People v. Bridgewater

• Decision Date: 29 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 105075.,105075.
• Citation: 918 N.E.2d 553,235 Ill.2d 85
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lavar BRIDGEWATER, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

918 N.E.2d 553

235 Ill.2d 85

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lavar BRIDGEWATER, Appellant.

No. 105075.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 29, 2009.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Fletcher P. Hamill, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, Joliet (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick, David H. Iskowich and Retha Stotts, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Defendant Lavar Bridgewater was charged with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(B) (West 2004)). He filed a motion to suppress evidence seized in a search of his vehicle. The circuit court of Will County granted defendant's motion, but the appellate court reversed, holding the search was justified as a search incident to arrest. 375 Ill.App.3d 414, 313 Ill.Dec. 750, 873 N.E.2d 45.

We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315(a). Based upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), we hold that the search of defendant's vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court's judgment, affirm the circuit court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Bolingbrook Police Officer John Morrow testified he observed defendant's vehicle traveling 59 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour speed zone. The vehicle also had tinted front windows. Morrow activated his emergency lights and siren and pursued the vehicle.

Morrow testified he was behind defendant's vehicle when it stopped at a traffic light. Defendant turned right, traveled approximately 200 feet, turned into a convenience store parking lot, and parked. Morrow stopped his squad car directly behind the vehicle.

Defendant and Morrow got out of their vehicles at approximately the same time. Morrow testified defendant turned and looked at him. Morrow initially told defendant to get back inside his vehicle. When defendant began walking toward the store, Morrow told him to come back to the squad car. Defendant stated he was going inside to get something to eat. Despite Morrow's instructions to return to his vehicle, defendant turned and walked into the store.

After calling for backup, Morrow entered the store and told defendant he was being stopped for speeding and driving a vehicle with tinted windows. Morrow told defendant he had to come back outside and produce his driver's license and proof of insurance. After being asked three or four times to step outside, defendant walked outside and stood on the curb near the front bumper of his car. When Morrow requested defendant's driver's license and proof of insurance, defendant stated he did not have to give the officer anything because he had done nothing wrong.

Defendant then placed his hands in his coat pockets. Morrow asked defendant two or three times to take his hands out of his pockets, but defendant did not comply. After defendant refused to place his hands on the store window, Morrow arrested him for obstructing a peace officer because he failed to obey commands. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in Morrow's squad car. The arrest occurred about five feet from the front of defendant's vehicle.

Morrow informed two other officers responding to the call for backup that he had arrested defendant. Morrow asked the other officers to search defendant's vehicle. As he was driving out of the parking lot, Morrow saw one of the other officers hold up an ammunition clip. When Morrow returned to defendant's vehicle, the officer stated he found the ammunition clip in the center console of the vehicle. Morrow joined in the search and found a handgun under the front passenger seat.

Defendant testified he did not see the squad car or hear the siren until he stopped at the convenience store. When he reached the door to the store, he heard Morrow order him back to his car. Defendant ignored the order and walked into the store. Morrow followed defendant inside and asked him twice to come back outside. When defendant walked out of the store, Morrow arrested him immediately. Defendant testified Morrow did not request his driver's license or proof of insurance until after he was handcuffed. Defendant denied placing his hands in his pockets outside the store, but admitted he was speeding and his car windows were tinted.

On November 10, 2005, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the items found in the search of his car. The State filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's ruling on November 30, 2005. The trial court denied the State's motion on December 19, 2005. The following day, the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and a notice of appeal.

On appeal, the State contended the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. The State argued the search of the car was a valid search incident to defendant's arrest for obstructing a peace officer. 375 Ill.App.3d 414, 313 Ill.Dec. 750, 873 N.E.2d 45. Based on Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004), the appellate court held the police officers were permitted to search defendant's vehicle incident to his arrest because he was a recent occupant of the vehicle. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 375 Ill.App.3d 414, 313 Ill. Dec. 750, 873 N.E.2d 45.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant's appeal to this court was initially limited to whether the search of his vehicle was justified as a search incident to arrest. After the parties briefed that issue, however, we allowed defendant to submit a supplemental brief raising an argument on the appellate court's jurisdiction to hear the State's interlocutory appeal. Defendant argues the appellate court did not have jurisdiction because the State failed to file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress evidence. Relying upon People v. Marker, 382 Ill.App.3d 464, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590 (2008), defendant argues the State's motion to reconsider did not toll the 30-day period for filing an appeal from the order suppressing evidence under Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (210 Ill.2d R. 606(b)). Defendant claims Rule 606(b) requires the State to file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the order granting the motion to suppress.

We allowed the State's motion to file a response to defendant's supplemental brief. The State argues this court should exercise its supervisory authority to address the merits of this appeal without considering the timeliness of the notice of appeal. The State also contends its notice of appeal was timely because the motion to reconsider tolled the 30-day period for filing under Rule 606(b). Further, the State asserts its appeal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of the order denying reconsideration, and that order is also appealable because it had the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. Finally, the State notes that prior to the appellate court's decision in Marker, Rule 606(b) was consistently interpreted as providing that a motion to reconsider tolled the time for appealing an interlocutory suppression order. Given the State's reliance on that long-standing precedent, any contrary decision by this court should be applied only prospectively.

Defendant's supplemental argument is premised on the appellate court's decision in Marker. In that case, the appellate court held the tolling provision in Supreme Court Rule 606(b) applies only to appeals from final judgments. Marker, 382 Ill. App.3d at 472, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590. Thus, a motion to reconsider does not toll the time for filing an appeal from an interlocutory order, and an appeal may not be taken after 30 days from entry of that order. Marker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 472, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590. The State's notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the interlocutory order. Marker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 477, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590. The appellate court, therefore, concluded the notice of appeal was untimely and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Marker, 382 Ill. App.3d at 477, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590.

The appellate court acknowledged the split of authority created by its decision. Marker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 477, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590. Thus, on its own motion, the appellate court certified under Supreme Court Rule 316 (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 26 (December 20, 2006), R. 316, eff. December 6, 2006), that the case involved "a question of such importance that it should be decided by the Supreme Court." Marker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 477, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590. The question certified was whether the State's motion to reconsider an order suppressing evidence tolls the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal under Supreme Court Rule 606(b). Marker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 477, 321 Ill.Dec. 71, 888 N.E.2d 590.

This court recently filed its decision in Marker. Relying on the plain language of Rule 606(b) and prior case law interpreting that rule, we held a timely motion to reconsider an order granting a defendant's motion to suppress tolls the time for filing an appeal. People v. Marker, 233 Ill.2d 158, 173, 330 Ill.Dec. 164, 908 N.E.2d 16 (2009). Accordingly, we reversed the appellate court's decision dismissing the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the appeal. Marker, 233 Ill.2d at 178, 330 Ill.Dec. 164, 908...