People v. Boykins

• Decision Date: 21 September 2017
• Docket Number: Docket No. 121365
• Citation: People v. Boykins, 2017 IL 121365, 93 N.E.3d 504 (Ill. 2017)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Byron BOYKINS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2017 IL 121365

93 N.E.3d 504

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Byron BOYKINS, Appellant.

Docket No. 121365

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed September 21, 2017.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Aliza R. Kaliski, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and David H. Iskowich, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The issue presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court's plea admonishments regarding mandatory supervised release (MSR) were sufficient to satisfy the due process rights of defendant, Byron Boykins. Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)), alleging that his due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to specifically admonish him that he would be required to serve a 3-year term of MSR after completing the 22-year prison sentence he negotiated in exchange for his plea. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal. 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U, 2016 WL 4988014. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 2007, defendant was charged by indictment with six counts of first degree murder and six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2006) ). In March 2009, defendant entered into a negotiated plea in which he agreed to plead guilty to first degree murder in exchange for 22 years' imprisonment, the dismissal of the AUUW charges, and the dismissal of a separate pending charge for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant was 20 years old at the time of the plea hearing. Prior to accepting the plea, the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: Mr. Boykins, you're charged with the offense of first degree murder. That event is alleged to have occurred on or about October the 16th of the year of 2006, in that you, without lawful justification, intentionally or knowingly killed—shot and killed Carlos Mathis, M-a-t-h-i-s.

In the State of Illinois that's referred to as—the sentencing for that case is from 20 to 40—20 to 60 years in the Illinois State penitentiary. If I find that you've been found guilty of the same or greater class felony in the last ten years, the maximum penitentiary time in this case would be life.

Upon your release from the penitentiary, there is a period of three years mandatory supervised release, sometimes referred to as parole.

Understanding the nature of the offense and its possible penalties, how do you plead to this matter; guilty or not guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty."

The trial court then confirmed that defendant was aware of the rights he would be giving up by entering a guilty plea and confirmed that he was entering the plea of his own free will. Additionally, the court reiterated the terms of the agreement that "in this particular situation," defendant was agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for "a period of 22[ ]years in the Illinois Department of Corrections." Defendant indicated that he had no questions.

¶ 4 After finding that a factual basis existed for the plea, the court accepted the plea and ratified the agreement. Defendant waived his right to a presentence investigation report, but the court was informed that defendant had several juvenile adjudications, that he was 17 years old at the time of the occurrence, and that he had no prior adult arrests. The court then imposed a sentence of 22 years in prison. Defendant again indicated that he had no questions about the sentence. The trial court did not mention MSR during sentencing, and the sentencing order does not refer to MSR.

¶ 5 In April 2014, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his constitutional due process rights were substantially violated because he was not advised that he would be required to serve a 3-year term of MSR upon completion of the 22-year prison sentence that he negotiated in exchange for his plea. Consequently, defendant alleged that he did not receive the benefit of his bargain because the total time he would be required to serve would exceed the term specifically announced by the trial court. Defendant further asserted that he had not been aware of the MSR term until he heard other inmates discussing it. As a remedy, defendant requested that the trial court reduce his prison term by three years or, alternatively, remove his obligation to serve the MSR term.

¶ 6 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the record contradicted defendant's allegations. The court concluded that the trial court sufficiently admonished defendant by advising him prior to imposing the sentence that upon his release from prison there was a three-year period of MSR.

¶ 7 The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court's admonishment satisfied due process where it "conveyed the necessary warning regarding the three-year term of MSR in no uncertain terms, such that an ordinary person in defendant's circumstances would understand it." 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U, ¶ 15, 2016 WL 4988014. Although the court acknowledged disagreement among the appellate court districts on the sufficiency of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 1997) admonitions, the court rejected defendant's argument that due process required the MSR admonishment to be specifically linked with the pronouncement of the agreed-upon sentence. 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U, ¶¶ 17-18, 2016 WL 4988014. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a method to challenge a conviction or sentence based on a substantial violation of constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2014). At the first stage of the proceedings, the circuit court must independently determine whether the petition is "frivolous or is patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2014). To be summarily dismissed at the first stage as frivolous or patently without merit, the petition must have no arguable basis either in law or in fact, relying instead on "an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation." People v. Hodges , 234 Ill.2d 1, 16-17, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204 (2009). Meritless legal theories include those theories that are completely contradicted by the record. Id. at 17, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204. We review the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo . People v. Tate , 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10, 366 Ill.Dec. 741, 980 N.E.2d 1100.

¶ 10 Defendant contends that he has sufficiently alleged a substantial violation of his due process rights because the trial court failed to adequately admonish him regarding the statutorily required three-year term of MSR. He maintains that although the court mentioned MSR when admonishing him about the possible range of penalties he could receive, under the standards set forth in People v. Whitfield , 217 Ill.2d 177, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005), and People v. Morris , 236 Ill.2d 345, 338 Ill.Dec. 863, 925 N.E.2d 1069 (2010), the admonishments did not satisfy due process where the court did not "link" the admonishment about the MSR term with his actual agreed-upon sentence to clearly apprise defendant that MSR would apply to his bargained-for sentence. He argues that an ordinary person in his circumstances would not understand that his sentence included the three-year MSR term.

¶ 11 Section 5-8-1(d)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) requires that a sentence for first degree murder must include a three-year MSR term in addition to the term of imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West 2008). Since the MSR term is statutorily mandated, it is not part of the plea bargain; the State cannot offer to exclude it as a part of a plea negotiation, and the court has no authority to withhold it in imposing sentence. Whitfield , 217 Ill.2d at 200-01, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658.

¶ 12 The requirement that a defendant be informed of the statutorily required MSR term arises from Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2), which mandates that in hearings on pleas of guilty, the trial court must inform the defendant and determine that he understands "the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law." Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 1997). In Whitfield , this court explained that pursuant to Rule 402, "every defendant who enters a plea of guilty has a due process right to be properly and fully admonished." Whitfield , 217 Ill.2d at 188, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must substantially comply with Rule 402(a)(2). Id. at 195, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658.

¶ 13 To substantially comply with Rule 402 and due process where a defendant enters into a negotiated plea for a specific sentence, the trial court must advise the defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a term of MSR will be added to the sentence. Id. at 194-95, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658.¹ Therefore, where Whitfield had bargained for a specific sentence, and the trial court accepted his plea without advising him that an MSR term would be added to the sentence, we held that Whitfield essentially received a sentence that was more onerous than the sentence for which he bargained, which violated due process notions of fundamental fairness. Id. at 201-02, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658.

¶ 14 In Morris , we did not explicitly reach the due process issue presented here, finding instead that Whitfield did not apply retroactively to the Morris defendants. We sought to clarify, however,...