People v. Brewer

• Citation: 615 N.E.2d 787,245 Ill.App.3d 890
• Decision Date: 09 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 3-91-0476,3-91-0476
• Parties: , 185 Ill.Dec. 917 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James W. BREWER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 787

615 N.E.2d 787

245 Ill.App.3d 890, 185 Ill.Dec. 917

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James W. BREWER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 3-91-0476.

Appellate Court of Illinois Third District.

June 9, 1993.

Stephen Omolecki, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, Edward A. Woller, for James W. Brewer.

John X. Breslin, Deputy Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, Larry VanDerSnick, State's Atty., Cambridge, Judith Z. Kelly, States' Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, for the People.

Justice SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted the defendant, James W. Brewer, of three counts of armed violence, three counts of armed robbery, two counts of disarming a peace officer, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of home invasion, and one count of attempted aggravated kidnapping. He was thereafter sentenced as an habitual criminal to life imprisonment. He appeals, and we affirm.

The record shows that the defendant, along with three other men, committed an armed robbery of a jewelry store in Davenport, Iowa, on October 19, 1989. The four men were from Indianapolis and after the robbery they headed back to that city. Outside of Atkinson, Illinois, two state police officers spotted the suspects' vehicle. The vehicle then exited the highway and entered a service station. The officers followed the car, and when three of the men exited it they approached them. The officers were apparently unaware that codefendant Nathan Alexander was still in the car.

Alexander then exited the car with an Uzi semiautomatic weapon. He proceeded to disarm the officers, and the four men then left the service station with the officers' weapons. They drove to a supermarket parking lot in order to find a car to steal and a white person to drive them. When they saw Lynette Hull getting out of a van, they approached her, took her keys, and told her she was going with them. However, she managed to escape, and while she ran into the store the men drove away in her van.

The men then drove around looking for another vehicle to steal. Eventually, they saw a van in a garage at the residence of Kim Verstraete. The men, armed with a gun, knocked at the door of the home and when Kim answered it, they entered her home without permission. They then forced her and her three-year-old son to accompany them to Chicago. Once in Chicago, they released her and her son.

Other evidence showed that codefendant Bruce Richardson testified against the defendant. He admitted that he faced the same charges as the defendant, and that he agreed to plead guilty and testify against the defendant in exchange for a recommendation by the State that he receive only a 20-year term of imprisonment. Defense counsel wanted to cross-examine Richardson regarding the fact that he faced a potential sentence of up to 90 years. However, the trial court refused to allow such cross-examination because it would also inform the jury of the potential sentence facing the defendant. As such, defense counsel was only allowed to ask Richardson if he knew he could get substantially more time than the 20 years of imprisonment he received. Richardson acknowledged that fact.

Richardson also testified that he had prior felony convictions for robbery and auto theft and a misdemeanor conviction for possession of stolen property. Other evidence presented to the jury showed that Richardson once identified himself to the police as the defendant, and that he and the defendant got into a heated argument over the incident. Richardson also threatened to "get" the defendant and "take care" of him.

Codefendant Mevester Lyles also testified against the defendant in exchange for a plea agreement with the State. Defense counsel was once again precluded from eliciting the fact that Lyles faced a potential sentence of up to 90 years. However, evidence was presented showing that Lyles had two prior felony theft convictions and that he had been found guilty of a number of the same offenses the defendant faced in the instant case.

On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of Richardson and Lyles. Specifically, he contends that the failure to allow evidence of the possible prison sentence facing the codefendants constituted reversible error.

The right to cross-examination of a witness regarding possible bias or motive is guaranteed by the Federal and State constitutions. (People v. Gonzalez (1984), 104 Ill.2d 332, 84 Ill.Dec. 457, 472 N.E.2d 417.) While a defendant should be given the widest possible latitude in cross-examining a State's witness, the form that latitude takes rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Any decision by the trial court regarding limitation of cross-examination will not be overturned upon review absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice. People v. Roy (1988), 172 Ill.App.3d 16, 122 Ill.Dec. 64, 526 N.E.2d 204.

Case law also establishes that the trial court may properly preclude any inquiry regarding specific sentences of an accomplice witness when such disclosure would also reveal the potential sentence facing the defendant. The purpose of preventing disclosure of the potential sentence facing the defendant is that such evidence is irrelevant to the jury and could possibly prejudice the State's right to a fair trial. People v. Lake (1978), 61 Ill.App.3d 428, 18 Ill.Dec. 900, 378 N.E.2d 364; People v. Portis (1986), 147 Ill.App.3d 917, 101 Ill.Dec. 351, 498 N.E.2d 675; People v. Roy (1988), 172 Ill.App.3d 16, 122 Ill.Dec. 64, 526 N.E.2d 204.

Contrary to the foregoing, the defendant asks this court to follow its decision in People v. Graves (1977), 54 Ill.App.3d 1027, 13 Ill.Dec. 192, 370 N.E.2d 1219. In Graves, we found that the potential sentence facing an accomplice witness could be revealed even though it would also reveal to the jury the sentence facing the defendant. However, we note that in Graves, unlike in the instant case, the defendant was apparently unable to elicit any testimony regarding the defendant's plea agreement with the State.

We also note that while a defendant's objective in eliciting sentencing information is to show the accomplice's bias, this is not an unlimited right and must be balanced with other competing interests. Therefore, in light of Lake, Portis, and Roy, we decline to follow Graves to the extent that it may conflict with these decisions. We now hold that a trial court may properly preclude such evidence in cases where the record shows that the defendant was able to conduct an extensive inquiry into the nature of the plea agreement with the State.

In the case at hand, the record shows that the defendant was able to elicit considerable evidence regarding the plea agreements and possible biases of Richardson and Lyle. The defendant was allowed to introduce evidence showing that the codefendants received deals in exchange for their testimony and that they received substantially less time than they might have had they not agreed to the deals. In addition, evidence was introduced showing that Richardson may have had a grudge against the defendant and was out to "get" him.

Consequently, we find that in light of the substantial amount of evidence presented regarding the plea agreements and the wide latitude afforded the defense during cross-examination to elicit other evidence of possible bias, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding evidence regarding...