People v. Bradford, Cr. 19058

Citation130 Cal.Rptr. 129,17 Cal.3d 8
Decision Date27 May 1976
Docket NumberCr. 19058
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties, 549 P.2d 1225 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eugene BRADFORD, Defendant and Appellant.

Richard E. Erwin, Public Defender, Kenneth Cleaver, Asst. Public Defender, and Kenneth R. Yegan, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frederick R. Millar, Jr., Theodora Berger and Steven H. Kaufmann, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

D. Lowell Jensen, Dist. Atty. and Thomas W. Condit, Deputy Dist. Atty., as amicicuriae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

CLARK, Justice.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered on jury verdicts convicting him of assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (b)) by using a firearm (Pen.Code, § 12022.5), exhibiting a firearm (Pen.Code, § 417), and possession of a concealable firearm by an exfelon (Pen.Code, § 12021). The judgment is affirmed, but modified.

Defendant and an accomplice robbed a bank in Ventura County. Minutes later, while still in Ventura County, they were stopped for speeding by Highway Patrol Officer Reynolds Patrick. Defendant, the driver, got out. As he and Patrick stepped to the side of the patrol car, defendant wrested the officer's revolver from him; Patrick tried to escape, but accidentally was struck by and pinned under a car driven by Alma Reinke. Defendant fired five shots at Patrick and Mrs. Reinke, then drove away. Patrick freed himself, radioed for assistance, and set off in pursuit.

The chase ended in Los Angeles County where defendant was involved in a traffic accident. During the chase, defendant's accomplice fired several shots at Officers Edward Douglas and Samuel Olmstead of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department when they attempted to intercept the robbers at a point on Pacific Coast Highway within Los Angeles County.

Defendant was prosecuted and convicted in federal court of bank robbery, in Los Angeles County of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (Officers Douglas and Olmstead), and in Ventura County of assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (Officer Patrick) by using a firearm, exhibiting a firearm (Mrs. Reinke), and possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-felon. This appeal is from the Ventura County judgment.

Multiple Prosecution

Defendant contends that the separate proceedings in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties constituted multiple prosecutions in violation of section 654 of the Penal Code as construed in Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206.

Section 654 provides in pertinent part: 'An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this Code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.'

In Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 21, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 612, 357 P.2d 839, 844, this court pointed out that 'Section 654's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related to the punishment to be imposed; double prosecution may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible.'

The distinction drawn in Neal was sharpened in Kellett v. Superior Court, supra. 'If needless harassment and the waste of public funds are to be avoided, some acts that are divisible for the purpose of punishment must be regarded as being too interrelated to permit their being prosecuted successively. When there is a course of conduct involving several physical acts, the actor's intent or objective and the number of victims involved, which are crucial in determining the permissible punishment, may be immaterial when successive prosecutions are attempted. When, as here, the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part (all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding Unless joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause. Failure to unite all such offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted if the initial proceedings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.' (63 Cal.2d 822 at p. 827, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366 at p. 370, 409 P.2d 206 at p. 210, italics added.) The People contend that joinder of the Los Angeles and Ventura County prosecutions was prohibited under section 777 of the Penal Code. Section 777 provides in pertinent part: '(E)xcept as otherwise provided by law the jurisdiction of every public offense is in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which it is committed.' As applied to felonies triable in the superior court, the 'jurisdictional territory' is the county, and the county in which the crime was committed is the proper venue, except where some other statute provides an alternative venue. (Witkin, Cal.Criminal Procedure, p. 66.)

In the circumstances of this case, defendant responds, section 783 of the Penal Code provided an alternative venue in Los Angeles County for the offenses otherwise triable in Ventura County. Section 783 provides in pertinent part: 'When a public offense is committed . . . on a . . . motor vehicle . . . prosecuting its trip, the jurisdiction (of such offense) is in any competent court, through . . . the jurisdictional territory of which the . . . motor vehicle . . . passes in the course of its . . . trip, or in the jurisdictional territory of which the . . . trip terminates.'

The question presented, therefore, is whether the offenses involved in this appeal can be said to have occurred 'on a . . . motor vehicle' within the meaning of section 783. Arguing that the sole purpose of such venue statutes is to eliminate the uncertainty that would otherwise exist if an offense committed inside a rapidly moving vehicle had to be prosecuted in the county in which it occurred, the People contend section 783 is inapplicable where, as here, the vehicle was stopped and the offenses were committed outside the vehicle at an identifiable spot along the highway. The People are correct.

Our venue statutes must be construed in light of the importance historically attached to Vicinage. At common law, a defendant in a criminal action had a right to be tried by a jury drawn from the vicinage, i.e., the neighborhood, in which the alleged crime occurred. (People v. Powell (1891) 87 Cal. 348, 354--355, 25 P. 481.) The substance of this common law right is preserved in the federal Constitution, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing a defendant in a state criminal prosecution a right to be tried by a jury drawn from, and comprising a representative cross-section of, the residents of the judicial district in which the crime was committed. (People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 556, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705.) It is also reflected in section 777's provision that, except as otherwise provided by law, a criminal offense is to be tried in the judicial district in which it occurred.

The right of a criminal defendant to be tried in the vicinage of the crime was interpreted so strictly at common law that, e.g., an offense committed partly in one county and partly in another was not prosecutable at all. (People v. Powell, supra, 87 Cal. 348 at p. 358, 25 P. 481.) Section 781 of the Penal Code, providing that an offense committed partly in one jurisdiction and party in another may be prosecuted in either, 'was intended to broaden criminal jurisdiction beyond the rigid limits fixed by the common law.' (People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 63, 59 Cal.Rptr. 817, 836, 429 P.2d 137, 156.) The same purpose underlies 'in-transit' statutes such as section 783, namely, to assure that venue will lie somewhere when the exact site of an offense cannot be ascertained because it was committed in a moving vehicle.

Persuasive authority from other jurisdictions not only identifies the limited purpose of in-transit venue statutes, but also establishes that, because the purpose is limited, such statutes are inapplicable when the offense occurs outside the vehicle at an identifiable location.

In Commonwealth v. Stefanowicz (1938) 133 Pa.Super. 501, 3 A.2d 22, a defendant convicted of statutory rape contended that Pennsylvania's in-transit statute was inapplicable in the circumstances of his case. Rejecting his claim, the court identified the purpose of the statute: 'In the instant case there was evidence that the crime was committed in the automobile which had been driven from the City of Pittsburgh, in Allegheny County, to a place within or without that county, where the crime was committed, and then the return journey made. The difficulty of proof of the exact locus of the crime is obvious. The very purpose of the act . . . was to obviate the difficulties of proof which confronted the Commonwealth in the present case.' (Id., at p. 505, 3 A.2d at p. 24.)

Defendant seeks support for his position in Stefanowicz, noting that the in-transit statute was held applicable even though the crime occurred while the car was stopped. However, as the court pointed out: 'It is too obvious for discussion that (the statute) does not require that offenses committed during journeys from place to place must be committed on the carriage or vehicle only when such is in motion. A journey is not always consummated by uninterrupted movement. If it were necessary to determine the exact place of temporary halts during journeys in the nighttime the difficulty of proof would not be obviated, and the purpose contemplated...

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