People v. Brooks

Decision Date29 November 2016
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Kieth BROOKS, Defendant.
CourtNew York Criminal Court

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County by Christine M. McGrath, Assistant District Attorney, for the People.

The Legal Aid Society by Rebecca Stegman, Esq., for Defendant.

ARMANDO MONTANO, J.

Defendant is charged with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle ( VTL § 511[1][a] ), Driving While Intoxicated ( VTL § 1192 [3 ] ), Leaving the Scene of an Incident Without Reporting ( VTL § 600[1] [a] ), Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol ( VTL § 1192[1] ), and Unlicensed Operation ( VTL § 509[1] ).

Defendant moves for an order, pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 and 30.30, dismissing the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds.

The factual allegations in the accusatory instrument sworn to by the deponent, PO Christia Quezada read as follows:

Deponent is informed by PO Mark Schmidt, that [on or about April 21, 2016 at approximately 7:03 AM at vicinity of Bruckner Boulevard and Metcalf Avenue, County of the Bronx, State of New York], informant responded to a motor vehicle accident and observed a Chrysler van (New York License Plate No. XXXXXXX), with its front end pressed against the rear of a Hyundai (New York License Plate # XXXXXXX). Deponent further states that he observed said Hyundai to be pressed against a Subaru (New York License Plate # XXXXXXX).
Deponent is further informed by informant that informant observed the aforementioned Chrysler van to be damaged in that the front bumper of said vehicle was dented, the hood of said vehicle was lifted and the front passenger side headlight was hanging off of said vehicle. Deponent is further informed by informant that he observed said Subaru to be damaged in that the rear end of the vehicle was dented.
Deponent is informed by C.A., that at the above time and place, a public roadway, informant observed defendant operating a Chrysler van (New York License Plate # XXXXXXX), in that defendant was seated behind the steering wheel, keys in the ignition, and the engine running, moving along a public roadway. Deponent is further informed by informant C.A. that informant was seated in the drivers seat of a Hyundai (New York License Plate # XXXXXXX) when the aforementioned Chrysler van operated by defendant struck the rear of the aforementioned Hyundai vehicle. Deponent is further informed by informant that defendant exited the vehicle and fled without providing his name, address and insurance information.
Deponent further states that he observed defendant to have bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech, a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and unsteady on his feet.
Deponent further states that he was present at the administration of a chemical test analysis of defendant's breath, and defendant refused to take said test.
Deponent further states that he obtained and read a teletype printout of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, whose computers are tied into our police computer for the purpose of obtaining records, which records were made in the course of business within a reasonable time after the event or occurrence, and said records show that the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle was suspended or revoked in that the defendant had in effect at least one suspension or revocation on at least one separate date for failure to answer, appear, or pay a fine.
Deponent further states that the basis for believing that the defendant knew or had reason to know that his/her license was suspended or revoked is as follows: Department of Motor Vehicle records revealed that defendant's license was suspended pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law 510.
Deponent further states that he has reviewed defendant's criminal history which is maintained by the Department of Criminal Justice Service which indicated defendant was convicted of Penal Law Section 220.09 Possession of a Controlled Substance, Docket Number 2004NY034500, on October 29, 2004, in New York Criminal Court.
Deponent further states that defendant stated, in sum and substance: WHY THE FUCK ARE YOU ARRESTING ME FOR DRIVING IF I DON'T HAVE A LICENSE.
Procedural History

1. At arraignment on April 21, 2016, the People stated not ready because they had yet to obtain the necessary supporting depositions. The case was adjourned to April 26, 2016 for conversion.

2. On April 26, 2016, the People stated not ready as they still required two supporting depositions. The case was adjourned to June 21, 2016 for conversion.

3. On June 21, 2016, defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued.

4. On June 22, 2016, defendant returned to court. The People stated not ready as they had yet to file and serve two supporting depositions. The case was adjourned to July 22, 2016 for conversion.

5. Off-calendar on June 23, 2016, the People filed with the court and served upon defense counsel the supporting depositions of PO Mark Schmidt and C.A., the certificate of translation of V.S., a certified copy of defendant's Department of Motor Vehicles Abstract of Driving Record, and a statement of readiness.

6. On July 22, 2016, the People stated that they were ready and maintained their readiness as of June 23, 2016. This court rejected the People's June 23, 2016 statement of readiness due to a defective certificate of translation. The case was adjourned to August 5, 2016 for conversion.

7. On August 15, 2016, the People asserted that the complaint had been fully converted as of June 23, 2016. Defendant challenged the People's statement of readiness and requested a motion schedule.

Parties' Contentions

Defendant asserts that the People have yet to validly declare their readiness as the complaint was never converted due to an insufficient certificate of translation for the alleged witness, C.A. Defendant points out that on July 22, 2016, this court deemed the complaint to be unconverted because the certificate of translation of V.S. was insufficient as it failed to indicate her qualifications as a translator. In spite of this court's ruling, defendant avers that the People have failed to cure the defective certificate of translation and the complaint remains unconverted to this day. Since more than 140 days of includable time have elapsed, in excess of the statutorily prescribed time of 90 days, defendant argues that this court should dismiss all counts in the accusatory instrument.

In opposition, the People contend that they should only be charged with a total of 62 days for the time period from April 21, 2016 to June 23, 2016. The People maintain that they filed and served a valid certificate of readiness on June 23, 2016. Additionally, the People assert that the failure to file a certificate of translation does not render a complaint invalid, facially insufficient, or unconverted.

As to the contents of a certificate of translation, the People assert that the Criminal Procedure Law does not require any specific language indicating that the translator was fluent in both languages. The People submit that because the certificate of translation indicates that the translator translated the accusatory instrument to the informant and that the informant indicated that he understood what was translated, the certificate of translation at issue is valid and sufficiently establishes that the informant understood the contents of the complaint.

Although defendant does not challenge the substance of the certificate of translation, the People note that the translator attests to the fact that she read the accusatory instrument to the complainant in Spanish. Because the accusatory instrument is drafted in English, the People aver that it is implicit that the translator understands both Spanish and English and was able to translate the document in such a manner that the complainant understood the contents of the complaint.

Discussion

The top count of the accusatory instrument is an unclassified misdemeanor, which is punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of up to one year. PL § 55.10(2)(c); VTL § 1193(1)(b). Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(b), the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action where the defendant is charged with one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, and none of which is a felony.

"[ CPL 30.30 ] does not address problems involving speedy trial rights or due process in a constitutional sense. Instead, it is purely a statutory ‘readiness rule’. It was enacted to serve the narrow purpose of insuring prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial, and its provisions must be interpreted accordingly." People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236, 239, 501 N.Y.S.2d 793, 492 N.E.2d 1209 (1986). "Whether the People have satisfied [their 30.30] obligation is generally determined by computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion." People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 208, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9, 604 N.E.2d 71 (1992).

For CPL § 30.30 purposes, in order for the People to be "ready for trial", the People must satisfy two elements. First, there must be a communication of readiness by the People which appears on the trial court's record by way of either a statement of readiness in open court or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the court clerk. See, People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287 (1985). Second, the People must declare their readiness when there are in fact ready to proceed to trial. Id. at 337, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287.

This court finds that defendant has met his initial burden "by...

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