People v. Bramlett, No. 27257
| Docket Nº | No. 27257 |
| Citation | 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 |
| Case Date | October 31, 1977 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Page 94
v.
William (Rusty) BRAMLETT, Defendant-Appellant.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 29, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 26, 1977.
Page 95
[194 Colo. 206] J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
[194 Colo. 207] Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Carol L. Gerstl, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
ERICKSON, Justice.
The defendant appeals a conviction for first-degree assault under 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, section 40-3-202(1)(a). 1 The only issue raised on appeal concerns the constitutionality of the penalty for first-degree assault as applied to defendants who can establish that they acted with a good faith, but unreasonable belief, that justification existed to use force.
Defendant was the manager of a service station near Ovid, Colorado. On May 4, 1973, several persons in a van pulled into the service station. An argument ensued during which the defendant shot one of the persons with a .22 caliber revolver. Trial to a jury resulted in a verdict of guilty of first-degree assault. Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional was denied. Defendant appeals. We reverse and remand with directions to grant the defendant a new trial.
The defendant argues that the penalty under the first-degree assault statute is unconstitutional as applied to certain defendants because it can result in a greater penalty for essentially the same conduct proscribed by the criminally-negligent homicide statute. 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, section 40-3-105. 2 He contends that a person who acts in the good faith, but unreasonable belief, that justification exists to use force in self-defense cannot constitutionally be subjected to a greater sentence when he causes serious bodily injury than if he had caused the death of his purported assailant. We agree.
1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, section 40-3-202, provides, in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if:
"(a) With intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person, he causes serious injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon."
Assault in the first degree is a class three felony which carries a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of forty years in the state penitentiary. 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, section 40-1-105. 3
[194 Colo. 208] The defendant interposed a defense of self-defense as authorized by 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, section 40-1-804(1): 4
"Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose."
This defense is expanded to include unreasonable beliefs to reduce the degree of culpability in cases in which death results by the criminally-negligent homicide statute:
"1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, section 40-3-105.
"(1) A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of another person:
"(a) By conduct amounting to criminal negligence; or (b) He intentionally causes the death of a person in the good faith but unreasonable belief that one or more
Page 96
grounds for justification exist under sections 40-1-801 to 40-1-807." 5Criminally-negligent homicide is a class one misdemeanor which carries a penalty of from six months to two years in jail. 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, section 40-1-106. 6
The defendant relies on People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975), in which we held the manslaughter statute unconstitutional because its intent requirement was not sufficiently distinguishable from the intent requirement for the lesser included offense of criminally-negligent homicide. In Calvaresi, we declared:
"Equal protection of the law is a guarantee of like treatment of all those who are similarly situated. Classification of persons under the criminal law must be under legislation that is reasonable and not arbitrary. There must be substantial differences having a reasonable relationship to the persons involved and the public purpose to be achieved. Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970). A statute which prescribes different degrees of punishment for the same acts...
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People v. Marcy, 80SA303
...on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation. E. g., People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977......
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Austin v. Litvak, 82SA236
...declaration of paternity in himself with respect to child born to natural mother during her marriage to another); People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977) (equal protection violated where conduct and intent proscribed by first degree assault statute and less severe offense of c......
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People v. Castro, 81SA103
...standard for distinguishing the proscribed conduct ...." People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d at 74-75; see also, e.g., People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); Peopl......
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People v. Jefferson, s. 86SA464
...legislative prerogative to establish the penalties and definitions which shall apply to specific criminal offenses. People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 210, 573 P.2d 94, 97 (1977). Moreover, establishing the legal constituents of criminal liability is a uniquely legislative function. See Pat......
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People v. Marcy, 80SA303
...on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation. E. g., People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977......
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Austin v. Litvak, 82SA236
...declaration of paternity in himself with respect to child born to natural mother during her marriage to another); People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977) (equal protection violated where conduct and intent proscribed by first degree assault statute and less severe offense of c......
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People v. Castro, 81SA103
...standard for distinguishing the proscribed conduct ...." People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d at 74-75; see also, e.g., People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); Peopl......
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People v. Jefferson, s. 86SA464
...legislative prerogative to establish the penalties and definitions which shall apply to specific criminal offenses. People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 210, 573 P.2d 94, 97 (1977). Moreover, establishing the legal constituents of criminal liability is a uniquely legislative function. See Pat......