People v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 21 November 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 51269
• Citation: 300 N.W.2d 760,102 Mich.App. 112
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ancel BOYD, Defendant-Appellee. 102 Mich.App. 112, 300 N.W.2d 760
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 760

300 N.W.2d 760

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ancel BOYD, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 51269.

102 Mich.App. 112, 300 N.W.2d 760

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Nov. 21, 1980.

Released for Publication Jan. 29, 1981.

[102 MICHAPP 113] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Gary L. Walker, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.

Priscilla Scull Burnham, Marquette, for defendant-appellee.

Before GILLIS, P. J., and BASHARA and CYNAR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged with assaulting a prison employee, M.C.L. § 750.197c; M.S.A. § 28.394(3). At the preliminary examination, it was established that the defendant, a prisoner at Marquette Branch State Prison, threw a container of liquid, probably urine, in the face of a guard. Defendant was bound over for trial by the examining magistrate.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge prior to trial. The trial court granted the motion and the prosecutor appeals.

The prosecutor asserts the trial court erred in holding that the statute requires proof that the defendant was attempting an escape at the time the assault occurred. ¹ Interpretation of the statute is necessary in order to resolve the issue. It states:

"A person lawfully imprisoned in a jail, other place of confinement established by law for any term, or lawfully imprisoned for any purpose at any other place, [102 MICHAPP 114] including but not limited to hospitals and other health care facilities or awaiting examination, trial, arraignment, sentence, or after sentence awaiting or during transfer to or from a prison, for a crime or offense, or charged with a crime or offense who, without being discharged from the place of confinement, or other lawful imprisonment by due process of law, through the use of violence, threats of violence or dangerous weapons, assaults an employee of the place of confinement or other custodian knowing the person to be an employee or custodian or breaks the place of confinement and escapes, or breaks the place of confinement although an escape is not actually made, is guilty of a felony." M.C.L. § 750.197c; M.S.A. § 28.394(3). (Emphasis added.)

The object of statutory construction is to discover and give effect to the legislative intent. Smith v. City Comm. of Grand Rapids, 281 Mich. 235, 240, 274 N.W. 776 (1937). The legislative history of a statute is instructive in making such a determination. People v. Hall, 391 Mich. 175, 191, 215 N.W.2d 166 (1974), Kizer v. Livingston County Board of Comm'rs, 38 Mich.App. 239, 247, 195 N.W.2d 884 (1972).

The emphasized portion of the statute was added by 1976 P.A. 188, formerly House Bill 5117. The two House staff analyses of the bill, which are nearly identical, state that the Legislature felt there were two deficiencies in the previous statute (1931 P.A. 59, § 1). First, the place of imprisonment appeared to be limited to jails and prisons. The Legislature determined that escapes from other places of legal confinement, such as mental hospitals, should also be included in the felony statute. The trial court noted the following excerpt from the analyses in its opinion:

"The bill would provide that a prisoner who knowingly assaults an employee of a place of confinement or [102 MICHAPP 115] other custodian while escaping or attempting to escape from lawful imprisonment, including lawful imprisonment at a hospital, other health care facility, or any other place, would be guilty of a felony. The bill would take effect on January 1, 1977."

We believe that the above language was directed toward the place of confinement problem and was not addressing the other stated purpose of the amendment, i. e., elevation of assaults on prison guards to felonies. Support for this interpretation of the analyses is found by reading the documents as a whole. The following statement, apparently not considered by the trial court, is also found in the analyses:

"In addition, many persons believe that corrections staff are not now adequately protected from prisoner assault by the law. Such an assault is at present a misdemeanor. Many persons believe that such an assault upon a corrections employee or custodian should also be punishable as a felony."

We take due note that this statement does not refer to escapes.

Further support for the prosecutor's argument that a prisoner can be charged under the statute for assaulting a prison guard without attempting to escape is found in the plain language of the law. Reading the statute in the disjunctive, it is clear that assaults or prison breaks or attempted prison breaks are prohibited. Had the Legislature wanted the assault charge to be conditioned on an attempted or successful prison break, it would have used the word "and" instead of "or".

Finally, we believe the fact that the Legislature amended the statute to add the assault language is an indication that it intended to elevate the crime of assault of a prison guard to felony status. Any [102 MICHAPP 116] other reading of the statute would render that portion of the amendment nugatory, contrary to the rule that every part of the act should be given full effect, if possible. Webster v. Rotary Electric Steel Co., 321 Mich. 526, 531, 33 N.W.2d 69 (1948), General Motors Corp. v. Erves, 395 Mich. 604, 617, 236 N.W.2d 432 (1975).

Therefore, we conclude that a prisoner who assaults a prison employee may be charged with a felony under 1976 PA 188, even though he was not attempting to escape at the time of the assault. See People v. Wingo...