People v. Brockman
| Decision Date | 30 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 69932,69951,s. 69932 |
| Parties | , 158 Ill.Dec. 513 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois v. Wilmer BROCKMAN, Jr., et al. (Wilmer Brockman, Jr., Appellee; Chrysler Corporation et al., Appellants). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Ernest Pool, Ottawa, R. Davy Eaglesfield III, Michael O. Ellis, Cromer, Eaglesfield & Maher, Indianapolis, Ind., for appellant Chrysler Corporation.
Harvey M. Sheldon, Shell J. Bleiweiss, David S. Finch, McDermott, Will & Emery Craig M. Armstrong, Armstrong & Surlin, Ottawa, for appellee.
[158 Ill.Dec. 515] Chicago, for appellant Amoco Chemical Co. et al.
Martha A. Churchill, Chicago, for amici curiae Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry et al.
Howard W. Feldman and Stanley N. Wasser, Feldman & Wasser, and Katherine D. Hodge, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Environmental Regulatory Group, Inc.
This appeal arose out of an action initiated by the State in the circuit court of La Salle County against defendants and third-party plaintiffs, Wilmer and Edith Brockman (Brockman), owners/operators of the Brockman I landfill, for violations of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1001 et seq.).
Brockman operated a sanitary landfill near Ottawa, Illinois. In May 1982, the State filed a five-count amended complaint which alleged that from August 1970 through September 1979, Brockman operated the landfill in violation of certain provisions of the Act. Specifically, count I alleged, inter alia, that Brockman violated sections 21(d) and (e) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 111 1/2, pars. 1021(d), (e)) and certain solid waste rules in that he "caused or allowed[ ] special waste * * * to be accepted and disposed of on the site." In its prayer for relief, the State asked, inter alia, that: (1) Brockman be enjoined from any further violations of the Act; (2) Brockman take steps to bring the site into compliance with the Act and the solid waste rules; (3) monetary penalties be imposed and costs and fees be assessed; and (4) any other appropriate relief be granted. Count V alleged that, as a result of the violations of the Act, Brockman had caused contamination of the groundwater and surface water, which, under the common law, constituted a public nuisance. The State prayed for an injunction, prohibiting Brockman from placing any further wastes at the site, requiring Brockman to take corrective action to remove potentially toxic or hazardous wastes from the site, and for any other appropriate relief. (Counts II, III and IV of the State's complaint, which adopted the allegations in count I and named other defendants, are not the subject of this appeal.)
In April 1987, Brockman filed a six-count third-party complaint against his customers, various generators and transporters of waste deposited at the Brockman landfill. 1 In count II, Brockman attempted to state a claim under section 22.2 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1022.2) and alleged that third-party defendants were statutorily liable to him for the entire cost of remedial action at the site, including costs and attorney fees. Count VI purported to state a claim for contribution pursuant to the Illinois Contribution Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq.).
Upon third-party defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-615.) On appeal, the appellate court, third district, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the dismissal of counts I, III, IV and V, reversed the dismissal of counts II and VI and remanded the cause to the circuit court. (192 Ill.App.3d 680.) We granted third-party defendants' petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315). As none of the parties have contested the appellate court's affirmance of the circuit court's dismissal of counts I, II, IV and V, only counts II and VI are at issue in this appeal. The Illinois Environmental Regulatory The narrow issue presented for our review is whether third-party claims against generators and transporters of waste may properly be joined in an action by the State against owners/operators of a sanitary landfill for violations of section 21 of the Act and for common law public nuisance. We answer the question in the affirmative.
[158 Ill.Dec. 516] Group, the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry and Mid-America Legal Foundation filed amicus curiae briefs in support of third-party defendants. 134 Ill.2d R. 345(a).
Prior to addressing the substantive issues raised in this appeal, we must consider a matter of procedure. Brockman asserts that the issue before this court is the viability of the allegations in his amended third-party complaint. Therefore, he maintains, arguments which third-party defendants raise concerning allegations asserted in the original third-party complaint are irrelevant. Third-party defendants respond contrarily and assert that the amended complaint is not properly preserved for our review because: (1) Brockman failed to file a petition for leave to appeal the denial of his motion to file the amended complaint and, therefore, the appellate court rulings are now the law of the case; (2) Brockman's prayer for relief asks only that the appellate court, which affirmed the denial of Brockman's motion to amend his third-party complaint, be affirmed; and (3) the cover of Brockman's brief does not state that cross-relief is requested (134 Ill.2d R. 315(g)).
It appears that Brockman has misapprehended the appellate court holding. In his brief, Brockman asserts that the appellate court found error in the trial court's denial of his motion to amend. Then, in support of his claim that the amended complaint is properly preserved, he points to his notice of appeal in the appellate court, wherein he assigned as error, inter alia, the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate the dismissal of his original complaint, which included leave to file an amended third-party complaint.
As is apparent from the appellate court opinion, there was no finding that the trial court erred in denying Brockman's motion. In fact, the appellate court found the denial to be a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. The court merely held that, on counts II and VI in the original third-party complaint, Brockman should be permitted to amend his complaint to add new parties.
In response to third-party defendants' arguments, initially, we note that the doctrine of the law of the case is inapplicable to this court's review of appellate court decisions. (People v. Triplett (1985), 108 Ill.2d 463, 488, 92 Ill.Dec. 454, 485 N.E.2d 9.) Secondly, even though Brockman's prayer for relief requests affirmance of the appellate court, the prayer is not controlling. The relevant inquiry is whether, based on the record, Brockman is entitled to any relief. This court may consider any issues and grant whatever relief is warranted by the record. (See 134 Ill.2d R. 318(a).) Finally, Brockman's failure to properly caption his brief is not fatal.
Despite Brockman's remiss in the presentation of his case to this court, since the issue was properly presented in and considered by the appellate court, and further, since our disposition of the larger issue may warrant the trial court's reconsideration of the motion, we choose to examine the propriety of the trial court's ruling. In our determination to review the court's ruling, we have considered and perceive no prejudice to third-party defendants.
Having determined that we will consider the correctness of the trial court's ruling on the motion, we next address Brockman's argument that, by its denial of the motion to amend the pleading, the trial court addressed the substance of the claims in the amended complaint. He maintains, relying on Miller v. Enslen (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 865, 18 Ill.Dec. 129, 377 N.E.2d 282, that the claims asserted in the amended complaint are properly before this court. We disagree.
Preliminarily, we find that Miller provides no support for Brockman's argument. The record reveals that in Brockman's attempt
[158 Ill.Dec. 517] to persuade the trial court to allow the amendment, he expressly advised the court that the purpose of the amendment was to correct matters of form in the original complaint. Brockman failed to adequately advise the court that, in addition, the amended complaint pled new legal theories. The trial court, in denying Brockman's motion to amend, stated that amending the complaint to correct matters of form would be of no purpose since the defects concerned matters of substance. Based on the court's comments and on the fact that the court neither invited nor heard any argument on the new legal theories raised in the amended complaint, we conclude that it gave no consideration to the substance of those claims. Accordingly, while we accept [143 Ill.2d 363] for review the propriety of the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the complaint, we decline, in the first instance, to pass upon either the substance or the sufficiency of the allegations in the amended complaint.
The trial court set April 15, 1987, as the deadline for amending the pleadings to include new parties and new legal theories. On July 15, 1987, a full three months after the deadline, Brockman moved to amend his complaint. The motion was denied. The appellate court found that Brockman's attempt to amend his complaint was untimely and held, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to amend.
Generally, a defendant may be allowed to amend his pleadings to introduce any party or to add new causes of action at any time prior to entry of a final judgment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-616(a).) Whether to permit an amendment is left to the broad discretion of the trial court. (Saldana v. Wirtz...
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...the third-party defendant is dependent on the liability of the third-party plaintiff to the original plaintiff.” [ People v. Brockman , 143 Ill 2d 351, 574 NE2d 626, 158 Ill Dec 513 (1991).] Thus, a third party action requires that the party seeking relief assert a claim of derivative liabi......
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Parties
...the third-party defendant is dependent on the liability of the third-party plaintiff to the original plaintiff.” [ People v. Brockman , 143 Ill 2d 351, 574 NE2d 626, 158 Ill Dec 513 (1991).] Thus, a third party action requires that the party seeking relief assert a claim of derivative liabi......