People v. Broussard

• Decision Date: 02 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. S024399,S024399
• Citation: 856 P.2d 1134,22 Cal.Rptr.2d 278,5 Cal.4th 1067
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 856 P.2d 1134 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Marc Edward BROUSSARD, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 278

22 Cal.Rptr.2d 278

5 Cal.4th 1067, 856 P.2d 1134

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Marc Edward BROUSSARD, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S024399.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Sept. 2, 1993.

[5 Cal.4th 1068] Jim Fahey, Davis, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama and Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Attys. Gen., Mark S. Howell, Aileen Bunney and Sharon Rosen Leib, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

KENNARD, Justice.

In 1982, California voters by initiative added a provision to the state Constitution establishing a new constitutional right: the right of every crime victim to obtain restitution from the person committing the crime for all losses suffered as a result of the criminal act. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The constitutional provision directed the Legislature to enact laws empowering trial courts to make restitution orders when sentencing convicted criminals. (Ibid.)

We granted review in this case to determine whether the Legislature has complied with this constitutional obligation to enact implementing legislation. Defendant Marc Edward Broussard, whose sentence for the crimes of theft and receiving stolen property directs him to pay restitution to the victims of these crimes, contends that the legislation passed to implement the constitutional right of restitution did not fully implement that right. He argues, in brief We reject defendant's contention. The legislation implementing the constitutional right of restitution, interpreted reasonably in light of its evident purpose, authorizes trial courts to order criminals to compensate all crime victims, whether their loss results from a physical injury or from the theft or destruction of their property.

[856 P.2d 1135] that under existing law a defendant convicted of a crime and denied probation may be ordered to pay restitution only when the criminal act caused physical injury to the crime victim. No restitution order is permitted, defendant maintains, when the loss to the crime victim is purely economic.

FACTS

In February 1991, defendant, who was facing criminal charges in at least four separate cases, entered into a plea bargain. He pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496, subd. (1)) and pleaded no contest to one count of grand theft (Pen.Code, § 487, subd. (1)). In return, all of the remaining charges were dismissed. On March 28, 1991, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve two years and eight months in prison, and ordered him to pay restitution totaling $5,545 ¹ to the victims of the three crimes of which he had been convicted. None of these crimes involved physical injury to the victim.

Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court lacked the power to order him to pay restitution to the victims. He argued that under the controlling statute, Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c), ² the trial court lacked the power to order him to pay restitution to the victims because none suffered physical injury. The Court of Appeal rejected the contention, concluding that under section 13967 restitution could be imposed for purely economic loss. We granted defendant's petition for review.

I

Under section 13967, subdivision (c), when a sentencing trial court denies probation to a criminal defendant, it must, unless there are "clear and compelling reasons" not to do so, order the defendant to pay restitution to any "victim" who "has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct...." ³ On its face, the statute mandates restitution whenever a crime victim has incurred economic loss regardless of whether the victim suffered any physical injury.

Defendant, however, argues that economic loss alone is insufficient, and that in addition the statute requires the victim to have suffered physical injury as a result of the defendant's criminal act. Defendant focuses on the word "victim" in the statute, turning to section 13960 for a definition Both section 13960 and section 13967 appear in the same article of the Government Code. (Art. 1, ch. 5, pt. 4, div. 3, tit. 2; hereafter referred to as "article 1.") Because of that placement, defendant argues that section 13960's narrow definition of "victim" governs that term as used in subdivision (c) of section 13967. Thus, defendant contends, to qualify under section 13967, subdivision (c) as a "victim" who "suffered economic loss," a person must be both a "victim" (one who suffered physical injury) and a person who "suffered economic loss." We disagree.

                of "victim." 4  Section 13960 states that "[a]s used in this article," a victim is a "person who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime," and [5 Cal.4th 1071] further states that a victim does not suffer an "injury" unless he or she suffers a "physical injury." 5
                

In construing a statute, our principal task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. (Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 989, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327.) We do so by first turning to the words themselves, giving them their ordinary meaning. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 15, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843; People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288.) Of course, " ' "language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend." ' " (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014.) In such circumstances, "[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act." (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299; see also Consumer Product Safety Com'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. (1980) 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 [statutory language is conclusive "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary"].)

Defendant argues that when section 13960 and subdivision (c) of section 13967 are read together, their "plain meaning" requires that the term "victim" contained in section 13967, subdivision (c) be defined

                [856 P.2d 1137] as set forth in section 13960, that is, as a person who has suffered a physical injury.  As we just noted, the plain meaning of a statute should not be followed when to do so would lead to "absurd results."  (People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 15, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843;  see also People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420;  Younger v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014.)   Here, as we shall explain, the voters, when they added article I, section 28, subdivision (b) to the California Constitution, placed the Legislature under a constitutional mandate to enact legislation directing trial courts to order defendants found guilty of criminal acts to pay restitution to all victims, not simply those who suffered a physical injury.  If we were to conclude that the Legislature knowingly disregarded this constitutional imperative, it would indeed be an "absurd" construction of the statute, and one we need not adopt.  The history of section 13967 shows that the Legislature intended to implement, not violate, its constitutional mandate
                

II

The history of section 13967 begins in 1965. In that year, the Legislature created a special fund to provide compensation to victims of violent crimes. (Stats.1965, ch. 1549, pp. 3641-3642; see also stats.1967, ch. 1546, pp. 3707-3709.) In 1973, the Legislature substantially revised the statutory scheme. (Stats.1973, ch. 1144, pp. 2348-2352.) As revised, the statutory scheme provided, among other things, for financial assistance from the restitution fund for medical expenses and lost wages to victims of violent crimes, with a maximum of $10,000 in each category. (§ 13965.) A new statute, section 13967, authorized a court-ordered fine of up to $10,000, to be paid into the restitution fund by any criminal defendant convicted of a violent crime that caused injury or death to the victim. The Legislature placed all of the provisions controlling the creation and administration of the restitution fund in article 1. Because the fund provided compensation only to victims of violent crimes, section 13960 defined the term "victim," for purposes of article 1, as one injured as a direct result of a violent crime.

In 1982, the voters of California passed Proposition 8, an initiative to reform the state's criminal justice system. The initiative included this amendment to the California Constitution: "It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer. [p] Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss, unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The amendment directed the Legislature to adopt implementing legislation. (Ibid.) The Legislature did so.

The new legislation, enacted in 1983, included: Penal Code section 1203.04, requiring trial courts to order restitution from defendants convicted of crimes and placed on probation; Welfare and Institutions Code section 729.6, imposing a similar requirement in all juvenile delinquency matters; Penal Code section 1202.4, requiring all persons convicted of a felony to pay a "restitution fine" of up to $10,000, payable into the restitution fund for victims of violent crime; and several laws designed to aid victims filing civil actions against persons convicted of crimes (§ 26820.4, subd. (b); former...