People v. Broughton
Decision Date | 21 March 2003 |
Docket Number | No. B156268.,B156268. |
Citation | 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 161,107 Cal.App.4th 307 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Katherine M. BROUGHTON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Sylvia Koryn, under appointment by the California Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Penal Code section 1381.5. requires the district attorney to bring a defendant imprisoned in a federal correctional institution to trial or for sentencing in state criminal proceedings within 90 days after receiving an assent from an authorized federal official for the release of the defendant from federal custody for that purpose. If the defendant is not brought to trial or for sentencing as required by section 1381.5,1 the trial court must, on motion, "dismiss the action."
Although as a formal matter, if the trial court at a sentencing hearing suspends imposition of sentence and places the defendant on probation, the defendant has not yet been sentenced, we hold section 1381.5 applies only to defendants who have not been tried or afforded an initial sentencing hearing following conviction, not probationers awaiting a probation revocation hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Katherine M. Broughton's motion to dismiss the criminal actions against her notwithstanding the district attorney's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 1381.5 following Broughton's demand for a "speedy trial" of her probation revocation hearing.
On September 14, 1998 Broughton pleaded guilty to possession of rock cocaine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and was placed on diversion for 18 months (§ 1000.2) under specified terms and conditions. On December 18, 1998 Broughton pleaded guilty to transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf.Code, § 11360, subd. (a).) Diversion in the first matter was terminated, and the two cases were scheduled for sentencing. On January 19, 1999 the trial court suspended imposition of sentence in both cases and placed Broughton on three years felony supervised probation with certain terms and conditions, including the condition she serve 210 days in county jail.
On October 2, 1999 Broughton was sentenced to 30 months in a federal correctional facility. The record does not identify the federal charges for which she was tried or convicted.
On January 19, 2001 Broughton appeared in the state trial court and admitted (and the court found true) that she had violated the terms of her probation by deserting probation in both state cases.2 The trial court revoked probation, then reinstated it in both cases with the condition that she serve an additional one year in county jail. Probation was to terminate upon her release from jail. Pursuant to Broughton's request, the court stayed the county jail condition of probation until January 31, 2001, and ordered Broughton to surrender on that date. Broughton did not inform the court of her federal sentence or otherwise indicate an inability to surrender herself for custody.3
On January 31, 2001 Broughton failed to surrender as ordered. Instead, the program director of a federal parole center informed the trial court that Broughton was in federal custody and had approximately five months left on her 30 month federal sentence. The trial court revoked probation and issued a bench warrant.
On April 13, 2001, while incarcerated in a federal correctional facility, Broughton filed in the state trial court an in propria persona "Motion for Speedy Trial or Speedy Disposition of Warrant(s)" under section 1381.5 (April motion).4 Broughton demanded a "speedy trial" "on all actions pending against her" in the state jurisdiction. The April motion stated Broughton was scheduled to be released from the Federal Correctional Institution, Dublin, on December 4, 2001. The trial court placed the motion in Broughton's case file and took no further action. There is no evidence the motion was served on the district attorney or Broughton's probation officer.
On October 4, 2001 the district attorney's office received a section 1381.5 "speedy trial" demand from Broughton (October demand). This demand listed Broughton's projected release date only as "4, 2002," omitting the month. Following receipt of the October demand the district attorney's office did not inquire of the head of the federal correctional institution in which Broughton was confined whether and when Broughton could be released for sentencing in the state matters, as required by section 1381.5.
Broughton was released from federal custody on January 8, 2002. On January 18, 2002 Broughton appeared in the state court and moved to quash the bench warrant issued on January 31, 2001 and to dismiss both state cases on the ground the district attorney failed to take any action on her section 1381.5 demand. The trial court dismissed the bench warrant and probation violation associated with her failure to surrender but denied Broughton's motion to dismiss the entire action, finding that Broughton had not been prejudiced by the district attorney's inaction. The court reinstated the previous order of probation with the condition Broughton serve one year in county jail. Probation was to terminate upon her release from custody.
Broughton obtained a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5)5 and filed a timely notice of appeal from the orders granting probation.6
Broughton contends section 1381.5 requires dismissal of an action if the district attorney fails to act on a demand for a "speedy trial" by a probationer awaiting a probation revocation hearing.
Section 1381.5 permits federal prisoners with pending criminal proceedings in state court to request to be brought to trial or for sentencing in the state action. Upon receipt of a request of defendant for trial or sentencing, the district attorney "shall promptly inquire" of the warden of the federal correctional institution housing the defendant "whether and when such defendant can be released for trial or sentencing" in the pending state matter. (§ 1381.5.) The People must bring the defendant to trial or for sentencing within 90 days of receiving an assent from the federal authorities for defendant's release for trial or sentencing in the state matter. "If [the] defendant is not brought to trial or for sentencing as provided [in section 1381.5], the court in which the action is pending shall, on motion or suggestion of the ... defendant or his counsel, dismiss the action." (Ibid.)
In a closely analogous situation involving section 1203.2a,7 the Supreme Court held that dismissal of a criminal action was mandatory, without any showing of prejudice, if a probation officer failed to comply with the statute's procedural requirements intended to permit a probationer has been incarcerated on another offense to request immediate imposition of sentence by the probationary court. (In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 1005, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 706, 911 P.2d 1381 (Hoddinott).) Although not citing Hoddinott, Broughton urges us to adopt a similar construction of section 1381.5, compelling dismissal of the underlying criminal action whenever the district attorney fails to comply with the section's mandate that he or she promptly inquire whether the defendant can be released for trial or sentencing.8 Before we may address Broughton's contention, however, we must determine whether section 1381.5 is available to probationers as to whom imposition of sentence was suspended when probation was granted at the initial sentencing hearing.9
The handful of Courts of Appeal that have considered this issue have concluded, most often in dicta, that section 1381.5, along with its companion statute section 1381,10 is applicable to probationers as to whom impositions of sentence was suspended because they "remain to be sentenced" in a pending criminal proceeding. (See, e.g., Rudman v. Superior Court (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 22, 26-27, 111 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Rudman); Boles v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 479, 484, 112 Cal.Rptr. 286; People v. Johnson (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 510, 514, 240 Cal.Rptr. 748, disapproved on another ground in Hoddinott, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 1005, 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 706, 911 P.2d 1381.)11 Those decisions, however, have employed an overly technical interpretation of sections 1381 and 1381.5 that is inconsistent with the statutes' overall language and purpose and leads to anomalous consequences.12
In this case we must determine whether section 1381.5 applies to an individual who has been tried and convicted and who then appeared at a timely initial sentencing hearing at which imposition of sentence was suspended when the court placed the defendant on probation. Specifically, is such an individual when facing a probation revocation hearing a defendant who "remains to be sentenced" and thus entitled to be "brought ... for sentencing" within the time constraints of section 1381.5, with the consequence of the failure to do so dismissal of the underlying conviction?
In approaching this task we are guided by well-established principles of statutory interpretation: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Amons
... ... Banks, supra, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 25104.) An order granting probation is identified in section 1237 as a "final judgment" for purposes of taking an appeal. ( People v. Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 792, 102 Cal. Rptr.2d 555, 14 P.3d 227; see also People v. Broughton (2003) ... 125 Cal.App.4th 869 ... 107 Cal.App.4th 307, 320, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 161; People v. Martinez (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1461-1462, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 358; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 500, 219 Cal.Rptr. 85.) 7 Defendant then had the opportunity to challenge the ... ...
-
In re Marilyn A.
...act.' [Citation.]" (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898-899, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420; see People v. Broughton (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 307, 316-317, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 161.) "If statutory language is susceptible to more than one interpretation, courts must adopt the meaning that ......
-
Craft v. Superior Court
...right are tripartite and include the defendant's interest in avoiding prolonged incarceration (see, e.g., People v. Broughton (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 307, 318, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 161; People v. Simpson (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 177, 106 Cal.Rptr. 254; People v. Brown (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 745, 751, ......
-
People v. HSU
...arguendo that the “sentence is part of the [criminal] trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”]; see People v. Broughton (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 307, 319, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 161 [“The fundamental policies advanced by speedy trial statutes ... apply to defendants who have not been afforded a s......
-
Other pretrial motions
...arguendo that the ‘sentence is part of the [criminal] trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’]; see People v. Broughton (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 307, 319 [‘The fundamental policies advanced by speedy trial statutes … apply to defendants who have not been afforded a sentencing hearing….’].)......
-
Table of cases
...v. Broome (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1479, §§5:63.1, 5:82 People v. Brophy (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 932, §5:53.4 People v. Broughton (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 307, §6:24 People v. Brown (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 602, §3:44.5 People v. Brown (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 352, §7:48 People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 5......