People v. Bridges

• Decision Date: 27 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1-17-0129,1-17-0129
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James BRIDGES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (1st) 170129
158 N.E.3d 1198
442 Ill.Dec. 163

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James BRIDGES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-17-0129

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, SIXTH DIVISION.

Filed March 27, 2020
Rehearing denied June 19, 2020

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Adrienne N. River, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Iris G. Ferosie, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

442 Ill.Dec. 166

¶ 1 Following a 2016 jury trial, defendant James Bridges was convicted of armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 35 and 21 years. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court did not properly follow the three-stage procedure for evaluating Batson claims (see Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ) of racial discrimination in jury section, and (2) he should be resentenced for armed robbery because one of his prior convictions is void as facially unconstitutional. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment herein and vacate the earlier conviction at issue.

158 N.E.3d 1202

442 Ill.Dec. 167

¶ 2 I. JURISDICTION

¶ 3 On April 22, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping. On December 16, 2016, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 35 and 21 years respectively, and he filed his notice of appeal. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 ), and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and Rule 606 (eff. July 1, 2017) governing appeals from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case.

¶ 4 II. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Defendant was charged in relevant part with armed robbery while armed with a firearm ( 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2012)) against Anthony Claybourne and aggravated kidnapping while armed with a firearm (id. § 10-2(a)(6)) against Edward Hill, both allegedly committed on or about September 26, 2012.

¶ 6 A. Jury Selection

¶ 7 At jury selection, after 14 prospective jurors were examined and the State spread of record the criminal histories of certain veniremen, one was stricken for cause without objection. The State exercised one peremptory challenge for Daniel Wilson, to which defendant objected under Batson and sought an explanation for the challenge. The court noted that defendant would have to make a prima facie case before an explanation was due. Defendant replied that Wilson was the only black man in the 14-person panel, failed to disclose traffic violations but so had another venireman, and had no concerning issues in his voir dire testimony. The court found that defendant had not made a prima facie case of racial discrimination, agreeing that Wilson was the only black man in the panel but noting that two black women were not stricken. Defendant made three peremptory strikes of veniremen, none of whom were the black women.

¶ 8 After another panel of 14 prospective jurors was examined, the State spread of record the criminal history of three veniremen, including Keith Hawkins who had an assault conviction in Alaska and a 1995 conviction for "assault with an attempt sex abuse of a minor." Three veniremen were stricken for cause without objection, and defendant used two peremptory challenges. The State then used three peremptory challenges, including Hawkins. Defendant objected under Batson because Hawkins was black, reminding the court of the striking of Wilson. The court asked the State why it excused Hawkins, the State responded to the effect that there was no prima facie case, and the court replied "I think there might be" and asked again for an explanation. The prosecutor replied that Hawkins had a conviction for "attempt criminal sexual assault of a child" and added "I don't feel comfortable with him as a juror." The court found that the State had given a race-neutral reason in Hawkins's prior conviction. Defendant asked to "reopen the question" of striking Wilson but the court declined. "We can't go backwards at this juncture. He was excused. I felt that was a proper excusal. I asked the State for an excuse as to Hawkins. They gave me one that I feel is race-neutral, so Hawkins is gone as well." The court noted for the record that a jury, including two alternates, had been selected. The two black women were primary, not alternate, jurors.

¶ 9 B. Trial

¶ 10 Hill and Lakesha Powell testified to being employees of a particular fast-food restaurant in September 2012. Defendant entered the restaurant on the evening of September 26, 2012, pointed a gun at Powell, grabbed her by the neck, and forced

158 N.E.3d 1203

442 Ill.Dec. 168

her to the cooler. She noticed that defendant was wearing gloves. Defendant then pointed a gun at Hill, forced Hill and Powell into the cooler, and locked it. While defendant was behind Powell for much of the time, Hill faced defendant from a few feet away, with the store lights on and with nothing covering defendant's face. Hill and Powell were in the cooler for about 15 minutes when a fellow employee, Claybourne, freed them. Hill saw defendant near the restaurant on the day after the incident and called the police, but defendant was gone before they arrived. Over a year later, Hill and Powell identified defendant from a photographic array and Hill also identified him from a lineup.

¶ 11 Claybourne and fellow employee Elijah Williams testified that they were in the restaurant's office on the evening in question, counting cash from a cash register drawer onto a table, when a man entered the room holding a gun. Claybourne identified defendant as that man at trial and in a photographic array and lineup over a year after the incident, but Williams was unable to make an identification. Williams laid face-down on the floor, while the man pointed his gun at Claybourne and demanded the money before grabbing the money himself from the table and drawer with gloved hands. The man demanded any security video, and he cocked his gun when Claybourne replied that there was no videotape. The man ordered Claybourne to the floor, threatened to kill him if he followed him, and left the restaurant. Claybourne saw defendant again about a month later and called police, but "[t]hey didn't come."

¶ 12 Following closing arguments, jury instructions, and deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty as charged of aggravated kidnapping while armed with a firearm and armed robbery while armed with a firearm.

¶ 13 C. Posttrial

¶ 14 Defendant first filed a general posttrial motion raising no Batson claim but later filed an amended posttrial motion raising a Batson claim. He noted that he is a black man and that he objected once when the State peremptorily struck the only black man in the first panel of veniremen and again when the State peremptorily struck the only black man in the second panel. He argued that he made a prima facie case of discrimination and that the State failed to provide a sufficient reason for the disputed challenges.

¶ 15 The State responded to the amended posttrial motion, noting that defendant's motion did not mention the men and two black persons in the first panel who the State did not challenge. The State argued that defendant failed to state a prima facie case in his first objection regarding Wilson because the nonchallenged veniremen included men and two black persons so that the theory of defendant's case rested on Wilson being "the only one [who] fits both groups jointly." As to the second panel and defendant's objection to striking Hawkins, the State argued again that there were men and black persons who were not stricken by the State and added that, despite the lack of a prima facie case, the court had the State explain the Hawkins challenge and then found its explanation of a prior felony conviction to be sufficient.

¶ 16 At the posttrial hearing, defendant argued that he had made a prima facie case that the State peremptorily challenged the only two black men in the venire and that the State then failed to sufficiently explain its challenges. The State argued that defendant's trial had black jurors so that the court correctly found no pattern or prima facie case of racial discrimination. When the court noted that the State explained the Hawkins

158 N.E.3d 1204

442 Ill.Dec. 169

challenge, defendant argued that the State's explanation was insufficient because other veniremen had criminal histories.

¶ 17 The court continued the hearing so that it could examine the record regarding jury selection. After it did so, the court spread of record that 2 black veniremen were seated and 1 stricken from the first panel and 1 black venireman was stricken and 1 seated from the second panel, so that there were only 5 black prospective jurors out of 28 total....