Hanlon and David Milligan activated their squad car's emergency lights and sirens and followed Marlante to his mother's house. The officers approached Marlante as he was knocking on his mother's back door and noticed that Marlante's face was covered in blood and that he was injured. Although Marlante appeared disoriented and dazed, and had difficulty answering simple questions, he related what had happened, telling the officers that the assailant had a black .38-caliber firearm.

¶ 13 Paramedics transported Marlante to Loretto Hospital, and he was later transferred to Mount Sinai Hospital, where he was hospitalized for about three days with a fracture near his left eye. Marlante testified that as a result of this incident, he had permanent scars on the inside edge of his left eyebrow, the arch of his right eyebrow, and persistent numbness in his head. Photographs of Marlante's injuries were admitted in evidence.

¶ 14 Upon returning home from the hospital, Marlante spoke with Desiree and looked at photographs on Facebook. During the armed robbery, defendant told Marlante that Desiree was his ex-girlfriend. Marlante then provided defendant's name to Detective Matias.

¶ 15 Marlante testified that he was shown a photo array at his home. The parties stipulated, however, that after Marlante provided defendant's name to Detective Matias, Marlante was shown a single I-CLEAR photograph of defendant, from which he positively identified defendant. An investigative alert was then issued for defendant.

¶ 16 At trial, Marlante denied that he initially told the police that the gun was black. His testimony was later impeached by Officer Hanlon, whose police report indicated that the gun was described as black in color.

¶ 17 The parties stipulated that Officer Scott Liedtke would testify that on June 10, 2016, while conducting a gambling investigation at 4841 West Monroe Street, a name check revealed the existence of the investigative alert, and defendant was arrested at 8:30 that evening. At the time of defendant's arrest, no firearm was recovered.

¶ 18 The following day, June 11, 2016, at Area North Police Headquarters, Marlante identified defendant from a six-person photo array.

¶ 19 After the parties rested, the trial court made the following findings:

"THE COURT: I do find that the complaining witness was credible. There was a discrepancy between the description of the gun, but there's no question that he knew it was a gun. He had testified that he had handled guns many times before because he had gone to the firing range with his brother who had a concealed carry. He was very familiar with guns, and he knew that this was a gun that the defendant had.

There's no question about the identification of the defendant. The complaining witness had an opportunity to see the defendant more than once—he saw him in the lobby, and then he was face-to-face with the defendant, just inches away, when the defendant was holding him and pinning him against the car. And he said that there were streetlights out, and it was well-lit. I find that he had an excellent opportunity to view the defendant. And not only that, but he made an immediate identification with the photo on Facebook and telling the police officer and showing the police officer the photo from Facebook.

Based upon all of that, there's a finding of guilty of armed robbery, Count 1; armed robbery, Count 2; aggravated battery, Count 3. There's also aggravated battery, Count 4; and aggravated battery, Count 5; and aggravated battery, Count 6. They were on a public way; they were on Washington Boulevard when the incident occurred. There were injuries to the complaining witness’ face as well, and that's borne out by the photographs, the injuries to each eye. The complaining witness also testified to the injuries to his head

and the dizziness. And the officer corroborated that, and the photographs corroborate what the complaining witness said happened. The injuries are consistent with what the complaining witness said happened. There's a finding, though, of not guilty of aggravated unlawful restraint."

¶ 20 Defense counsel filed a written motion for new trial. While generally maintaining that the State's evidence failed to establish his guilt on all of the charged counts, the motion was more specific as to count I. Defendant alleged that Marlante's testimony was insufficient to establish that defendant possessed a firearm.

¶ 21 After hearing argument on the motion, the trial court denied the motion and proceeded to sentencing. After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, but prior to imposing sentence, defendant requested a "stay" to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court granted defendant a continuance to prepare a motion.

¶ 22 On November 30, 2017, the trial court appointed the Office of the Public Defender to represent defendant and granted trial counsel leave to withdraw. On December 7, 2017, Assistant Public Defender (APD) Wendy Fawcett requested a continuance to review transcripts from the trial.

¶ 23 On February 26, 2018, APD Fawcett filed defendant's second motion for new trial. The motion alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to meaningfully cross examine Marlante Jackson and Officer Hanlon, (2) stipulating to the testimony of Detective Matias, and (3) failing to argue that defendant should not be found guilty of both counts I and II.

¶ 24 With respect to this third claim, the motion averred:

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