People v. Breeden

• Decision Date: 09 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 4–12–1049.,4–12–1049.
• Citation: 54 N.E.3d 916,403 Ill.Dec. 775
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Thomas BREEDEN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

54 N.E.3d 916

403 Ill.Dec. 775

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Thomas BREEDEN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 4–12–1049.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

May 9, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Daaron V. Kimmel, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Kathy Shepard, all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The trial court sentenced defendant, Thomas Breeden, to 58 months' imprisonment for failure to register as a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/ 6 (West 2008)). He appealed, arguing the sentence was excessive. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's sentencing decision, finding no abuse of discretion. People v. Breeden, 2014 IL App (4th) 121049, ¶ 59, 388 Ill.Dec. 62, 23 N.E.3d 1260.

¶ 2 Also on appeal, the State maintained that three of the monetary assessments in defendant's case were void because the circuit clerk, rather than a judge, imposed them and because case law regarded them as fines. Specifically, it challenged the assessments of $10 for “Arrestee's Medical” (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2008) ), $10 for “St Police Services” (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5), (5) (West 2010)), and $5 for “Drug Court Program” (55 ILCS 5/5–1101(f) (West 2008)). The State further asserted that a fourth assessment, a fine of $255 under section 10 of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/10 (West 2008) ), was void because even though a judge imposed it, the fine was less than the minimum amount of $500 that section 10 required. Defendant agreed with the State's arguments. On review, we vacated the four fines referenced by the parties and remanded the case to the trial court with directions that it calculate and directly impose any mandatory fines, including a sex offender registration fine in the amount of $500, and apply any monetary credit to which defendant was entitled. Breeden, 2014 IL App (4th) 121049, ¶ 59, 388 Ill.Dec. 62, 23 N.E.3d 1260.

¶ 3 On January 20, 2016, the supreme court denied a petition for leave to appeal filed by defendant but directed this court to vacate our judgment in the case and reconsider the matter in light of People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, 398 Ill.Dec. 22, 43 N.E.3d 932, to determine whether a different result is warranted. In accordance with the supreme court's direction, we vacate our prior judgment and reconsider the matter in light of Castleberry. After reconsideration, we vacate the three fines identified by the parties as improperly assessed by the circuit clerk (the $10 “Arrestee's Medical” fine, the $10 “St Police Services” fine, and the $5 “Drug Court Program” fine) and remand to the trial court for imposition of the mandatory fines and the application of appropriate credit against those fines. We otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. The Original Charge

¶ 6 On January 15, 2010, the State filed an information against defendant in Champaign County, charging that on or about October 5, 2009, he violated section 6 of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2008) ) in that, being a “sex offender” within the meaning of section 2(A) (730 ILCS 150/2(A) (West 2008)), he failed to “register in person with the new agency of jurisdiction” within three days after changing his residence.

¶ 7 B. The Negotiated Guilty Plea

¶ 8 In a hearing on April 27, 2010, defendant said he wanted to plead guilty to the charge of failing to register as a sex offender. The trial court admonished him, telling him, among other things, the minimum and maximum punishments for the offense. The court said:

“THE COURT: This is a Class 3 felony.

Standard penalty range, counsel?

MR. KANIS [ (prosecutor) ]: Standard range.

THE COURT: Means you can be sent to prison for not less than two, nor more than five years, followed by a period of mandatory supervised release of one year. Maximum fine could be up to 25 thousand dollars.”

¶ 9 After confirming with defendant that he understood all the rights he would be giving up by pleading guilty and that he was pleading guilty of his own free will, the trial court asked counsel if there were any agreements. An assistant State's Attorney, Chris Kanis, replied:

“MR. KANIS: Your Honor, in exchange for Defendant's plea of guilty to Count I, be sentenced to probation for a period of 24 months. Serve 18 days in the county correctional center. Credit for nine days served, making this a time-served plea. Pay a fine of three hundred dollars and court costs. A local anticrime assessment fee of ten dollars. Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act Fee. Probation service fee to be set by the Court. Genetic marker grouping analysis fee of two hundred dollars. Total 45 dollars credit against any fines for time spent in custody. And comply with [deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) ] reporting requirements and statute.

THE COURT: Ms. Propps [ (defense counsel) ], is that the agreement?

MS. PROPPS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Breeden, is that the agreement that you have with the State?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

¶ 10 In response to the trial court's queries, defendant denied anyone had promised him anything else, and he denied he had been forced or threatened. Upon defendant's reaffirmation of his desire to plead guilty to the charge of failure to register as a sex offender, the court accepted his guilty plea.

¶ 11 The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing. After hearing the prosecutor's brief summary of defendant's criminal record, the court imposed the following sentence:

“THE COURT: We'll show the Defendant is sentenced to a period of probation for 24 months, subject to the standard conditions which will include 18 days in custody with credit for nine served. He has the monetary obligations due and owing, with a probation service fee fixed in the amount of 15 dollars per month.

If he's not already done so, he'll submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Department of State Police.”

¶ 12 The written sentencing order, dated and entered the same day, incorporated the terms of the plea agreement and stated the probation service fee would be $15 per month, but it did not specify the amount of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance fee. The order required defendant to “pay all fines, fees and costs as authorized by statute” and to pay all financial obligations within 180 days.

¶ 13 A docket entry dated the same day, April 27, 2010, said: “Fine + Cost Fee $1604.55 Signed Judge DIFANIS THOMAS J.” In addition to the 24 months of probation; the 18 days in jail; the credit for 9 days; and the submission of blood, saliva, and tissue specimens, the docket entry imposed the following monetary assessments:

“Fine + Cost	519.55
	PROBATION MONITORIN	360.00
	PUBLIC DEFENDER	450.00
	ST POLICE SERVICES	10.00
	CRIME STOPPERS	10.00
	STATE OFFENDER DNA	.00
	SEXUAL OFFENDER REG	255.00.”

¶ 14 The record contains a printout from the offender DNA database of the Illinois State Police. According to the printout, defendant had already submitted a DNA specimen. He did so on June 2, 1997.

¶ 15 C. The Revocation of Probation

¶ 16 On April 23, 2012, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant's probation. According to the petition, one of the conditions of probation was that he refrain from violating any criminal statute. The petition alleged that on April 3, 2012, he violated this condition by violating two subsections of section 11–9.4–1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/11–9.4–1 (West 2010) ). He allegedly violated subsection (b) (720 ILCS 5/11–9.4–1(b) (West 2010)) by knowingly being present in a public park, Lincoln Park, in Danville. He allegedly violated subsection (c) (720 ILCS 5/11–9.4–1(c) (West 2010)) by knowingly loitering on a public way within 500 feet of Lincoln Park. (Even though the violation of probation occurred in Vermilion County, the Champaign County circuit court has jurisdiction because the original offense of failure to register as a sex offender occurred in Champaign County.)

¶ 17 On August 1, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on the State's petition to revoke probation. Defense counsel told the trial court “this [was] going to be an admission and stipulation.” After admonishing defendant and confirming that his admission was voluntary (see Ill. S.Ct. R. 402A(a), (b) (eff. Nov. 1, 2003)), the court said it was ready to hear the factual basis (see Ill. S.Ct. R. 402A(c) (eff. Nov. 1, 2003)).

¶ 18 The prosecutor represented that the evidence would show the following. Around April 3, 2012, defendant was in the process of trying to buy a car from Wright Motors, a retail merchant in Danville. Wright Motors had lent him a vehicle to use temporarily, pending the sale. The sale fell through, and Wright Motors requested defendant to give back the vehicle it had lent him. In telephone conversations with Wright Motors, defendant falsely said that he was in Bloomington and that he was unable to return the vehicle. One of the managers of Wright Motors, a man named Carter, went to Lincoln Park to pick up his three-year-old son, and he noticed the loaner vehicle parked in a parking lot within 500 feet of the park. He approached the vehicle and saw defendant sitting inside it. Carter called two other employees of Wright Motors, who then repossessed the vehicle from defendant. Someone also called the police, and the police arrived and placed defendant under arrest. Defendant admitted he had lied to Wright Motors about his location, and he admitted being in the park.

¶ 19 The trial court asked defense counsel if she believed the State had witnesses who, if called, would testify substantially as indicated in the factual basis. Defense counsel answered yes. The court accepted defendant's admission and stipulation to the allegations in the petition to revoke probation, and the court revoked his...