People v. Brandon

Decision Date14 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03CA1176.,03CA1176.
Citation140 P.3d 15
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rasheed Jamal BRANDON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Ned Jaeckle, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

ROTHENBERG, J.

Defendant, Rasheed Jamal Brandon, appeals the judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of a controlled substance (one thousand grams or more), tampering with evidence, and resisting arrest; and the sentence imposed following a bench trial finding him guilty of two habitual criminal counts. Because we conclude the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I.

At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the People presented testimony which supported the following facts. A Utah state patrol officer pulled an automobile over and ticketed defendant, the driver, for speeding. Defendant is an African-American male, and his passengers, Jason Williams and Denisha Bush, are also African-Americans. Bush was a codefendant at trial.

During the stop, the Utah officer became suspicious about possible illegal drug activity and attempted to search the car by consent. However, the initial consent given by defendant was withdrawn, and no search was performed. The Utah officer then called the Colorado Highway Patrol and stated that he had just stopped a car with three persons in it who appeared nervous. The Utah officer described them by race and supplied a description of the car and its license plate number.

Later that same day, the car—which was then being driven by Bush—was pulled over by Colorado Highway Patrol Troopers Hunter and Tobias, accompanied by a drug sniffing canine, who had been waiting for the car after receiving the tip from the Utah Highway Patrol.

According to Trooper Hunter, the car was traveling sixty-five miles an hour in a sixty-mile-an-hour zone. Hunter asked Bush to step out of the car and stand behind it on the side of the road, but in front of the patrol car. He asked her where she was going, and she said she was heading to Denver or Glendale for a cousin's funeral. Hunter asked Bush for identification, and she provided an identification card. She said she had forgotten her driver's license, and so Hunter called dispatch to see whether she had a valid license.

Hunter testified that, because the license check initially revealed that Bush did not have a license, he went back to the car and asked defendant whether he had a license and could drive. While defendant handed over his license, Hunter asked Williams where he was going, and Williams said he was going "[t]o Denver to visit relatives." Hunter asked whether the trip was for anything else, expecting to hear about the funeral, and became suspicious when Williams did not mention it. Soon afterwards, Trooper Tobias received a call from dispatch confirming that Bush had a valid California driver's license.

After Hunter received that information from Tobias, he went to Bush, who was still outside the car, handed her paperwork back to her, and told her to "[p]lease slow down, get an insurance card, and have a safe trip." However, Hunter further testified that, "within a second or so," he told Bush he had concerns about her story, particularly because Williams did not know about the funeral. Hunter asked her how her cousin had died, and she began crying. He continued to question her, asking whether she had anything illegal in the car, including a list of specific drugs, weapons, or cash. She said she did not.

Hunter testified that he then asked Bush whether he could search her car for drugs. She asked, "Why?" and he said he just wanted "to look" and "it will take just a few minutes and you can be on your way." She responded that she wanted to go on to the funeral in Denver. Hunter said he understood, but again asked to search her car. According to Hunter's testimony, which the trial court found credible, after two requests, Bush replied, "Sure." Over defendant's vociferous objection, Hunter put the dog in the back seat of the car. The dog "alerted" to a bag there which was then searched. It contained a large amount of cocaine.

The patrol car was equipped with a video camera that was also capable of recording sound. However, much of the exchange between the passengers and the officers was not recorded or is unintelligible, and much of the conversation between Bush and Hunter is off camera. Hunter explained that he did not have the microphone that would have recorded the verbal exchanges.

The trial court credited the troopers' testimony over Bush's testimony and denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the state troopers' initial encounter with Bush— which lasted from the time the car was pulled over until Bush's paperwork was returned— was a valid investigatory stop resulting from an alleged traffic violation. The court also found that once Bush's paperwork was returned to her, there was no basis for the continued detention of the vehicle or its passengers because no reasonable suspicion existed, but that the search nevertheless was valid because Bush voluntarily consented to it and was the record owner of the car.

II.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He maintains that the search of the vehicle was the product of an unlawful detention and that Bush's later consent to the search and the resulting discovery of the contraband was obtained through the exploitation of the unlawful detention. He also contends he and the other occupants of the vehicle were victims of racial prejudice. We agree the motion to suppress should have been granted and therefore need not address his contention that the vehicle was stopped partially or totally because of the race of the occupants.

A.

Initially, we note that the trial court found that Bush was the title owner of the car, but that both she and defendant used it. Further, the court "assume[d], without deciding, that [defendant] had an interest in the vehicle adequate for him to be considered a person who could consent to the search." See People v. Tufts, 717 P.2d 485, 490 (Colo.1986)(concluding the evidence supported the inference that the defendant was allowed by the registered owner to use the car); People v. Naranjo, 686 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Colo.1984)(a passenger's status alone does not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in an automobile's passenger compartment, but standing is conferred if the defendant-passenger asserts a possessory or proprietary interest in the car or the items seized, or if the owner gives the defendant permission to use the vehicle).

On appeal, the People have not disputed defendant's standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search, and we therefore need not address it.

B.

When reviewing a trial court's suppression order, we defer to its findings of fact, but review its conclusions of law de novo. People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666 (Colo. 2001). We must determine on appeal whether the trial court applied the correct legal standards to the facts of the case, and whether sufficient evidence in the record supports its legal conclusions. People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315, 320 (Colo.2000)("[T]he trial court's application of legal standards to those facts is treated as a question of law to be reviewed de novo.").

Hence, we review de novo the legality of the Colorado troopers' traffic stop of the vehicle and its three occupants, and the legality of the troopers' conduct following the initial encounter. See People v. Haley, supra.

Here, the trial court found, and the parties agree, as do we, that the initial encounter was a valid investigatory stop resulting from an alleged traffic violation. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)("Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]."); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1399, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)(generally, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred).

The trial court further found that once Bush's paperwork was returned to her, there was no basis for the continued detention of the vehicle or its passengers because no reasonable suspicion existed. That finding is also not challenged.

At issue, therefore, is the legality of the troopers' conduct following the initial encounter.

C.

The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen . . . the purpose for which [an] investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for continued detention and interrogation of citizens." People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85-86 (Colo.1995).

Thus, once a driver produces a valid license and proof that he or she is entitled to operate the vehicle, the driver "must be allowed to proceed on his [or her] way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo.1997)(quoting United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429 (10th Cir.1997)); see People v. Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.3d 141, 147 (Colo.2001)("The [traffic] stop usually must `last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,' and the `scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification."') (quoting People v. Ingram, 984 P.2d 597, 603-04 (Colo.1999)).

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