People v. Bridges

• Decision Date: 11 May 1892
• Citation: 142 Ill. 30,31 N.E. 115
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BRIDGES.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

142 Ill. 30

31 N.E. 115

PEOPLE

v.BRIDGES.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 11, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Prosecution of James M. Bridges for a violation of Laws 1887, p. 189, as amended by Laws 1889, p. 158, concerning the protection of fish. Defendant was convicted, and that judgment was reversed by the appellate court. The case comes before the supreme court on a certificate of importance from the judges of the appellate court. Reversed.

John C. Mathis, A. J. Lester, and E. S. Smith, for the People.

Palniers & Shutt, for appellee.

BAILEY, J.

This is a prosecution commenced in the name of the people of the state of Illinois against James M. Bridges before a justice of the peace of Sangamon county for a violation of the provisions of the act entitled ‘An act to encourage the propagation and cultivation and to secure the protection of fishes in all the waters of this state,’ approved May 31, 1887, as amended by an act approved June 3, 1889. Laws 1887, p. 189; Laws 1889, p. 158. The trial before the justice of the peace resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendant. The cause was thereupon removed to the circuit court by appeal, where a trial de novo was had, resulting in the conviction of the defendant, and the imposition upon him of a fine of $10. From that judgment the defendant appealed to the appellate court of the third district, where said conviction was reversed, and a final judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. The present appeal is from said judgment of reversal, the judges of the appellate court having granted a certificate that the case involves questions of law of such importance, on account of principal and collateral interests, that it should be passed upon by this court.

The trial in the circuit court was without a jury, the facts being all admitted by the following stipulation: ‘Jacob Miller is the owner of the southwest quarter of section 8, in township 15 north, range 3 west of the 3d P.M., in Sangamon county, Illinois, in which what is known as ‘Sand Prairie Lake,’ is situated. The small body of water known as ‘Sand Prairie Lake’ is about one quarter of a mile in length, and its width ranges from about twenty-five to one hundred years. It is situated in the bottom of the north fork of the Sangamon river, and is distant from said river only a few yards at the furthest point. There is a low place or depression in said northwest quarter of said section 8, reaching from the north end of said lake or pond to the bed of said river at most seasons of the year, but in case of high water this depression or slough fills with water, and connects directly the waters of this pond or lake with the waters of said stream or river, and at times this connection lasts for a period of several days or weeks. The rises of said river or stream generally occur in the spring of the year or the early summer, and again in the fall. When there is no high water in the river or stream, the said lake or pond is entirely shut in, and its waters do not mingle at all with the waters of said stream. In July, 1889, the defendant, James Bridges, obtained the consent of said Jacob Miller to fish with a seine in said body of water so situated on said premises, and to catch and kill fish in said pond with a seine. After consent was given defendant by Jacob Miller so do do, the defendant, with the help of others, went in and upon said pond, and with a large seine, with meshes of one and one half inches, and about seventy yards long, (not a minnow seine) dragged said pond or body of water, and caught and killed thereby a large number of fish of different kinds, of the varieties common to the waters within the state of Illinois. The north fork of the Sangamon river is not a stream or river used for navigation.' The foregoing being all the evidence offered at the trial, the circuit court held as matter of law, in substance, that the catching and kiling of said fish by the defendant, in manner and form as shown by said stipulation, was unlawful, and rendered the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the complaint.

The statutory provisions for the violation of which the prosecution was instituted are to be found in the sixth section of said amendatory act, and are as follows: ‘That it shall be unlawful for any person to catch or kill any fish with any seine or other device used as a seine in or upon any of the rivers, creeks, streams, ponds, lakes, sloughs, bayous, or other water courses wholly within or runningthrough the state of Illinois; nor shall the meshes of any weir, basket, or trap, or any device for catching fish in such waters not above prohibited, except for catching minnows for bait, be less than two inches square: provided, however, that seining shall be lawful and allowed between the first day of July in each year and the first day of April in the following year, with seines, the meshes of which shall not be less than two inches square, in such rivers or streams as are used for navigation, wholly within the state, and not above or beyond any private or corporate dam on said rivers or streams, and also in the navigable bays or lakes connected with such navigable streams, wholly within the state, and not extending beyond the overflowed bottoms of such rivers or streams; * * * and any person offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined as provided in this act.’ Rev. St. 1891, c. 56, § 6. The questions presented are (1) whether this statute applies to the lake or pond in controversy; and (2) whether, as applied to said lake or pond, it is valid. The first of these questions is solely one of construction, and has no dependence upon the second, except so far as it involves the rule that a statute should, if possible, be so construed as to sustain its provisions, by avoiding, where that can be done, all conflict with the fundamental law. Do the provisions of said statute apply, and were they intended by the legislature to apply, to bodies of water of the character of the one in question here? The object of the statute, as expressed in its title, is ‘to encourage the propagation and cultivation and to secure protection of fish in all the waters of this state,’ and section 6 of the amendatory act prohibits the catching or killing of fish with any seine, etc., ‘in or upon any of the rivers, creeks, streams, ponds, lakes, sloughs, bayous, and other water courses wholly within this state, or running through the state of Illinois.’ The body of water in question, as the stipulation admits, is a lake or pond of considerable dimensions, lying wholly within this state, and one which, in its natural state, is stocked with a considerable amount of fish of the varieties common to the waters of this state. The language of the statute is certainly broad enough to include it, and we are unable to yield our assent to the reasons which are urged in favor of the construction which would exclude it.

It is contended that the general words, ‘other water courses,’ should be held to operate as a limitation upon the scope or meaning to be given to the more specific enumeration of different classes of streams or bodies of water, so as to exclude all waters which do not properly fall under the designation of water courses. It is true that, where several words susceptible of an analogous meaning are coupled together, the maxim noscuntur a sociis is often applied; that is to say, they take, so to speak, color from each other, but that is usually, if not uniformly, by way of restricting the more general to a sense analogous to the less general. In re Swigert, 119 Ill. 83, 6 N. E. Rep. 469; End. Interp. St. §§ 400-411. The rule, however, does not seem to have the converse operation. Thus, where various specific terms are associated with words of a more general character, and the ordinary signification of the general words is more restricted than that of all the specific terms taken collectively, the meaning of the general words may be enlarged, but the scope of the specific words used will not be restricted, or their force practically nullified, by their association with general words of that character. To constitute a water course, according to the ordinary signification of that term, there must be a stream usually flowing in a particular direction, and in a definite channel, and it must usually discharge itself into some other stream or body of water. Palmer v. Waddell, 22 Kan. 352; Robinson v. Shanks, (Ind. Sup.) 20 N. E. Rep. 713. If, then, the words ‘other water courses' should be given their ordinary signification, and should be allowed to control the more specific words of the statute, they would practically eliminate from it the words ‘ponds' and ‘lakes,’ and perhaps also the words ‘sloughs' and ‘bayous,’ as the first two of these words most usually, and the last two very frequently, are not included within the ordinary meaning of ‘water courses.’ It is manifest that this latter term was used, not by way of restricting anything which had already been mentioned, but for the purpose of including any other water course of the same general nature as those specified, if such there should happen to be in the state, which were not sufficiently described in the specification already made Whether or not there were such in fact is not material. The general words were obviously used by way of precaution, so as to render it certain that no waters of that general nature should be omitted.

Again, it is contended that the body of water in question cannot be deemed to have been within the contemplation of the legislature when it passed said statute, because the land covered by said water, as well as all the lands by which it was surrounded, are the private property of Miller, and that said body of water, by reason of its situation, is subject to no right of navigation in favor of the public, and no right of easement in favor of other riparian proprietors. It has no outlet, and during the...