People v. Bradford
| Docket Number | 73 SSM 5,No. 73 SSM 5 |
| Decision Date | 13 June 2023 |
| Citation | 40 N.Y.3d 938,217 N.E.3d 24,195 N.Y.S.3d 452 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel BRADFORD, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Thomas P. Theophilos, Buffalo, for appellant.
Brooks T. Baker, District Attorney, Bath (John C. Tunney of counsel), for respondent.
The Appellate Division order should be reversed and the matter remitted to County Court for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum.
It is undisputed that sheriff officials required defendant to wear a stun belt at trial, that neither the People nor the trial court were aware of that fact, and that defendant failed to preserve any argument concerning the stun belt. Because the trial court did not articulate a particularized need for defendant to wear a stun belt, the use of that restraint was error (see People v. Buchanan , 13 N.Y.3d 1, 4, 884 N.Y.S.2d 337, 912 N.E.2d 553 [2009] ). However, this flaw was not a mode of proceedings error (see People v. Cooke , 24 N.Y.3d 1196, 1197, 3 N.Y.S.3d 755, 27 N.E.3d 469 [2015], cert. denied 577 U.S. 1011, 136 S.Ct. 542, 193 L.Ed.2d 434 [2015] ; People v. Schrock , 108 A.D.3d 1221, 1225–1226, 969 N.Y.S.2d 668 [4th Dept. 2013], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 998, 981 N.Y.S.2d 4, 3 N.E.3d 1172 [2013] ).1 The courts below thus did not abuse their discretion by summarily denying the portion of defendant's CPL 440.10 motion based on his unpreserved assertion of a Buchanan error, which could have been raised before the trial court.
The courts below erred by summarily denying the portion of defendant's motion concerning his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Given the conceded Buchanan violation, factual issues exist concerning trial counsel's effectiveness. For instance, County Court should determine if counsel had a legitimate explanation for declining to object. There has been no hearing concerning whether defendant voiced his concerns about wearing the stun belt to his trial attorney as he contends (see People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 284, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883 [2004] []). Further, defendant submitted evidence in support of his motion which raises factual questions as to whether he consented to wearing the stun belt at trial (see Cooke, 24 N.Y.3d at 1197, 3 N.Y.S.3d 755, 27 N.E.3d 469 ).2 Defendant's ineffective assistance claim should be decided under the applicable standard (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712–713, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 [1998] ) on a full record following a hearing (see CPL 440.30[5] ).3
Defendant challenges the Sheriff Department's forcible imposition of a stun belt throughout his trial, without the court's knowledge or approval. A stun belt is a battery-operated device which "fit[s] around the waist" and is capable of delivering "a 50,000– to 70,000–volt surge through [the wearer], causing immediate loss of muscular control and incapacitation" (Jonathan Turley, Torture at the Push of a Button, Washington Post [Aug 28, 2003], available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/08/28/torture–at–the–push–of–a–button/0c962af1–de74–41cf–9a0d–948a369852b0/ [last accessed May 18, 2023]).1 More than twenty years ago, the United Nations Committee Against Torture called for abolition of the device, suggesting that its use may violate the international treaty against torture (Elizabeth Olson, U.S. Prisoner Restraints Amount to Torture, Geneva Panel Says, N.Y. Times [May 18, 2000], available at https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/18/world/us-prisoner-restraints-amount-to-torture-geneva-panel-says.html [last accessed May 18, 2023]). This Court has recognized that stun belts carry a "known potential for extremely painful and humiliating physical effects" ( People v. Cruz, 17 N.Y.3d 941, 945 n *, 936 N.Y.S.2d 661, 960 N.E.2d 430 [2011] ) and has set procedural safeguards around their use (see generally People v. Buchanan, 13 N.Y.3d 1, 884 N.Y.S.2d 337, 912 N.E.2d 553 [2009] ).
Those procedural safeguards were not followed here when the Sheriff's Department usurped the trial court's authority to determine the necessity of a stun belt and mandated defendant wear the physical restraint. Unlike the majority, I conclude that this is a mode of proceedings error and that no factual questions remain regarding defense counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object to the belt's use. Therefore, there is no basis to remit this matter for further proceedings, and I would reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
In 2011, defendant Daniel Bradford was convicted upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree, multiple counts of criminal contempt, and offering a false instrument for filing. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 23 years to life.2 In 2020, defendant moved pro se to vacate his convictions under CPL 440.10, arguing that he was improperly forced to wear a stun belt throughout his trial. In his supporting affidavit defendant alleged that on the morning his trial commenced, Sheriff's deputies brought him from his jail cell to the booking area, where the deputies placed a stun belt on the counter and explained that it would deliver an electric shock to the wearer when activated. They activated the belt so that defendant could see it sparking and then presented him with a form explaining the function of the belt and told him he was required to sign it.3 Defendant complied and was fitted with the belt. When defendant asked his attorney why he was being required to wear it, his attorney replied that it was the Sheriff's Department's policy and there was nothing he could do about it. A deputy overheard the exchange and interjected that the belt was standard policy and defendant was required to wear it. Defendant averred that the belt's prongs stuck into his skin and caused welts by the end of each day, and that throughout the trial deputies sat next to him with an activation button, causing him to worry that the belt might be activated. Defense counsel never raised the issue to the court.4
County Court denied defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing, concluding that the use of a stun belt is not a constitutional issue and is therefore waivable, and that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the use of the belt. The Appellate Division affirmed over a two-justice dissent ( People v. Bradford, 204 A.D.3d 1483, 167 N.Y.S.3d 287 [4th Dept. 2022] ). Citing ( People v. Cooke, 24 N.Y.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 755, 27 N.E.3d 469 [2015] ), the majority held that "improper use of a stun belt is not a mode of proceedings error" and therefore "the failure to object to [its] use means that reversal would not have been required on a direct appeal" ( 204 A.D.3d at 1484, 167 N.Y.S.3d 287 ). The majority also rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that defendant did not establish that the belt was visible to the jury and therefore did not "make a sufficient showing of egregiousness or that his right to a fair trial was compromised" ( id. at 1485, 167 N.Y.S.3d 287 ). The dissenters would have reversed and remitted for a hearing on the ineffective assistance claim on the ground that the trial ( id. at 1487, 167 N.Y.S.3d 287 ). One of the dissenting justices granted leave to appeal.5
Defendant contends that it was a mode of proceedings error for the Sheriff's Department to require him to wear a stun belt without the trial court's knowledge because non-judicial court personnel may not assume judicial responsibilities. I agree.
A mode of proceedings error goes "to the essential validity of the process and [is] so fundamental that the entire trial is irreparably tainted" ( People v. Kelly, 5 N.Y.3d 116, 120–121, 799 N.Y.S.2d 763, 832 N.E.2d 1179 [2005] ). Those errors are "immune not only from the rules governing preservation and waiver but also from harmless error analysis" and "require reversal without regard to the prejudice, or lack thereof, to the defendant" ( People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 534, 540, 36 N.Y.S.3d 68, 55 N.E.3d 1041 [2016] ). We have previously recognized a mode of proceedings error where a court "delegat[es] [its] function" or "discharge[s] some of [its] duties" to a non-judicial official ( People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 312–313, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984, 487 N.E.2d 894 [1985] ).
The Court has held that while "there are cases in which a court may properly find, considering the nature of the charged offense, the defendant's history and other relevant factors, that a stun belt is necessary" for courtroom security, "a stun belt may not be required unless the trial court makes findings on the record showing that the particular defendant before [it] needs such a restraint" ( Buchanan, 13 N.Y.3d at 4, 884 N.Y.S.2d 337, 912 N.E.2d 553 ). We clarified in Cooke that a court's imposition of a stun belt without the requisite finding does not amount to a mode of proceedings error (see 24 N.Y.3d at 1197, 3 N.Y.S.3d 755, 27 N.E.3d 469 ), but sheriff's deputies are not judges.
Contrary to the view of the majority, Cooke does not control this case or foreclose defendant's argument that a mode of proceedings error occurred. That decision did not reference the precise issue presented by defendant; it simply cited People v. Schrock, 108 A.D.3d 1221, 969 N.Y.S.2d 668 [4th Dept. 2013] in a string cite for the proposition that a "trial court's failure to make a finding of necessity for [a] stun belt's use does not constitute an unwaivable mode of proceedings error" ( Cooke, 24 N.Y.3d at 1197, 3 N.Y.S.3d 755, 27 N.E.3d 469 ). However, the asserted mode of proceedings error in this appeal is not simply the court's failure to make the relevant finding but "the Sheriff's unilateral decision to require defendant to wear a stun belt during trial...
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