People v. Brown

• Decision Date: 27 March 2001
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. JACK BROWN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

96 N.Y.2d 80

749 N.E.2d 170

725 N.Y.S.2d 601

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. JACK BROWN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued February 6, 2001.

Decided March 27, 2001.

Christopher S. Anderson, Rochester, for appellant.

Terrence M. Parker, District Attorney of Allegany County, Belmont, for respondent.

Chief Judge KAYE and Judges SMITH, LEVINE, CIPARICK, WESLEY and GRAFFEO concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROSENBLATT, J.

The case before us involves the interplay of several themes in search warrant jurisprudence: the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, overbreadth, severability and the plain view doctrine. Here, a search warrant authorized police to search for four particularized items and "any other property the possession of which would be considered contraband." While executing the warrant, police discovered several weapons in plain view, none of them enumerated in the warrant. The issue before us is whether overbroad language can be severed from an otherwise valid warrant and the plain view seizure upheld. On the facts presented here, we hold that it can.

Defendant allegedly stole a tractor and asked his acquaintance, John DiDominico, to help him sell it. DiDominico owned a similar tractor and defendant wanted to switch Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) plates with DiDominico and transport the tractor out of the vicinity undetected. In return, defendant offered to cut DiDominico in on the sale proceeds.

DiDominico informed the police of defendant's plan. He told them how defendant stole the tractor from a nearby landowner, stashed it temporarily on State land and then moved it to a creek bed on DiDominico's property. He also told them that defendant was preparing to transport the tractor to nearby Warsaw, New York. According to DiDominico, defendant had already removed the VIN plate from the stolen tractor, as well as a steel tow chain and a "top link bar," part of a coupling device attached to the rear of the tractor. With DiDominico's consent, police inspected the tractor. By tracing a hidden VIN number stamped inside the tractor, they located the owner, who confirmed that it was stolen.

Police obtained a warrant authorizing them to search defendant's property for the stolen tractor's ignition key, the missing VIN plate, the steel chain, the top link bar and "any other property the possession of which would be considered contraband." (Emphasis added.) In a supporting deposition attached to the warrant, DiDominico stated that defendant kept a variety of firearms on his property and had mentioned to him that two of his handguns were unregistered.

While executing the warrant, the police discovered various guns, including a .357 magnum revolver and a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. The revolver was wrapped in plastic inside a floor vent in the rear bedroom of defendant's trailer. The semi-automatic was wrapped in cloth, hidden in a jar underneath his bathroom sink. Both guns were loaded. By file-checking the guns over the phone, the police learned that they were unregistered and seized them. The officers also seized six blasting caps they found in a floor vent in defendant's living room. They were not able to locate any of the items listed in the warrant. After indictment, defendant moved to suppress the guns and blasting caps, arguing that the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad in that it authorized a general search for "any other property the possession of which would be considered contraband." He also argued that the plain view doctrine did not authorize the seizure of the guns and blasting caps. Supreme Court held a suppression hearing in connection with the execution of the search warrant. The officers testified that at all times during the search they were looking for only the four enumerated items.

The court denied defendant's motion, holding that the overbroad language could be severed from the warrant and that the police lawfully seized the weapons in plain view while executing the valid (particularized) portion of the warrant. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. We likewise affirm.

I. Particularity and Overbreadth

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue except those "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the * * * things to be seized" (US Const 4th Amend). To meet the particularity requirement, the warrant's directive must be "specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer" (People v Darling, 95 NY2d 530, 537 [citing Andresen v Maryland, 427 US 463, 480; Marron v United States, 275 US 192, 196]). The requirement was designed to prohibit law enforcement agents from undertaking a general exploratory search of a person's belongings (see, Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 467

). Indeed, indiscriminate searches pursuant to general warrants "were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment" (Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 583).¹

Contrary to the People's contention, we hold that the warrant's final directive, authorizing the search for "any otherproperty the possession of which would be considered contraband" was overbroad. It granted the executing officers unfettered discretion to look anywhere and seize anything they thought "would be considered contraband." Had this been the only directive, the warrant would fail for lack of particularity and any evidence seized under it would be suppressed (e.g., People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396, 405

).

II. Severability

We must next determine whether the overbroad directive invalidates the entire warrant. The warrant described four items—the stolen tractor's ignition key, the missing VIN plate, the steel chain and the top link bar—with particularity sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Defendant argues that notwithstanding these particularized directives the additional authorization to search for "any other * * * contraband" poisoned the warrant as a whole, allowing a general search. The People ask us to sever the unparticularized directive and sustain the warrant insofar as it authorized the seizure of the particularized items.

It is now settled law that when a search warrant is partially but not wholly invalid, only the fruits of the invalid portion need be suppressed. We first recognized this in People v Hansen (38 NY2d 17 [1975]). There, the warrant authorized police to search a residence and a van for drug contraband. The Court determined that the police had probable cause to search the residence but not the van (see, People v Hansen, supra, at 19-20

). We severed the invalid portion (suppressing the evidence seized from the van) and upheld the valid portion (admitting the evidence seized from the residence) (see, People v Hansen, supra, at 21-22). As one commentator notes, it would be "harsh medicine indeed" if a partially valid warrant were to be invalidated in toto merely because it erroneously permitted a search for additional items (2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.6 [f], at 581-582 [3d ed]).

Attempting to distinguish Hansen, defendant contends that the severance doctrine cannot be applied to any warrant that contains a provision authorizing a general search. To deter general searches, defendant argues, all evidence seized during execution of an overbroad warrant should be suppressed.² We disagree and hold that the severance doctrine is equally applicable in the context of the partially overbroad warrant here. Indeed, other New York courts, relying on Hansen, have severed unconstitutionally overbroad directives like the one before us, upholding seizures under the remaining particularized portions (see, e.g., People v Conte, 159 AD2d 993, 994

[sustaining seizure of evidence particularized in warrant even though portion of warrant impermissibly authorized police to seize "other contraband"]; People v Niemczycki, 67 AD2d 442, 444 [sustaining seizure of particularized item even though warrant also authorized seizure of "any other contraband"]; People v Haas, 55 AD2d 683 [severing portion of warrant authorizing a search for "stolen goods" and admitting evidence particularly described in valid remainder]). By admitting evidence seized pursuant to the particularized portion, these courts strike what we regard as the proper balance between deterring overbroad searches and the need to introduce validly seized evidence in prosecuting criminal activity.

We have a further complication not present in Hansen. Unlike the case before us, Hansen involved the seizure of evidence specifically authorized in the valid (unsevered) portion of the warrant. Thus, there was no doubt that the evidence seized was not the fruit of the warrant's invalid directive. Here, however, the items seized were not enumerated in the warrant. Defendant argues that it is entirely possible that the guns and blasting caps were the fruits of the overbroad directive to seize "any other * * * contraband." This possibility, defendant contends, renders them inadmissible. Defendant relies on People v Giordano (72 AD2d 550). There, an otherwise particularized warrant also authorized a search for "any other contraband." While executing the warrant the police seized unenumerated weapons in plain view. The court refused to sever the overbroad directive and suppressed the weapons, stating that it was "impossible to tell" whether the police were executing the valid or invalid portion of the warrant when they seized the unenumerated items in plain view (People v Giordano, supra, at 551).

Under Giordano, the plain view doctrine is inapplicable as a matter of law whenever a warrant contains an invalid directive and the evidence seized in plain view fits within that directive. This rule is not called for by the Constitution or our decisional law.³ The better approach is to sever the invalid directive and apply the plain view doctrine to the valid remainder....